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In late 2005 China adopted a largely rewritten Company Law that radically increased the role of 
courts.  This study, based on a review of more than 1000 Company Law-related disputes 
reported between 1992 and 2008 and extensive interactions with PRC officials and sitting 
judges, evaluates how the Shanghai People’s Court system has fared over 15 years in corporate 
law adjudication.  Although the Shanghai People’s Courts show generally increasing technical 
competence and even intimations of political independence, their path toward institutional 
autonomy is inconsistent.  Through 2006, the Shanghai Court system demonstrated significantly 
increased autonomy.  After 2006 and enactment of the new Company Law, a new, if partial, 
limitation on institutional autonomy seems to be at work, as the Shanghai People’s Courts 
refused to accept or adjudicate claims explicitly permitted in the revised 2006 statute but not yet 
elaborated in Supreme People’s Court Regulation.  This reaction is perverse, as the same Courts 
had liberally adjudicated the same claims before 2006 without any statutory or Supreme 
People’s Court Regulatory authorization.  That strange dynamic illustrates the bureaucratic 
embedding of the People’s Courts in China’s modified authoritarian system and how such 
entrenchment can divert or constrain the progressive autonomy won by the same Courts in the 
formal legal system.  The conclusions have positive and negative aspects.  On the positive side, 
there is significant momentum toward ever-increasing competence and autonomy of the People’s 
Courts in Shanghai, at least for the application of corporate and commercial law.  On the 
negative side, a familiar paradox may be at work:  with formal substantive law and institutional 
“modernization” promised and even partially delivered alongside equally apparent failures in 
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the exercise of judicial autonomy, the result may be to de-legitimize the very institutions offered 
by the state and ruling Party as twin pillars of “modern” governance and “rule of law.”  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Political-legal reform in the People’s Republic of China (“PRC” or “China”) has lagged 
far behind the pace of economic system change and growth.  Corporate law theorists hold that in 
transitional jurisdictions where the judiciary is politically weak or subject to oppressive 
influence, lacking in autonomy, or simply without technical competence, then company law and 
corporate governance must be largely “self-enforcing.”2  By “self-enforcing,” theorists mean a 
corporate law design characterized by voting rules and transactional rights granted to firm 
investor-principals, and reliance on procedural protections, clear prohibitions and bright-line 
                                                 
2 Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 
1914 (1996) (stating “company law that depends on fast and reliable judicial decisions is simply out of the 
question”). 
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rules—all meant to operate ex ante as substitutes for less precise judicial standards applied ex 
post.  China’s first post-1949 company law of 19943 was a textbook example of such a regime.4  
Given the constraints acting on the PRC People’s Courts embedded in an authoritarian political 
system, and the burdens on China’s overworked public companies regulator, the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (“CSRC”), the 1994 statute’s self-enforcing design and negligible 
allowance for judicial involvement were appropriate.   
 In late 2005, the national legislature of the PRC passed a wholesale reworking of the 
1994 Company Law, effective as of January 1, 2006.5  In a head-spinning departure from the 
self-enforcing model of corporate law, the Company Law was suddenly filled with broad 
invitations for sophisticated judicial involvement.  Although there had been undeniable 
improvements in the quality of the PRC People’s Courts up to 2005, few would have judged 
such progress a match for the significantly increased demands placed on the judiciary.   
 With the 2006 change in mind, I analyze corporate law adjudication in Shanghai between 
1992 and 2008, focusing on People’s Court practice after adoption of the new Company Law.  
My purpose is to better understand the demonstrated technical competence, institutional 
autonomy and political independence of one major People’s Court system in the PRC.  In 
particular, I examine how Chinese law and judicial institutions work for Chinese domestic 
stakeholders and enterprises, and thus not foreign investors, foreign-invested enterprises, or 
foreign participants in the global capital markets purchasing stock in PRC issuers—where 
                                                 
3 Adopted at the 5th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People’s Congress on 
December 29, 1993 and effective January 1, 1994, and amended by the 13th Meeting of the Standing Committee of 
the Ninth People’s Congress on December 25, 1999 and the 11th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Tenth 
National People’s Congress on August 28, 2004.   
4 The definitive text of the 1994 Company Law [hereinafter 1994 Company Law] referred to here appears 
(adjacent to the 2006 Company Law changes) at ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO ZHENGQUANFA, ZHONGHUA 
RENMIN GONGHEGUO GONGSIFA XINJIU TIAOWEN DUIZHAO JIANMING JIEDU 217-416 (Gui Minjie ed., 2005).    
5 Amended by the 18th Meeting of the Tenth National People’s Congress on October 27, 2005.  The 
definitive text of the 2006 Company Law [hereinafter 2006 Company Law] referred to here appears in GONGSI FALÜ 
GUIZHANG SIFA JIESHI QUANSHU 1-1 (State Council Legislative Affairs Office ed., 2006) [hereinafter CLC].   
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Chinese law and legal institutions may serve different aims.  To do so, I analyze full-length 
corporate law opinions for more than 200 cases selected from a much larger sample,6 a decade’s 
worth of cases analyzed in a 2003 Shanghai Higher People’s Court “Opinion” on the 1994 
Company Law,7 and more than 760 disputes described in a 2007 report on cases implementing 
the Company Law in calendar year 20068—all for a very wide diversity of Shanghai jurisdictions 
and procedural postures.9  I also rely on extensive discussions with Shanghai Court officials 
currently handling such disputes.    
                                                 
6 Derived from annual Shanghai case collections reproducing opinions in civil and criminal cases 
aggregating over 500 case opinion sets (trial level and appellate level). 
7 Reviewing cases from the previous decade (1993-2003) [hereinafter Shanghai Company Law Opinion] in 
GONGSIFA YINAN WENTI JIEXI (DI SAN BAN) 231-36 (Shanghai Higher People’s Court ed., 2006) [hereinafter 
SHANGHAI HIGHER PEOPLE’S COURT 2006].   
8 Shanghai Higher People’s Ct. No. 2 Civil Division, Shanghai Fayuan Xin “Gongsifa” Shishi Yi Zhounian 
Sifa Diaocha [Judicial Investigation of Application of the New “Company Law” in the Shanghai Courts After One 
Year], GONGSI FALÜ PINGLUN (2007 NIANJUAN) 38-51, (2007) [hereinafter Shanghai Higher People’s Court No. 2 
Civil Division 2007 or Shanghai Company Law Report]. 
9 It should be noted that China, with a population of over 1.3 billion, has almost 200,000 judges (and 
approximately the same number of staff), more than 3,100 Basic-level People’s Courts, 406 Intermediate People’s 
Courts, 32 Higher People’s Courts and the large institution which is the Supreme People’s Court.  See Jerome A. 
Cohen, The Court of Mass Appeal, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 4, 2009, at A11 [hereinafter Mass Appeal 
Courts].  In that broader picture, the Shanghai Municipality and its judicial institutions are relatively unique, and 
thus judicial institution performance in Shanghai is not easily generalized to the entirety of the PRC or the Chinese 
world.  Shanghai shares some of the characteristics of other large coastal urban areas in China, such as Beijing, 
Tianjin, Chongqing (Yangtze River “coastal”), Guangzhou and Shenzhen.  At the same time, Shanghai—certainly 
when compared to Beijing and Shenzhen—is far more politically conservative across the board, and thus would be 
thought to have judicial institutions which act equally conservatively.  Shanghai is by the same token not “rural” 
(although some of the distant jurisdictions inside Shanghai Municipality are much more agricultural than the center 
or suburbs of Shanghai) and thus the People’s Courts act very differently than similarly placed rural institutions 
(such as the Qinghe County (Hebei Province) People’s Courts wonderfully analyzed by sociologist Liu Sida, see 
Sida Liu, Beyond Global Convergence: Conflicts of Legitimacy in a Chinese Lower Court, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
75 (2006) [hereinafter Beyond Convergence]).  Notwithstanding, the People’s Courts implicated in this study range 
very widely, and include every district in Shanghai, from the expected Pudong New District (situs of the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange) to far off Baoshan District and even Chongming Island, and extending to special courts established 
under separate ministries or departments, like the Shanghai Rail Transport Intermediate People’s Court.  As noted in 
the body of this article, in many cases the Shanghai People’s Courts are forced to deal with competing proceedings 
and/or prior rulings from other jurisdictions, especially judicial institutions—some very rural—in the Yangtze River 
Delta (no doubt this made necessary the interesting treaty-like document between adjacent People’s Court systems, 
the “Agreement for Cooperation and Exchange for Judicial Work by the People’s Courts in the Yangtze River Delta 
Region,” noted at Gu Wenjian, Jinrong Weiji Youle Kuaishen Tongdao [Financial Crisis Cases Have An 
Accelerated Hearing Channel], DONGFANG ZAOBAO [ORIENTAL MORNING NEWS], Dec. 3, 2008, at A6 [hereinafter 
Accelerated Hearings]).  
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 My case/opinion-centered study that focuses on the actual application of contemporary 
Chinese law in complex disputes is controversial.  Many scholars in China and abroad share the 
attitude articulated by one Beijing academic in 2006: 
Generally speaking, case law in the Anglo-American legal system is itself the law 
….  However, in a continental (civil) law system like China’s, law is constituted 
only by what the legislators promulgate as law; the decisions of the Chinese 
courts at present are not law, and such decisions are not in any way 
systematized.10   
 
Such scholars argue that there is no real value in studying Chinese cases and legal opinions, 
however unsystematically reported, because they are largely irrelevant in determining “what the 
law is.”  In their view, the law is found in statutes and regulation promulgated by various 
legislative and administrative authorities and easily reviewed in abundant statutory collections.  
While it is true that judicial pronouncements on specific cases in China have no binding or 
persuasive effect on other decision makers in the same (regional) People’s Court system, much 
less across the national judicial or regulatory system,11 a study of individual cases and the 
                                                 
10 This scholar is China University of International Business and Economics  Professor Wang Jun, see 
GONGSIFA ANLI XUANPING 1 (Ma Qijia ed., 2006) [hereinafter SELECTED COMPANY LAW CASES].  Ironically, the 
same Professor Wang Jun understands the nature of the pursuit embodied by this article, and approves, stating that 
only by reviewing actual cases by functioning judicial actors and seeing “the usual way” (“yiban zuofa”) in which 
the law is applied can the civil law system legislator understand how to make the law more perfect, in theory and in 
application.      
11 This is not to say that there have not been experiments in post-Reform China with case law as 
precedents—e.g., the 2002 experiments in the Zhengzhou Zhongyuan District People’s Court (judges encouraged to 
review prior cases on point in arriving at judgments) and the Tianjin Municipal Higher People’s Court (prior cases, 
confirmed as “leading” cases by the People’s Court system, can be referred to in arriving at judgments, but cannot 
be the “basis” for arriving at present judgments).  See WANG  SHIRONG, ZHONGGUO SIFA GAIGE YANJIU: PANLI YÜ 
FALÜ FAZHAN 151-52 (2006).  See also Xin He, Routinization of Divorce Law Practice in China: Institutional 
Constraints’ Influence on Judicial Behaviour, 23 INT’L J. L. POL’Y & FAM. 83, 104 [hereinafter Divorce Law 
Practice] (stating People’s Court judges in family law cases rely on “precedents of upper level courts”); Benjamin 
Liebman & Timothy Wu, China’s Network Justice, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 257 (2007) (noting People’s Courts judges rely 
on the decisions of People’s Courts in other jurisdictions).  The careful reader will understand that hostility to case 
law precedents cannot remain the case forever, especially as the Chinese People’s Courts continue to exercise 
increasing autonomy with respect to cases featuring complex fact patterns and requiring standard-applying doctrines 
like the corporate law that is the subject of this writing.  This development track is understood by PRC corporate law 
specialists, and legal specialists and economists concerned with legal and judicial reform in China.  See Huajie 
Minyuan: Sifa Ying Ti Zhengzhi Huachu “Huanchongdai” [Assuaging Popular Anger: The Judiciary Should Be A 
“Conflict Resolution Area” Substitute], NANFANG ZHOUMO [SOUTHERN WEEKEND], Nov. 13, 2008, at E31 
[hereinafter Assuaging Popular Anger] (providing an edited transcript of discussion on the judiciary, rule of law and 
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opinions they conjure is a very good way to understand how the People’s Courts apply China’s 
published norms.  Perhaps more important, my study of cases and legal opinions reveals a great 
deal about how PRC judicial officers understand their role, and the degree to which they are 
competent in applying complex doctrines when much is at stake.  
 A second objection to my study might be that data composed of formal judicial opinions 
results in an ill-advised emphasis on adjudication results expressed at their most symbolic.  But 
that symbolism and the articulated jurisprudence supporting specific results are critically 
important.  If interested in the way  Chinese judicial institutions operate in Chinese society, for 
Chinese citizens, and thus the degree to which they are understood to be competent, autonomous 
and/or independent, there is no better gauge than what the judiciary does formally and for public 
consumption.12  Accordingly, this study examines how complex legal doctrines are applied by 
the judiciary in Shanghai and entirely for public consumption.  Thus, I do not bother much with 
                                                                                                                                                             
the legal and political system by Zhang Sizhi, Wu Ge, Shen Hong, Cai Dingjian, Chen Ming, Qiu Feng, Mo Luo and 
others in November 2008); Luo Peixin, Judicial Plights in the Context of the New Company Law of China (May 26, 
2006) (unpublished paper, presented at The Third Asian Law Institute Conference, Shanghai, China) [hereinafter 
Company Law Plights].   
12 The range of such formal action in this study is extremely wide, and thus indicates that the action itself is 
not merely formal.  Most of the cases reviewed start at the District (or Basic) People’s Court level, whence they are 
subject to appeal (to the intermediate level) at the litigants’ initiative.  Less frequently cases skip over the District 
level and proceed directly to an Intermediate People’s Court, whence appeal is taken to the Shanghai Higher 
People’s Court.  In only one example in the sample,  Guangxi Xineng Sci.and Tech. Co. Ltd. v. Guotai Sec. Co. Ltd, 
2004 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 211-12 (Shanghai Higher People’s Ct., 2003), aff’d, Sup. People’s 
Ct. (2003), does the case reach the Supreme People’s Court.  Indeed, many of the case opinions indicate seemingly 
endless re-hearings, often by the same court level (but by different panels of judicial officers).  For instance, one 
2004–2006 case shows a dispute heard twice by the District People’s Court, an appeal to the Intermediate People’s 
Court, remand to the original District level, and then appeal again to the higher Intermediate People’s Court.  
Shanghai Bund City Real Estate Comprehensive Dev. Co. v. Zhu Haimao, 2006 HU ER ZHONG MIN SAN (SHANG) 
ZHONG ZI NO. 461 (Shanghai Jiading Dist. People’s Ct., 2004), reh’g granted, Shanghai Jiading Dist. People’s Ct. 
(2005), rev’d, Shanghai No. 2 Interm. People’s Ct. (No. 3 Civ. Div.) (2006), remanded to, Jiading Dist. People’s Ct. 
(2006), appeal filed, Shanghai No. 2 Interm. People’s Ct. (2006), available at http://www.hshfy.sh.cn/fyitw/gweb/.  
The Chinese courts do not hold to the fact-law distinction between trial and appellate courts known in the United 
States, England and many non-Chinese jurisdictions.  Accordingly, PRC appellate proceedings allow not only law 
pleadings, but de novo pleadings of law and fact.  Yet, in the many cases reviewed for the study, very few show 
reversal at the second level of adjudication.  Certainly higher-level courts demonstrate how free they are to 
undertake factual investigations de novo, and often apply different law and/or remedies, but the final judgments 
rarely change.  That being said, the proportion of reversals or differentiated judgments seems higher in corporate and 
commercial cases when compared to criminal prosecutions or criminal appeals.  All of this supports the belief that 
the Shanghai People’s Courts are not just “going through the motions” in corporate law adjudication and thus not 
operating merely in the “formal”. 
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difficult suppositions addressed in a good deal of current scholarship on the Chinese People’s 
Courts:  i.e., the reality of why People’s Courts’ act in the corporate law sphere, as difficult as 
that would be to generalize even in one (regional) People’s Court system.  For example, I make 
no effort here to divine the real influence of “Political-Legal” or “Adjudication” Committees13 
staffed by political cadres and non-lawyers, the extent to which judicial officials hearing specific 
pleadings actually decide cases or write the related opinions,14 political pressure or other factors 
at work in judicial responses or decision-making,15 the extent to which lower Court judges seek 
explicit guidance from higher-level People’s Courts prior to rendering initial trial-level 
judgments, the effect of cadre incentive systems on judges, the injuries done by high-levels of 
corruption and decision-making dominated by ex parte interactions, or any of the varied order of 
“social processes” at work.  With this focus I do not mean to disavow the idea that Chinese 
judicial institutions—and in fact the entire PRC legal construction program—operate on at least 
two levels:  (i) the symbolic/formal/globally-convergent/legitimacy-seeking, and (ii) the 
authentic/informal/indigenous/administration-requiring.16   
                                                 
13 See infra note 34.   
14 Although it should be noted that most post-2000 opinions in the Shanghai system declare the name(s) of 
the opinion-writing judge (and his or her or their secretary), and open with a declaration to the effect that the judges 
listed as opinion-writers were the same panel that heard the case. 
15 See Nicholas C. Howson, Judicial Independence and Company Law in the Shanghai Courts, in JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA: LESSONS FOR GLOBAL RULE OF LAW PROMOTION 134 (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2009) 
[hereinafter Shanghai Judicial Independence]; infra note 34. 
16 See Nicholas C. Howson, Rujiahua Zhi Si? [The Death of Confucianization?], 17 SHANGHAI SHUPING 
[SHANGHAI REVIEW OF BOOKS], Nov. 2, 2008, at 5; Beyond Convergence, supra note 9, at 91 (addressing the 
establishment of an “Administrative Division” in a local level Hebei People’s Court notwithstanding very few 
petitions for administrative review, “One might reasonably pose the question why the judicial reform bothered to 
establish the Administrative Division in the basic level courts.  Indeed, given the institutional constraints of 
administrative litigation, without considerations of legitimacy at the global level, the existence of the Administrative 
Division in Chinese basic-level courts would have become completely unnecessary.  This clearly indicates the 
symbolic meaning of the judicial organization, i.e., to create the outlook of a judiciary that is capable to check and 
balance the power of the government offices, as the judiciaries of the Western countries usually do.  Meanwhile, the 
demand for economic growth produces an equally important type of legitimacy for the Chinese government.  When 
these two types of legitimacy coincide in the judicial practice, the appropriated formal structure is decoupled from 
both.  The decoupling of the judicial organization, therefore, shows the conflict and compromise between the two 
major types of legitimacy that are vital for the Chinese state.”). 
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 This study is highly significant from at least two standpoints.  First, for corporate 
governance specialists, it provides a more accurate view of how effective corporate governance 
has developed in China, and might in the future develop in China and other transitional political 
economies.  With the start of massive corporatization of state-owned and collectively-owned 
assets in the PRC starting in the 1990s, China and the world recognized that the achievement of 
effective corporate governance presents real difficulties.17  Those obstacles threatened to embed 
in China’s corporate law, and corporate governance practices, systems that would work against 
aggregating capital for significant development, attracting investment from private and public 
capital markets, or creating market participants that in turn respond efficiently in a semi-
marketized economy.  Throughout it has been understood that all other available instruments of 
corporate governance must be supported by the application and enforcement of corporate law, 
usually ex post, by a competent judiciary.18  The 2005 amendments to the PRC Company Law 
were explicitly19 directed to this critically important amelioration of China’s corporate 
governance system.20  A review of corporate law adjudication in Shanghai over almost two 
                                                 
17 Not least because of extra-legal, political-economic, factors, such as the nature of China’s state-
capitalism (or corporatization-without-privatization), the inability to really separate “government” and “enterprise” 
(zhengqi fenkai in the Chinese idiom), and the huge incentives working against effective corporate governance.  See 
STOYAN TENEV, CHUNLIN ZHANG & LOUP BREFORT, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ENTERPRISE REFORM IN 
CHINA: BUILDING THE INSTITUTIONS OF MODERN MARKETS (2002) [hereinafter CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND 
ENTERPRISE REFORM]. 
18 See ZHONGGUO GONGSI ZHILI BAOGAO (2003 NIAN) (Shanghai Stock Exchange Research Center ed., 
2003) [hereinafter CHINA CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REPORT]; Donald C. Clarke, The Role of Non-legal Institutions 
in Chinese Corporate Governance, in TRANSFORMING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN EAST ASIA 168, 168-92 (Hideki 
Kanda, Kon-sik Kim & Curtis Milhaupt eds., 2008) [hereinafter Non-legal Institutions]; Benjamin Liebman & 
Curtis Milhaupt, Reputational Sanctions in China’s Securities Markets, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 929 (2009).  
19 See Cao Kangtai, Guanyu “Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsifa (Xiugai Caoan)” de Shuoming 
[Explanation Regarding “Company Law of the PRC (Amended Draft)”], in ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO 
ZHENGQUANFA, ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO GONGSIFA XINJIU TIAOWEN DUIZHAO JIANMING JIEDU 525-26 
(Gui Minjie ed., 2005) [hereinafter LAO Company Law Explanation].   
20 Thus, the present story for corporate governance specialists is also tangentially about identification of 
“functional” as opposed to merely “formal” convergence in business organization and corporate and securities law 
in a transitional political economic system like the PRC, a topic I have already explored in some detail in connection 
with China’s company law developments.  See Nicholas C. Howson, The Doctrine That Dared Not Speak Its Name: 
Anglo-American Fiduciary Duties in China’s 2005 Company Law and Case Law Intimations of Prior Convergence, 
in TRANSFORMING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN EAST ASIA 193, 193-254 (Hideki Kanda, Kon-sik Kim & Curtis 
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decades thus provides data on how China’s People’s Courts have done in supporting better 
corporate governance, and the real impact of formal change in substantive law that gives a 
greater role to court institutions.     
 Second, for legal institutional analysts this study offers a richer understanding of the 
function, operation and political-legal role of the judiciary in contemporary China’s non-
democratic, non-“rule of law” state, and the impact of substantive legal change and economic 
system change on the same institutions.  The Chinese People’s Courts are increasingly the 
subject of intense study by political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists and legal scholars.21  
Some of this work focuses on specific areas of adjudicatory (or mediation) practice, including 
hot button issues like family law,22 labor rights,23 environmental torts,24 and even constitutional 
                                                                                                                                                             
Milhaupt eds., 2008) [hereinafter Doctrine That Dared Not]; Ronald Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: 
Convergence of Form or Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329 (2001).  See also CHAO XI, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
AND LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA 222 (2009) [hereinafter CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND REFORM] (concluding 
Professor Xi Chao’s broader study of China’s corporate law); Iain MacNeil, Adaptation and Convergence in 
Governance: The Case of Chinese Listed Companies, 2 J. CORP. L. STUD. 289 (2002). 
21 For more generalized considerations, see RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE 
OF LAW 280-342 (2002) [hereinafter LONG MARCH]; Donald C. Clarke, Power and Politics in the Chinese Court 
System, 10 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1(1996) [hereinafter Power and Politics].  See also JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN 
CHINA: LESSONS FOR GLOBAL RULE OF LAW PROMOTION (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2009) [hereinafter CHINA 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE]; Pierre Landry, The Institutional Diffusion of Courts in China, in RULE BY LAW: THE 
POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 207-34 (Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., 2008) 
[hereinafter AUTHORITARIAN RULE OF LAW]; Xin He, Ideology or Reality? Limited Judicial Independence in 
Contemporary China, 6 AUSTL. J. ASIAN L. 213 (2004); Xin He, Why Do They Not Take Disputes? Law, Power and 
Politics in the Decision Making of Chinese Courts, 3 INT’L. J. L. IN CONTEXT 203 (2007) [hereinafter Not Taking 
Disputes]; Benjamin J. Liebman, China’s Courts: Restricted Reform, 191 CHINA Q. 620 (2007) [hereinafter 
Restricted Reform]; Beyond Convergence, supra note 9; Ethan Michelson, Climbing the Dispute Pagoda: 
Grievances and Appeals to the Official Justice System in Rural China, 72 AM. SOC. REV. 459 (2007).  For an 
influential PRC scholar and onetime head of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Legal Research Institute 
writing on Reform-era Courts generally, but in a foreign language, see Chunying Xin, What Kind of Judicial Power 
Does China Need?, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 58 (2003) [hereinafter What Kind of Judiciary].  Of course, many PRC 
public intellectuals like Professor He Weifang continue to advocate in favor of judicial reform.  See He Weifang, 
Sifa Gaige de Nanti Yü Chulu [Difficulties and the Way Out for Judicial Reform], NANFANG ZHOUMO [SOUTHERN 
WEEKEND], Sept. 17, 2008, at E31 [hereinafter Judicial Reform Difficulties]; He Weifang, Sifa Shenmihua Gai Ruhe 
Qüchu [The Way in Which We Should Eliminate Mystification of the Judicial Function], NANFANG ZHOUMO 
[SOUTHERN WEEKEND], Sept. 25, 2008, at E30 [hereinafter Judicial Mystification]. 
22 See Divorce Law Practice, supra note 11. 
23 See C.K. LEE, AGAINST THE LAW: LABOR PROTESTS IN CHINA’S RUSTBELT AND SUNBELT (2007) 
[hereinafter AGAINST THE LAW]; Mary Gallagher, “Use the Law as Your Weapon!” Institutional Change and Legal 
Mobilization in China, in ENGAGING LAW IN CHINA: STATE, SOCIETY AND POSSIBILITIES FOR JUSTICE (Neil J. 
Daimant, Stanley B. Lubman & Kevin O’Brien eds., 2005); Xin He & Su Yang, Street as Courtroom: State 
Accommodation of Labor Protest in Southern China, 44 L. & SOC’Y REV. 1 (forthcoming 2010). 
312 EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 5: 303 
 
rights and administrative law.25  One American scholar analyzes the incentives at work for 
Chinese judges, and their bureaucratic roles and responses.26  And some address comparisons 
between the workings of formal judicial institutions and local or central arbitration 
commissions.27  There is less writing on how the People’s Courts act in the commercial sphere,28 
and seemingly no writing whatsoever on corporate law (or securities law) adjudication—
notwithstanding a corporatization project more than two decades old.29  With respect to courts 
established in the embrace of authoritarian political regimes generally, two North American 
scholars have elaborated five primary functions:  (i) social control and the containment of 
political opposition; (ii) bolstering regime “legality”; (iii) support of administrative compliance 
and coordination of competing factions; (iv) the facilitation of trade and investment; and (v) the 
provision of cover for controversial policies.30  In this article I investigate how the Shanghai 
People’s Courts perform their more “horizontally-oriented” conflict resolution and investment 
facilitation functions, and to a lesser extent their regulatory and administrative compliance 
functions.  This is a sphere of activity far less provocative for China’s rulers than other more 
explicit areas of “vertical” political-social control, such as enforcement of the criminal law or 
                                                                                                                                                             
24 See Rachel Stern’s developing work on environmental litigation in China. 
25 See Keith Hand, Using the Law for a Righteous Purpose: Sun Zhigang and Evolving Forms of Citizen 
Action in the People’s Republic of China, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 114 (2006); Thomas E. Kellogg, 
Courageous Explorers? Education Litigation and Judicial Innovation in China, 54 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 141 (2007). 
26 This is Carl Minzner and his ongoing investigation of the workings of the cadre/judge “responsibility 
system” inside the People’s Courts.  See, e.g., Carl Minzner, Judicial Responsibility Systems for Incorrectly Decided 
Cases, in CHINESE JUSTICE: CIVIL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA  (Margaret Woo & Mary 
Gallagher eds., forthcoming 2010) [hereinafter Judicial Responsibility System]. 
27 See, e.g., Fuyong Chen, Striving for Independence, Competence, and Fairness: A Case Study of the 
Beijing Arbitration Commission, 18 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 313 (2009) (examining local arbitration commissions 
(using the Beijing Arbitration Commission), as distinguished from the long-standing China International Economic 
and Trade Arbitration Commission charged with hearing “foreign-related” disputes). 
28 See Xin He, Enforcing Commercial Judgments in the Pearl River Delta of China, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 419 
(2009). 
29 But see Doctrine That Dared Not, supra note 20.  See also Non-legal Institutions, supra note 18 
(providing a consideration of necessary judicial institutions substitutes in respect of public company corporate 
governance).  
30 AUTHORITARIAN RULE OF LAW, supra note 21, at 4. 
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police action against anti-Party critics.31  This approach is not meant to ignore the political-
ceremonial role the People’s Courts have even in corporate law adjudication.  That role is as 
substantial today as it was in Chinese imperial history (via the magistrate), and is in the criminal 
law sphere in contemporary China, and corporate law adjudication in foreign jurisdictions.32  In 
fact, Company Law application in the Chinese People’s Courts has extremely significant 
implications for politics and governance in the PRC.  Since 1994 the Chinese People’s Courts 
have been given the power and technical bases to act in corporate and commercial law cases with 
a degree of expertise and autonomy far beyond the traditional role of Communist-era courts, and 
in cases where very significant material interests are at stake.  Not only that, but the PRC Courts 
are now increasingly asked to apply the newly-justiciable corporate law in disputes arising 
between independent commercial actors and other more privileged political-economic actors, 
thus challenging judicial institutions to act “independently” as well as “autonomously”.  
Consider for example a shareholder’s lawsuit against a company director who represents the 
interests of a state agency-related or municipal government controlling shareholder—or the 
controlling shareholder itself33—for breach of corporate fiduciary duties, abuse of the 
corporation, shareholder oppression, or impermissible related party transactions.  Here the PRC 
judiciary is called upon to protect legal rights and norms under the PRC Company Law against 
                                                 
31 It is also a sphere where at least the Shanghai People’s Courts appear to engage in markedly lower rates 
of mediation.  Of the total number of corporate law cases accepted by the Shanghai People’s Courts in 2006, for first 
hearing cases, 55.21% gave rise to judgment, 11.46% were concluded via mediation, and 33.33% were subject to 
some kind of Court order.  For cases subject to re-hearing and/or appeal, judgments were issued in 43.41% of the 
cases, 55.13% were subject to Court order and a paltry 1.46% were resolved through mediation.  Shanghai Higher 
People’s Court No. 2 Civil Division 2007, supra note 8, at 37-51.  Sociologist Liu Sida notes that this percentage of 
mediation is significantly lower than in other civil cases in the PRC nationally.  E-mail from Liu Sida, Assistant 
Professor of Sociology and Law, University of Wisconsin–Madison, to Nicholas C. Howson, Assistant Professor of 
Law, University of Michigan Law School (Feb. 2009) (on file with author). 
32 Consider the clear “political ceremonial” role allowed the Delaware Court of Chancery in the most 
authoritative corporate law adjudication in the United States, embodied in that same Court’s high-flying rhetoric and 
articulation of legal standards matched with non-application of the standards it proclaims.  See In re The Walt 
Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del.Ch. 2005). 
33 Permitted under the 2006 Company Law, where controlling shareholders explicitly have fiduciary duties 
to the corporation and by implication to the minority shareholders.  See 2006 Company Law, supra note 5, art. 20.  
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the superior power and influence of the government (or Party which controls the state), which 
power has for many years included absolute domination and funding-control of the People’s 
Courts hearing the case.34  As the PRC Courts act autonomously in this apparently mundane 
                                                 
34 This article does not focus on questions of (explicit) political independence.  For a consideration of that 
aspect, see Shanghai Judicial Independence, supra note 15, invoking as explicit examples of demonstrated judicial 
(political) independence:  (i) the 2003 case where a District level Shanghai People’s Court says it will enforce the 
contractual rights of the occupier of a condemned industrial site against a local government agency (which offers as 
a defense against payment of compensation under the contract the idea that it signed the contract on behalf of the 
District People’s Government and did not perform accordingly pursuant to the “instructions of higher levels” 
(shangji zhishi))  because the contract was validly formed under law, and the rights arising thereunder shall “receive 
the protection of the law” (implicitly against the government)—Shanghai Kangpaisi Enter. Gen. Co. v. Shanghai 
Mun. Admin. of Industry and Com. Huangpu Dist. Branch, 2004 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 352 
(Shanghai No. 2 Interm. People’s Ct., 2001), aff’d, Shanghai Higher People’s Ct. (2003); and (ii) the 2007 veil-
piercing case which demonstrates court action against the interest of what is almost certainly a large (and central) 
state player, but presents the more expected circumstance of the Shanghai People’s Courts acting against the interest 
of a non-Shanghai government political power—Shanghai Huaxin Elec. Wire and Cable Co. v. China Tietong 
Group Co., 2007 HU GAO MIN ER (SHANG) ZHONG ZI No. 145 (Shanghai No. 2 Interm. People’s Ct. (No. 4 Civil 
Division), 2007), aff’d, Shanghai Higher People’s Ct. (2007), available at http://www.hshfy.sh.cn/fyitw/gweb.  See 
also the cases noted infra notes 220 to 224 and accompanying text, where the Shanghai People’s Courts lecture 
former collective leaders metamorphosed into directors and officers with fiduciary duties, and forbidding the use of 
corporatization and corporate law as a shield for misappropriation of public assets.  With respect to the political 
independence inquiry, there seems to be general agreement that “about 80%” of all People’s Court judges are 
Communist Party members.  See Wu Yulian (Hunan Higher People’s Ct.), Faguan Sanzhong Shenfen [The Three 
Statuses of Judges], DONGFANG FAYAN, Oct. 12, 2008, available at http://www.dffy.com/fayanguancha/sd/200810/ 
20081012174522.htm.  Yet, there continues to be a good deal of controversy and some mystery over the function of 
the so-called “Political-Legal Committee” (zhengfawei) or “Adjudication Committee” (shenpan weiyuanhui) inside 
the People’s Court system generally, and with respect to judgments rendered on individual cases specifically.  At 
their worst, such Committees—staffed with officers devoid of legal training—are understood as purely Party 
political institutions deciding cases without reference to the considered views of the judges actually hearing the case 
and solely on political (or worse bureaucratic “quota”) grounds.  At their sunniest, the Political-Legal Committees 
are merely lofty administrative organs that issue policy guidance to the Court system under their jurisdiction.  The 
truth is probably somewhere in the middle, and seems to vary among jurisdictions and the nature of the cases. It is 
certain that such Committees function for each of the three levels in the Shanghai People's Courts system—thus, 
inside the Higher People's Court, the Intermediate People’s Courts, and each Basic (or District) Level People’s 
Court.  According to officials at the Shanghai People’s Courts, most corporate and commercial case opinions are 
first drafted and then “filed” (beian) with the Adjudication Committee.  Yet the same officials noted that if a specific 
case is “particular” (teshu), potentially impacting on social stability (wending) or “conflicting authority”, the panel 
actually hearing the case and its People’s Court level will seek the opinion of the Political-Legal Committee before 
accepting or deciding a case.  These same officials declared that the notion of “conflicting authority” does not 
accommodate political conflict or political-economic privilege, but instead “conflicting jurisdictions” (for instance 
CSRC regulation or the application of the corporate law by the Courts).  It is difficult to know how realistic that 
appraisal is, and the extent to which Courts acting alone or under the power of such Committees would not be very 
sensitive to the political background of the cases and litigants who appear before them.  The normative dispute about 
politicization of the People's Courts, and these Committees, in China as joined between Beijing University Law 
School colleagues Zhu Suli and He Weifang is described in Beyond Convergence, supra note 9, at 81 (n.4), 92-93, 
and Not Taking Disputes, supra note 21, at 203-04.   
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context of corporate and commercial law it must have significant implications for the exercise of 
the judicial power independently in other, more sensitive, contexts.35 
 This article makes two central claims with respect to corporate governance and 
development of the judiciary.  First, this survey confirms what must now be understood 
universally among corporate convergence scholars:  formal convergence is only one aspect of 
how and whether legal and governance systems work.  Perhaps more important is the way in 
which path-dependent factors determine the articulation, implementation and ultimately the 
relevance of proclaimed legal norms and procedural mechanisms.  This article shows that law 
does indeed matter in the Chinese People’s Courts, and that the same Courts evidence a startling 
degree of competence, but pre-existing indigenous forms, specific political-economic forces, and 
institutional strength and legitimacy are strongly determinative of how apparently convergent 
forms are implemented.  Given this data, there remains a very serious question as to whether 
corporate governance can operate in China over the long term to support more secure property 
rights, large-scale investment, efficient allocation of capital, and ultimately growth.  Second, the 
formal grant of greater autonomy to, and implicitly greater demands on the competence of, the 
Chinese judiciary has brought about somewhat contradictory effects.  On one hand, the invitation 
to action by the People’s Courts assumed in the successive Company Law statutes has 
undeniably spurred the Courts towards far greater autonomy than ever before.  On the other 
hand, there are very serious limitations—both instructed within the bureaucratic system and self-
                                                 
35 I note that the study relates to a time period during which the rhetoric applied to the People’s Courts has 
shifted significantly, and in a direction which most outside observers understand as away from professionalism and 
autonomy.  The Supreme People’s Court’s Second Five-Year Program for the People’s Courts released in late 2005 
exhibited extraordinary emphasis on judicial professionalism and autonomy.  Starting in late 2007, with a change in 
leadership at the top of the Supreme People’s Court (from Xiao Yang to Wang Shengjun), and confirmed in the 
March 25, 2009 Third Five-Year Program for the People’s Courts, the Supreme People’s Court now exhorts the 
People’s Courts towards a revivified “mass line” (called “democratic”) style.  See Mass Appeal Courts, supra note 
9; Nicholas C. Howson, Review of Xiaoqun Xu, Trial of Modernity: Judicial Reform in Early Twentieth-Century 
China, 1901-1937, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 518 (2009) [hereinafter Trial of Modernity Review]; Judicial Reform 
Difficulties, supra note 21; Judicial Mystification, supra note 21.   
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initiated—on the autonomy of the Shanghai People’s Courts in the course of their Company Law 
work.  Again over the long term, the resulting paradox may challenge the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of the Chinese legal system for some of its most important consumers.   
 In this article I proceed as follows:  In Part II, I describe the character of China’s modern 
company law establishment, and explain the expanded justiciability of PRC corporate law under 
the 2006 statute.  In Part III, I detail indications of increasing autonomy of the Shanghai People’s 
Courts in Company Law adjudication from 1992 to 2008, but note one counter-intuitive 
constraint at work after promulgation of the 2006 Company Law.  In Part IV, I offer evidence 
contrary to the data presented in Part III, and show how the Shanghai People’s Courts act with 
diminished autonomy in applying the corporate law over the same period.  Part V concludes, 
with a Table of Selected Cases and Case Reports Appendix (detailing the full proceedings and 
judgments in several highly indicative corporate law cases) appended. 
 
II. THE 2006 COMPANY LAW – A NEW JUSTICIABILITY 
 
 China’s formal company law after 199236 was always an expression of the standard 
shareholder-oriented form of corporation and thus in formal terms a vindication of pre-2008 
Global Financial Crisis declarations of the “end of corporate law history.”37  China’s company 
law model was fashioned in this manner for two reasons.  First, the Law was intended to respond 
to the demands of domestic and globalized capital markets on Reform-era China—where the 
purpose of corporate establishments was to attract finance from value-seeking shareholders 
                                                 
36 See Nicholas C. Howson, China’s Company Law: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?  A Modest 
Complaint, 11 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 127, 128-29 (1997) (arguing that the 1994 Company Law  —with respect to 
indicia of “shareholder-orientation”—was a retreat from the better form of “Opinion on Standards for Companies 
Limited by Shares” of May 1992) [hereinafter One Step Forward]. 
37 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001). 
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wielding non-state, domestic and foreign, capital.38  Second, the adoption of a shareholder-
oriented company model was the continuation of China’s century-long quest for “modernity” so 
often synonymous with the formal adoption of perceived state of the art institutions, laws and 
practices.39 
 In form at least, the 1994 Company Law exemplified the so-called “self-enforcing” 
corporate law model.40  The company statute and much of the elaborating regulation and 
mandatory forms promulgated by the CSRC were characterized by voting rules and transactional 
rights granted to direct participants in the Chinese corporation, reliance on procedural protections 
and clear prohibitions with respect to disfavored transactions, and bright-line rules meant to 
operate ex ante—all as substitutes for judicial or administrative actor-articulated standards 
applied ex post.41  For instance, the 1994 Company Law required supermajority (two thirds) 
shareholder approval before any change to the company’s articles of association.42  Likewise, the 
CSRC’s 1997 “Mandatory Articles of Association for Overseas Listing Companies” provided for 
class-like shareholder negative veto rights,43 and separate CSRC regulations issued in 2004 
                                                 
38 So, in fact a partial vindication of Professor Coffee’s ideas of more than a decade ago.  See John Coffee, 
The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and its Implications, 93 
NW. U. L. REV. 641 (1999).  This appraisal of the philosophical underpinnings of China’s corporate law system 
remains true, even if China’s first try at a modern company law statute in 1993-94 was in parts self-contradictory 
and simply incoherent.  See One Step Forward, supra note 36. 
39 See WELLINGTON K.K. CHAN, MERCHANTS, MANDARINS, AND MODERN ENTERPRISE IN LATE CH’ING 
CHINA (1977); DOU JIANMIN, ZHONGGUO GONGSIZHI SIXIANG YANJIU (1999) [hereinafter HISTORY OF CHINESE 
CORPORATE THOUGHT]; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ENTERPRISE REFORM, supra note 17, at 9-10; WANG 
XIAOWEN, GONGSI LUN (1930); C.K. Lai, The Qing State and Merchant Enterprise: The China Merchant’s 
Company, 1872-1902, in TO ACHIEVE SECURITY AND WEALTH: THE QING IMPERIAL STATE AND THE ECONOMY 
(J.K. Leonard & J.R. Watts eds., 1991);  Donald C. Clarke, Corporate Governance in China: An Overview, 14 
CHINA ECON. REV. 494, 494-95, 497-502 (2003); William C. Kirby, China Unincorporated: Company Law and 
Business Enterprise in Twentieth-Century China, 54 J. ASIAN STUD. 43, 44 (1995). 
40 Separately, one would look at the 1994 statute as something steeped in a business regulation model of 
law, and distant from the “enabling” forms seen in most Western jurisdictions after the rise of the corporate form at 
the end of the 19th century. 
41 See Doctrine That Dared Not, supra note 20.   
42 1994 Company Law, supra note 4, arts. 106 & 107. 
43 This at a time when PRC corporate law did not recognize different “classes” of shares (and so these 
mandatory corporate charters speak to different “types” (leibie) of shares).  See Mandatory Articles of Association 
for Overseas Listing Companies, CLC, supra note 5, at 4-43.  This Articles of Association-based provision alone 
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required disinterested “public” shareholder approval of related party transactions, including the 
wide-scale abuse whereby controlling shareholders burdened their dominated public subsidiaries 
with guaranty obligations benefiting such shareholders.44  Consistent with this self-enforcing 
orientation, little in the 1994 Company Law invited judicial participation in sorting out corporate 
disputes, whether for external actors (e.g., corporate veil piercing) or internal participants (e.g., 
traditional corporate fiduciary duties). 45 
 The rationales supporting a self-enforcing design in early 1990s China—and many would 
say mid-2000s China—are easily understood.  The PRC’s reforming judicial structures were and 
are widely perceived from abroad as being subject to political and other extra-legal pressures, 
and lacking in real sophistication or competence.46  The criticisms openly leveled at the PRC 
People’s Courts from inside China then and now range even more widely, and include their 
perceived lack of political independence,47 lower courts seeking guidance from higher courts 
prior to rendering judgments,48 funding by and resulting deference to local government and Party 
                                                                                                                                                             
proved effective in defeating a PRC central government-disfavored Singapore Airlines bid to acquire something 
close to control of China Eastern Airlines Company, Limited in 2007.  See Barry Naughton, SASAC and Rising 
Corporate Power in China, 24 CHINA LEADERSHIP MONITOR 1 (2007). 
44 China Securities Regulation Commission, “Guanyü Jiaqiang Shehui Gongzhonggu Gudong Quanyi 
Baohu de Ruogan Guiding” [Several Provisions on Protection of the Rights of Public Shareholders], (2004)  ZHENG 
JIAN FA No. 118, issued Dec. 7, 2004—which in the case of guarantees for affiliates notably came after an 
immediately useless 2003 CSRC and Ministry of Finance Notice stipulating merely super-majority board approval 
or majority shareholder’s meeting approval:  “Guanyü Guifan Shangshi Gongsi Yü Guanlianfang Zijin Wanglai Ji 
Shangshi Gongsi Duiwai Danbao Ruogan Wenti de Tongzhi” [Notice on Several Issues Concerning the 
Standardization of Funds Transfers Between Listed Companies and Their Affiliates and the Provision  of Guarantees 
by Listed Companies], (2003)  ZHENG JIAN FA No. 56, issued Aug. 28, 2003, ¶ 2(3) (“useless” because the board 
was dominated by the controlling shareholder, likewise the approving full shareholders’ meeting).   
45 The notion of “self-enforcement” of course goes merely to the design of a legal stipulation, and does not 
mean that apparently self-enforcing mechanisms do not need some degree of external enforcement, or that such 
external enforcement is actually implemented. 
46 See LONG MARCH, supra note 21; CHINA JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 21; Power and Politics, 
supra note 21; Not Taking Disputes, supra note 21; Restricted Reform, supra note 21; What Kind of Judiciary, supra 
note 21.    
47 See CHINA JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 21; Judicial Reform Difficulties, supra note 21; 
Assuaging Popular Anger, supra note 11.  
48 See Zhao Lei, Qüxiao “Anjian Qingshi” Husheng Zai Qi [Calls Raised Again to Eliminate “Seeking 
Guidance in Cases”], NANFANG ZHOUMO [SOUTHERN WEEKEND], May 5, 2009, at 
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organs,49 inability to act against local governments whether to enforce central government policy 
or vindicate the asserted rights of citizen individuals or groups,50 powerlessness against the 
police and secret police,51 inability to accept cases which involve large numbers of plaintiffs and 
thus have implications for “social stability,”52 wide-ranging corruption,53 lack of technical 
competence,54 writing of opinions before judicial hearings and trials,55 lack of due process and 
procedural consistency,56 endless procedures, appeals, and frustrations which do not deliver a 
resolution or compensation much less anything resembling “justice”,57 understaffing and over-
                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/epaper/nfzm/content/20090521/ArticelA03002FM.htm [hereinafter Seeking 
Guidance] (stating that the Supreme People’s Court is drafting a prohibition on the practice). 
49 On November 28, 2008, a proposal by the Central Legal-Political Commission to create central funding 
for all People’s Courts—the “Opinions of the Central Legal-Political Commission on Several Issues in the 
Deepening of Reform in the Judicial System and Work Mechanism”—was endorsed by the Chinese Politburo.  If 
implemented, this may prove a very important step in creating a more independent judiciary in the PRC and 
unhooking the Courts from the power and influence of their current paymasters, the local governments and Party 
organs in jurisdictions where they sit.  See Chen Huan, Fayuan Jingfei Yilai Tongji Caizheng Zhi Sifa Daishang 
Difang Zhuyi Yinji [Court Relying on Local Government Financing and Administration for Funding Leads to Signs 
of Localism], SINA.COM, Dec. 5, 2008, at http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2008-12-05/015716785000.shtml (considering 
this proposed reform and its perhaps limited effect).  See also Wang Jianxun, Celiang Shehui de Hexie Chengdu 
[Measuring the Degree of Harmony in Society], DONGFANG ZAOBAO [ORIENTAL MORNING NEWS], Dec. 7, 2008, at 
D24 [hereinafter Measuring Harmony].  Yet, as noted above, this proposed reform will have to battle with the new 
“mass line” for PRC judicial institutions pushed by the Supreme People’s Court and the Communist Party.  See 
Trial of Modernity Review, supra note 35; Mass Appeal Courts, supra note 9; Judicial Reform Difficulties, supra 
note 21; Judicial Mystification, supra note 21. 
50 See Assuaging Popular Anger, supra note 11.  
51 Id. 
52 See Xiao Han, Qunti Peichang: Quanyi Yü Jiuan [Mass Compensation: Rights and Stability], CAIJING, 
Oct. 13, 2008, at 152 [hereinafter Mass Compensation]. 
53 See Qin Xudong, Wang Xiaolin & Luo Jieqi, Zuigaofayuan Fuyuanzhang Huang Songyou Shean Beicha 
[Supreme People’s Court Vice President Huang Songyou’s Case Involvement Investigated], CAIJING, Nov. 10, 2008, 
at 141; Yang Tao, Xiaochu “Zhixing Fubai” Libukai Jiancha Jiandu [The Elimination of “Corrupt Enforcement” 
Cannot Be Separated from Oversight by the Procurate], DONGFANG ZAOBAO [ORIENTAL MORNING NEWS], Nov. 12, 
2008, at A23.  In the first article, a discussion of the Autumn 2008 fall of Supreme People’s Court Vice-President 
Huang Songyou on alleged corruption charges, the authors invoke the prosecution and dismissal of the President of 
the Guangdong Province Higher People’s Court, the former President of the Hunan Higher People’s Court, the 
President of the Liaoning Province Higher People’s Court, and many examples from the Intermediate and Basic (or 
District-) level People’s Courts. 
54 See Judicial Mystification, supra note 21.  
55 Chen Dongli, “Zaochan Panjue” You Hai Sifa Gongxin [Public Confidence in the Judiciary is Hurt by 
“Pre-Manufactured Judgments”], XIN JING BAO [NEW CAPITAL NEWS], Oct. 27, 2008, at A03. 
56 See Assuaging Popular Anger, supra note 11.  
57 See Zhao Lei, Zhongguo Zuimangde Fating [China’s Busiest Court], NANFANG ZHOUMO [SOUTHERN 
WEEKEND], Dec. 4, 2008, at A7 [hereinafter China’s Busiest Court]; Assuaging Popular Anger, supra note 11. 
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stretched resources,58 failure to provide long-promised public hearings of cases,59 enforcement 
“chaos”,60 and much more.  
 Given the perceived state of the Chinese judiciary and the resulting requirements for a 
self-enforcing model of corporate law, the extensive amendments to the 1994 Law announced in 
November 2005 were startling.  The new Company Law unveiled in late 2005 expanded the 
original statute with two new chapters, reduced the original 230 Articles to 219, and added 44 
new Articles, amended 91 Articles and completely eliminated 13.61  Most important, in the 
words of corporate law scholar Professor Liu Junhai the 2006 Company Law radically changed 
and augmented the “justiciability” (or “litigability” (kesuxing)) of China’s corporate statute and 
the entire corporate governance regime.62  Similar views issued from the No.2 Civil Division of 
the Supreme People’s Court in Beijing, that part of the Court bureaucracy charged with hearing 
corporate law cases, with its statement that the new form of Company Law “strengthened the 
justiciability of civil [law] rights protection” (zengqiang minshi quanyi de kesuxing).63  The 
Shanghai Higher People’s Court echoed these academic and Court leadership pronouncements in 
                                                 
58 See China’s Busiest Court, supra note 57.  
59 See Assuaging Popular Anger, supra note 11. 
60 See Ye Doudou & Luo Jieqi, Qiuzhi “Zhixing Luan” [Seeking Remedies for “Enforcement Chaos”], 
CAIJING, Nov. 24, 2008, at 136. 
61 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Minerting Fuzeren Dui “Guanyü Shiyong ‘Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 
Gongsifa’ Ruogan Wenti de Guiding (Yi)’” Da Jizhewen [Responsible Person of the Supreme People’s Court No. 2 
Civil Division Responds to Journalists’ Questions Regarding “Several Regulations on Questions Regarding 
“Regarding Implementation of the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (First)], in ZUIGAO RENMIN 
FAYUAN GUANYÜ GONGSIFA SIFA JIESHI (YI), (ER) LIJIE YÜ SHIYONG 4 (Xi Xiaoming ed., 2006) [hereinafter 
SPC Press Conference 2006].    
62 LIU JUNHAI, XIN GONGSIFA DE ZHIDU CHUANGXIN: LIFA ZHENGDIAN YÜ JIESHI NANDIAN 622-31 
(2006).  Separately, and less relevant to this study, the 2006 Company Law is far more “enabling” than its 
predecessor, although it preserves some significant color of a business regulation statute.   
63 SPC Press Conference 2006, supra note 61, at 4-5.   
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200764 and noted the concrete effect of such formal changes, saying that the amended statute 
“must affect the way in which corporate cases are heard by the judiciary.”65  
 Behind this seemingly radical change of direction was the fact that corporate governance 
at China’s corporate entities—whether small privately-held close corporations and corporate 
partnerships, or the largest corporatized SOEs now publicly-held companies with shares listed in 
Shanghai, Hong Kong, London, or New York—was not functioning.  In the private, closely-held 
context, corporate establishments became the fertile setting for fraud, looting and asset stripping, 
minority shareholder oppression, and firm mismanagement.  In the public company setting, 
notwithstanding mandatory PRC and foreign disclosure requirements, the power of PRC and 
foreign securities and exchange regulation, and the ready threat of foreign securities class action 
suits, the situation proved even worse.  Public companies were run as instruments meant to 
conveniently attract passive capital from the stock markets and serve the needs of a controlling 
shareholder (often an identity of the central or local government) and its insider appointees (just 
as often political cadres advancing through a nomenklatura (Party personnel) system divorced 
from the reach of corporate or securities law),66 with ample opportunity for conflicted 
transactions or outright stealing of assets.67  The deficit understood in the public company 
context contributed to both the perception and reality of dysfunctional capital markets, 
understood as either a “casino” (in the famous words of Chinese reform economist Wu Jinglian) 
or an insiders’ playground with an informational asymmetry overwhelmingly in favor of such 
                                                 
64 Saying: the revised Law “makes a new arrangement with respect to the civil law rights and privileges” in 
relation to the corporate form, and opens a new era of “private-ordering”.  Shanghai Higher People’s Court No. 2 
Civil Division 2007, supra note 8, at 37. 
65 Id.  
66 Nicholas C. Howson, China’s Restructured Commercial Banks: The Old Nomenklatura System Serving 
New Corporate Governance Structures?, in CHINA’S EMERGING FINANCIAL MARKETS: CHALLENGES AND GLOBAL 
MARKETS 123-63 (Martha Avery, Cai Jinqing & Zhu Min eds., 2009). 
67 See STEPHEN GREEN, CHINA’S STOCKMARKET: A GUIDE TO ITS PROGRESS, PLAYERS AND PROSPECTS 
118-53 (2003) [hereinafter CHINA’S STOCKMARKET]; LAO Company Law Explanation, supra note 19, at 528-30.  
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insiders and their political masters.68  As the Shanghai Stock Exchange summed up in an 
influential 2003 “China Corporate Governance Report,” China’s corporate governance regime 
and implementation were deeply flawed because of lopsided shareholding structures, the failure 
to divorce the government from enterprise ownership and control, weak self-regulation and 
enforcement, obstacles in the way of shareholders seeking legal protections, insider control of 
enterprises and personnel appointments, weak external governance mechanisms,69 a failed 
information disclosure regime, lack of a fiduciary duties “culture” and supporting ethical 
commercial norms, and a passive media failing to communicate reliable information to the 
public.70  As recognized by everyone from external analysts to the highest reaches of the PRC 
government,71 one of the ways to reverse this disturbing development path was to involve the 
judiciary and the legal system, as an adjunct to the over-stretched securities regulator and the 
perhaps equally over-taxed but certainly technically deficient and politically-conflicted People’s 
Procurate (China’s public prosecutor).72  As the Shanghai Stock Exchange said in respect of 
public company governance:   
                                                 
68 LAO Company Law Explanation, supra note 19, at 529-30.  This in turn led to fears that the Chinese 
domestic capital markets would become so discredited as to produce a classic expression of George Akerlof’s 
“lemons problem” and resulting “death spiral” or simply fail in achieving rational allocation of capital to the most 
efficient enterprises (as an adjunct to the commercial banking system, itself reforming only very slowly).  See 
George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 
(1970); Bernard Black, The Core Institutions That Support Strong Securities Markets, 55 BUS. LAW. 1565 (2000).  
At the end of 2008, announcing emergency measures to deal with the worldwide financial crisis, President Hu Jintao 
as chair of the Central Economic Commission declared five key measures designed to increase growth and domestic 
demand, one of which showed the same, continuing, concern about corporate governance, market supervision and 
investor participation.  In that statement, President Hu outlined policy initiatives designed to raise the quality of 
listed companies and their level of corporate governance, strengthen regulation of the securities markets, and 
increase investor trust in the same market and its issuers.  See Jingji Yunxing Kunnan Zengjia Zhongyang Paiding 5 
Da Renwu Quebao Zengchang [Difficulties in  Operation of the Economy  Increase: The Central [Authorities] Set 
Out Five Major Tasks to Ensure Growth], DONGFANG ZAOBAO [ORIENTAL MORNING NEWS], Dec. 11, 2008, at A2-
A3 (describing the policy statement as reported in the Shanghai papers).   
69 The market for corporate control, creditors’ rights and a bankruptcy regime, institutional investors, and 
executive compensation. 
70 CHINA CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REPORT, supra note 18, at 20-32.  
71 LAO Company Law Explanation, supra note 19, at 525-26.  
72 This was recognized explicitly in the public remarks by the President of the Changning District People’s 
Court, who noted that the People’s Court had to get involved in ex post standards application to attack phenomena 
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In practice, the punishment of illegal behavior by insiders as well as securities 
markets violations reflects an emphasis on administrative and criminal 
responsibility instead of civil liability, an over-reliance on government regulation 
and intervention, an unsatisfactory implementation of shareholders’ civil actions, 
and the difficulties faced by investors in search of legal protection.73   
 
Thus, the Shanghai Stock Exchange report proposed, China had to (i) amend the Company Law 
and the Securities Law to give wider scope for self-enforcing regulation and shareholder action 
(over administrative oversight and the business regulation model), (ii) strengthen the 
effectiveness, economic structure, and enforceability of judicial remedies to allow shareholders 
to seek such remedies in a low-cost and effective way, and thus participate fully in corporate 
governance, (iii) provide additional substantive remedies (and claims) for shareholders in the 
Company and Securities Laws, and (iv) expand the private right of action for securities markets 
fraud and manipulation and include public interest plaintiffs.74    
  Interestingly in light of the findings below regarding the relative absence of public 
company cases in the Shanghai Courts,75 the initial response to these governance failures and the 
                                                                                                                                                             
like opportunism and shareholder oppression which are simply impossible to regulate ex ante.  Remarks of President 
Zou Bihua (Dec. 5, 2008) (notes on file with author). 
73 CHINA CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REPORT, supra note 18, at 23.   
74 CHINA CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REPORT, supra note 18, at 135.  The Shanghai Higher People’s Court 
recognized this in its own 2007 report on application of the Company Law.  While admitting that the 1994 statute 
was “incomplete”, it also emphasized that that the decade before 2006 saw problems with China’s company law and 
corporate governance systems far more serious than mere incomplete, sloppy or contradictory drafting, including 
rampant fraud visited on shareholders, controlling shareholder opportunism, misuse of corporate limited liability to 
harm the legitimate rights of creditors, etc.  As the Court somewhat poignantly observes, “the great tide of the 
marketized economy called out for… a company system which the Courts might actually be able to implement. . .”  
SHANGHAI HIGHER PEOPLE’S COURT 2006, supra note 7, at 1.  See the lovely echo of this energy in a 2007 Shanghai 
case, where a defendant controlling shareholder’s defense against piercing the corporate veil to the defendant—to 
the effect that “the [piercing] claim is not a proper subject of litigation [as against administrative fiat]”—is roundly 
rejected by the Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court and the Shanghai Higher People’s Court, both of which 
endorse the idea that this is precisely the kind of remedy civil parties are to avail themselves of under the new 2006 
Company Law.  See Shanghai Huaxin Elec. Wire and Cable Co. v. China Tietong Group Co., 2007 HU GAO MIN ER 
(SHANG) ZHONG ZI NO. 145 (Shanghai No. 2 Interm.  People’s Ct. (No. 4 Civil Division) 2007) (upholding the 
assertion and adjudication of parent liability “by litigation” and invoking “misuse of the corporate form” under 
Article 20 of the 2006 Company Law), aff’d, Shanghai Higher People’s Ct. (2007), available at 
http://www.hshfy.ah.cn/fyitw/gweb. 
75 See infra notes 308 to 356 and accompanying text. 
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consequent push for judicial involvement came not from the People’s Courts, the PRC 
legislature, or even the CSRC, but the new class of public shareholders themselves.76  After 
1998, and much to the judiciary’s discomfort, they flooded the PRC Courts with claims of false 
or misleading disclosure claims against securities issuers.77  Those developments, and the 
pressure starting with public shareholders and belatedly supported by the CSRC, and channeled 
by the Supreme People’s Court, resembled the effort almost 10 years later to make the PRC 
Company Law itself “justiciable”.  Yet, mere justiciability of the Company Law was not enough, 
for the institutions applying the corporate and commercial law had to be seen as acting 
autonomously, or even independently.  As economist Chen Zhiwu noted in a Chinese language 
essay arguing for increased justiciability of shareholders’ claims under China’s corporate law 
and securities regulation, “if the judiciary [in China] does not have real independence, then 
                                                 
76 The People’s Court system, led by the No. 2 Civil Division of the Supreme People’s Court and working 
with a good many of the PRC’s top corporate law academics, later had an instrumental role in re-forming the 
Company Law and expanding justiciability. 
77 See Jiang Shuzhen v. Hongguang Indus. Co., Ltd., (Shanghai Pudong New District People’s Ct., 1998), 
appeal denied, (1999) in XU ZHAOHONG & ZHENG HUI, ZHENGQUANFA ANLI JINGJIE 58-64 (2001) [hereinafter 
COLLECTED SECURITIES CASES].  The Supreme People’s Court, pushed behind the scenes by a then very reformist 
and pro-rule of law CSRC, finally relented with a half-hearted permission in January 2003, allowing a shareholders’ 
private right of action to sue for compensation on false or misleading disclosure claims (but only after determination 
of liability by the securities regulator or the criminal justice system), and without providing a civil action for stock 
manipulation, insider trading, or insiders’ breach of corporate fiduciary duties.  As noted below, the securities 
regulatory authority (and the state, through the People’s Procurate) still monopolizes regulation of every other aspect 
of public company and securities regulation and enforcement aside from false or misleading disclosure—such as 
stock manipulation or insider trading.  Only in the Fall of 2008—in the midst of a “strike hard” campaign against 
stock manipulation—did the CSRC first levy a fine exceeding US$1.5 million for stock manipulation (coupled with 
confiscation of US$2 million in illegal profits, and reference for criminal prosecution) in the Shoufang Financial 
Advisory-Wang Jianzhong “pump and dump” case.  See Xin Shanlun, Shoufang Zhangmenren Beifa Zhongshen 
Jinru – Zhengjianhui Tongshi Gei Wang Jianzhong Kaichu Zuida Geren Fa Mo Dan 2.5 Yi Yuan [Shoufang 
Manipulator Penalized by Being Barred for Life – At Same Time CSRC Levies Against Wang Jianzhong Largest 
Fine for Individual and Confiscates RMB 25 Million Yuan], DONGFANG ZAOBAO [ORIENTAL MORNING NEWS], Nov. 
22, 2008, at A23 [hereinafter Manipulator Penalized].  This fine and reference for criminal prosecution was the high 
point in a six month period which saw very vigorous enforcement by the CSRC against market manipulators, 
corrupt funds trading, false disclosure, insider trading, etc., including the public investigation of the trading activities 
of one of China’s commercial superstars, the Chairman of the Guo Mei (“Gomei”) electronics concern.  See Bannian 
Lai Zhengjianhui Xingzheng Chufa Jueding [Administrative Penalties and Decisions Imposed by CSRC Within the 
Past Six Months], DONGFANG ZAOBAO [ORIENTAL MORNING NEWS], Nov. 24, 2008, at B9 (detailing CSRC 
enforcement actions and fines levied between April 8 and November 21, 2008) [hereinafter Penalties Imposed by 
CSRC]. 
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investors will not be able to enjoy real and reliable legal protections.”78  And if investors do not 
enjoy, or perceive they may not enjoy, “real and reliable” legal protections of their property 
interests in firms, the corporate and capital markets system will fail or at least not measure up to 
its historic task in ensuring efficient capital allocation and growth.   
 Although the new Company Law preserves or augments certain of the prior self-
enforcing mechanisms imposed in the 1994 Law and CSRC regulation,79 it also presents an 
entirely new world for the often dismissed PRC judiciary.  A partial list of important changes 
which constitute unprecedented invitations to private party litigation and extensive judicial 
involvement includes:  
• Ex post corporate veil-piercing and liability for controlling shareholder oppression 
(Article 20); 
 
• Ex post liability for related party transactions that injure the company (Article 21);  
 
• Ex post invalidation of shareholders resolutions which violate law or administrative 
regulations (Article 22);80 
 
• Shareholders’ right of action for ex post invalidation of board or shareholders resolutions 
or voting arrangements in violation of law or administrative regulations (Article 22); 
 
• Shareholders’ right to sue for financial information and accounts of limited liability 
companies (Article 34); 
 
• Shareholders’ right to put shares back to company in the event of non-distribution of 
dividends (Article 75); 
 
                                                 
78 Chen Zhiwu, Sifa Duli, Panlifa Yü Gudong Quanyi Baohu [Judicial Independence, Case Law and the 
Protection of Shareholders’ Rights], in CHEN ZHIWU, FEILIXING KANFEN 207 (2008).  Dr. Chen might have crafted 
the statement to say “investors will not believe they enjoy real and reliable legal protections.”  
79 Such as the disinterested shareholder approval of controlling shareholder guarantees now written into 
Article 16 of the 2006 Company Law, supra note 5: “Where a company intends to provide a guarantee for a 
company shareholder or the company’s actual control party, the matter must be subject to a resolution adopted by a 
shareholders’ meeting or the shareholders’ general meeting.  The shareholder or actual control party specified in the 
preceding paragraph shall not be permitted to participate in the vote on the matter specified in the preceding 
paragraph.  The resolution shall be passed if it is voted for by other shareholders attending the meeting who hold 
more than half of the voting rights.”    
80 A function specifically and properly assigned to the Delaware Court of Chancery sitting in equity under 
the DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 225. 
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• Shareholders’ right to sue for appraisal rights if no agreement reached on put of equity in 
limited liability companies (Article 75); 
 
• Ex post liability of directors for corporate actions which cause serious damage to the 
company (and the director has not recorded an objection) (Article 113); 
 
• Shareholders’ right to sue for declaration that stolen, lost or destroyed share certificates 
are void (Article 144); 
 
• Ex post applied corporate duty of care and duty of loyalty standards (Article 148);  
 
• Company’s right to sue directors and officers for restitution of “earnings” gained after 
violation of duties of loyalty determined ex post (Article 149); 
 
• Derivative action against company officers and directors, either by supervisory board 
members on behalf of the company, or as initiated by the shareholders directly if the 
supervisory board does not act (Articles 54, 119 & 152); 
 
• Shareholders’ direct right of action to sue directors, officers and supervisory board 
members for violations of law, regulation or company articles of association where 
shareholders are injured (Article 153); and 
 
• Court powers to declare companies bankrupt after conforming liquidation (Articles 181-
191). 
 
Perhaps the most significant provision in this impressive list is Article 153 of the 2006 Company 
Law, which effectively confers on shareholders of companies limited by shares81 a very broad 
right of action to sue senior management of companies limited by shares for any breach of law or 
regulation or the company’s articles of association.  This provision makes any breach of law, 
regulation or stipulated procedure by the company, or the senior management that directs it, 
actionable, so long as it causes injury to plaintiff shareholders.  Some reputable PRC corporate 
law scholars even see in the 2006 Company Law the most robust invitation to judicial action 
imaginable, for instance divining a private right of action to sue for the creation and enforcement 
                                                 
81 The Chinese Company Law allows for two primary corporate forms: the “company limited by shares” 
(gufenyouxian gongsi) and the “limited liability company” (youxianzeren gongsi).  The Company Law also 
authorizes a sub-form of the latter type of company, the SOE-friendly “wholly state-owned company” which has no 
shareholders’ meeting and is invested in by state administrative departments, and a third form, the “single person 
company”.  The company limited by shares is like a joint stock company in Western parlance, and the limited 
liability company like a close corporation or corporate partnership.    
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of CSR standards (Article 5) or even limitations on Communist Party involvement in firm 
management (Article 19).82  In sum, although the 2006 Company Law undeniably “modernized” 
China’s corporate law and governance system, and ironed out some of the incoherencies of the 
1994 statute,83 it also squarely addressed what many have seen as the central problem in 
governance reform:  the role and power of the Chinese judiciary. 
 
III. AUTONOMY DEMONSTRATED 
 
 “Autonomy” in the context of the PRC People’s Courts should be distinguished from two 
other important concepts: “competence” and “independence.”  Competence is the easier concept 
to understand, and goes to the technical expertise of judicial institutions in evaluating fact- and 
law-complex disputes.  For example, competence refers to the extent to which Chinese People’s 
Courts can adjudicate corporate fiduciary duty-of-care cases with the very rich facts and difficult 
application of law those entail, or equally subtle and complex inquiries allowing ex post 
corporate veil-piercing and disregard of a bedrock corporate attribute (shareholder limited 
liability).84  The idea of autonomy is distinct from “independence,” although the two concepts 
                                                 
82 Company Law Plights, supra note 11.   
83 For instance, elimination of the plain silly Article in the 1994 Company Law which declared that state-
owned assets contributed to a corporate legal person by the state remained the property of the state—giving the state 
an apparent property-rights windfall, continuing ownership of the assets and the equity interest in the intervening 
company representing the contributed assets.  See 1994 Company Law, supra note 4, art. 4. 
84 The Shanghai’s Courts evidence increasing competence in adjudicating corporate law matters over the 
period 1992-2008, albeit with the occasional mistake.  Interestingly, there is no necessary connection between the 
relative superiority (level) of a court in the Shanghai judicial bureaucracy and its demonstrated competence in 
corporate law cases:  oftentimes the opinions show that the most expert adjudication is performed at very local 
District People’s Court levels, far away from the sophisticated action in Pudong New District, Jingan District, 
Luwan District, etc. or the exalted premises of the Shanghai Higher People’s Court.  This indicates that the quality 
of judicial personnel is an important variable, and technically proficient judges are produced by good education and 
a superior intellect, just as the very highest reaches of a particular People’s Court system may be staffed with less 
well-educated, less intellectually-accomplished, individuals who are essentially senior bureaucrats and political 
cadres.  The competence exhibited is indeed rather impressive given the very difficult hand dealt to Chinese judges 
generally in this area:  a Company Law which largely regulates partnerships, apparent restrictions against using the 
corporate statute on large-scale companies limited by shares with a diffuse shareholder base, and the maddening 
presence in the Chinese business landscape of “other” business associations—ranging from entities “left over from 
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may be stops on a single continuum.  Autonomy in the PRC context is the ability of the judicial 
institution to act with its own institutional authority, even if in Chinese parlance it has no “legal 
basis” (falü yijü) to act.85  Examples of demonstrated autonomy presented in this article are the 
many cases in which the Shanghai People’s Courts accept, hear and decide cases on corporate 
fiduciary duties, corporate veil piercing, invalidation of board or shareholders’ resolutions, and 
shareholder petitions for company dissolution when the PRC judiciary has no legal basis for such 
action.86  Judicial independence is still another idea, and goes to the ability of courts and judicial 
officers to act independently from, and against the interest of, political or military power.  For an 
example of how these three conceptual distinctions operate, or not, together, consider how a 
People’s Court might invoke sophisticated corporate law doctrine and apply evidentiary analysis 
in evaluating competently a veil-piercing claim, act autonomously in accepting and then actually 
piercing the corporate veil to assert liability against the controlling shareholder of a debtor 
company without an authorizing legal basis, and yet be unable to act independently in 
proclaiming much less enforcing that legal responsibility if the controlling shareholder is a far 
more powerful instrument of the state, Party or military.87   
 I also note up front that judicial autonomy, however construed or implemented, may not 
be an undiluted good.  This principle is especially true in a transitional economic and political 
culture such as the PRC’s, with just-developing notions of professionalism, public interest and 
                                                                                                                                                             
history” to spontaneous business associations with no basis in PRC law or regulation.  See infra notes 181 to 204 
and accompanying text. 
85 So this is to be distinguished from a perhaps distinct conception of judicial autonomy familiar from the 
study of common law courts, the practice of such courts actually creating substantive legal principles which 
elaborate on, or even contradict, statutory or regulatory norms.  
86 Which in the PRC context would be making those disputes justiciable in the Company Law, or by 
provision of an explicit framework via Supreme People’s Court judicial “Regulations” (sifa guiding) (incorrectly 
called judicial “Opinions” (sifa jieshi)).  See infra notes 91 to 105 and accompanying text.   
87 As I have noted elsewhere, see Shanghai Judicial Independence, supra note 15, it is extremely difficult 
to assess the degree of political independence exercised by the People’s Courts via the study of case outcomes or 
formal judicial opinions because the operative political background to any specific case is so opaque and not easily 
determined by judgment review or interactions with judges, lawyers or litigants. 
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ethics.  In China, unconstrained autonomy may see judicial institutions departing from 
promulgated legal bases and regulatory controls as a result of corruption, bribery, or ex parte 
pressures.88  This phenomenon is ever-present in contemporary China for all state institutions, 
not just the People’s Courts.  Nonetheless, given the absolute lack of institutional autonomy in 
the People’s Court system historically, any demonstration of autonomy in the modern era should 
be deemed a generally positive development for the legal system and its institutions as a whole.   
 The five sub-sections of this Part III show the multiple ways in which the autonomy of 
the Shanghai People’s Courts between 1992 and 2008 in corporate law matters is expressed:  (a) 
judicial implementation of the Company Law or corporate law principles without statutory or 
bureaucratic authorization, or departing from such authorization;89 (b) application of the law and 
remedies using common law or equity court-like powers; (c) refusal to apply badly-formulated 
corporate law to de facto partnerships; (d) articulation and protection of an autonomous sphere 
for commercial firms and market activity;  and (e) application of corporate law with significant 
authority, often to invalidate or instruct re-arrangement of privately-ordered contractual or 
business arrangements. 
 
A. Adjudication in the Absence of Statutory or (Supreme People’s Court) Regulatory 
Authorization; Caveat Autonomy 
 
 Prior to adoption of the 2006 Company Law, the Shanghai People’s Courts took up the 
challenge offered them in the early 1990s and—in relative terms—ran amok in accepting, 
hearing, adjudicating and pronouncing judgments on matters they were not formally authorized 
to accept.  Specifically, they applied doctrines and procedural innovations such as corporate 
fiduciary duties, corporate veil-piercing and derivative lawsuits all without explicit authorization 
                                                 
88 I am indebted to Professor Mary Gallagher, University of Michigan, for this insight. 
89 Including application of the 2006 Company Law and remedies to pre-2006 claims, but with an 
“authorization-constraint” posited after January 1, 2006.  See infra notes 153 to 156 and accompanying text. 
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in statute or judicial regulation, or even after authorization in statute, without the specific legal 
basis usually provided by Supreme People’s Court Regulations.90  The picture after 2005 and the 
passage of the 2006 Company Law is more complex and indicates some retreat on judicial 
autonomy.     
As the apex of the bureaucratic system which is the Chinese judiciary, the Supreme 
People’s Court in Beijing is empowered to issue three kinds of explanatory documents with the 
power of law or regulation:  “Explanations” (jieshi), “Regulations” (guiding), and “Approving 
Responses” (pifu).  Explanations provide substantive elaboration of statute or “Law” (fa) passed 
by the national legislature,91 such as the PRC Company Law.  Regulations give judicial 
institutions at all levels direction on how to apply Law to certain cases or with respect to certain 
common problems, often focusing on procedural aspects.  Approving Responses are the Supreme 
People’s Court’s answers to submissions regarding specific application of law problems arising 
from Provincial or Province-level Municipality92 Higher People’s Courts and People’s Liberation 
Army Courts.93  
As of this writing, the Supreme People’s Court has issued only two judicial Regulations 
concerning the 2006 Company Law, the first94 on how the People’s Courts should handle actions 
                                                 
90 These developments are consistent with one positive implication of the effect on the Chinese judiciary of 
new economic law and forms in the partially-marketized PRC.  See Doctrine That Dared Not, supra note 20. 
91 In Chinese “fa”, to be distinguished from State Council regulation or other normative documents or 
norms adopted by local-level People’s Congresses (guiding, banfa, tiaoli, guizhang, etc.).  See Perry Keller, Sources 
of Order in Chinese Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 711 (1994).  
92 Shanghai Municipality is one such “directly-administered” Municipality, treated like a Province (or 
Autonomous Region)-level jurisdiction.  
93 Xi Xiaoming & Jia Wei, Zhengquan Shichang Xujia Chenshu Minshi Peichang Zhidu [The Civil 
Compensation System for Misrepresentation in Securities Markets], 3 ZHENGQUAN FALÜ PINGLUN [SECURITIES 
LAW REVIEW] 33, 41-47 (2003).  Thus, the two Supreme People’s Court pronouncements on the 2006 Company 
Law issued as of this writing, universally—and incorrectly—referred to as “Judicial Explanations” (sifa jieshi) in 
common discussion, academic articles and journalist treatments, are actually “Regulations” because they seek to 
explain the application of certain parts of the Company Law (or in the case of the first set of Regulations, the use of 
both the 1994 Company Law and its 2006 successor) in the People’s Court bureaucracy. 
94 ZUIGAO RENMIN FAYUAN GUANYÜ GONSIFA SIFA JIESHI (YI), (ER) LIJIE YÜ SHIYONG 3 (Xi Xiaoming 
ed., 2006) [hereinafter SPC COMPANY LAW REGULATIONS].  See also the use of these Regulations in a post-January 
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which straddle January 1, 2006, and the second95 on shareholder petitions for judicial dissolution 
of companies.96    
Regulations can impact the application of a statute like the Company Law in at least four 
important ways:  (i) providing a specific authorization for a claim or action already given a legal 
basis in Law; (ii) forbidding certain kinds of claims which the People’s Courts might be tempted 
to accept, even where there is a colorable legal basis in Law; (iii) providing new bases for 
justiciability over and above what is set forth in Law; and (iv) prodding the People’s Court to re-
start acceptance and adjudication of cases they have voluntarily or by instruction ceased 
accepting.  For an example of the first category, Supreme People’s Court Regulations issued in 
January 2003 provided a specific legal basis for shareholders’ claims against issuers, controlling 
shareholders, underwriters and accountants arising from false or misleading disclosure in the 
public stock markets.97  That this authority is invested in judicial Regulations is also exemplified 
by the fact that the new PRC Bankruptcy Law remains basically unimplemented by the Chinese 
judiciary because there are no Regulations on that Law.98  In the second, restrictive, category, are 
the same January 2003 Regulations alluded to above permitting shareholders’ suits for false or 
misleading disclosure which also explicitly prohibited acceptance of shareholders claims on 
                                                                                                                                                             
1, 2006 case in Yu Xiaoqi v. Shanghai Changxin Accountancy Ltd., ZHONGGUO ZUIJIN XIN GONGSIFA – DIANXING 
ANLI PINGXI 185 (Huai Xiaofeng ed., 2007) [hereinafter ANALYSIS OF NEW CASES], (Shanghai Changning Dist.  
People’s Ct. and Shanghai No. 1 Interm.People’s Ct., 2006), (showing the use of these Regulations in a post-January 
1, 2006 case that contested shareholder resolutions passed at a dissident special shareholders’ meeting that occurred 
pre-January 1, 2006; mandating application of of only the 1994 Company Law to party claims). 
95 SPC COMPANY LAW REGULATIONS, supra note 94, at 7-11. 
96 A third set of Regulations, on the derivative action mechanism inserted into the 2006 Company Law at 
Articles 54, 119 & 152, is expected soon. 
97 ZUIGAO RENMIN FAYUAN GUANYÜ SHENLI ZHENGQUAN SHICHANG YIN XUJIACHENSHU YINFA DE 
MINSHI PEICHANG ANJIAN DE RUOGAN GUIDING [SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT SEVERAL REGULATIONS REGARDING 
CIVIL COMPENSATION CASES ARISING FROM FALSE DISCLOSURE IN THE SECURITIES MARKETS], Jan. 9, 2003,  FA SHI 
No. 2, CLC, supra note 5, at 5-25 – 5-29 [hereinafter MISREPRESENTATION IN SECURITIES MARKETS REGULATIONS].  
98 The Supreme People’s Court started work on Regulations on the Bankruptcy Law in October 2007.  See 
Dou Yumei, Qiye Pochanfa Sifa Jieyi Qicao Gongzuo Qidong [Work Starts on Drafting a Judicial Interpretation for 
the Enterprise Bankrutpcy Law], July 11, 2007, available at 
http://chinacourt.org/html/article/200707/11/256034.shtml.  This does not mean that the Courts do not accept any 
bankruptcy cases, only that they have great difficulty in handling these cases to a conclusion. 
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other aspects of securities markets fraud, such as stock manipulation or insider trading.99  
Similarly, the 2nd Judicial Regulations on the 2006 Company Law issued in May 2008 forbid the 
acceptance of shareholder petitions for dissolution of PRC companies based on factors outside of 
those listed in the statute.100  In the third, liberalizing, category, are the parts of the same 2nd 
Judicial Regulations on the 2006 Company Law which provide for expanded justiciability of 
creditors’ claims against firms in liquidation.101  For the fourth category, Regulations which 
“prod” the People’s Court into action or a re-start of adjudication work voluntarily abandoned, a 
good example is the continuing strife over settling a Regulation which might re-commence 
adjudication of creditors’ actions on non-performing loans sold by commercial banks to asset 
management companies, and then on to third party purchasers of discounted bundles of such 
debt.102  To date, the Supreme People’s Court has managed to produce only a document which is 
                                                 
99 MISREPRESENTATION IN SECURITIES MARKETS REGULATIONS, supra note 97.  The Supreme People’s 
Court subsequently removed this restriction in May 2007, and has permitted actions on claims other than 
misrepresentation, including claims for insider trading and manipulation (but always subject to the prerequisite rule 
set forth in the 2003 Supreme Court Regulations).  See Zhengquan Minshi Peichang: Zhengjianhui Bu Cha, Fayuan 
Bu Shen [Civil Lawsuits for Damages in Securities Cases: If the Securities Regulatory Commission Does Not 
Investigate, the Courts Will Not Try the Case], CAIJING, Sept. 11, 2007, available at 
http://www.Caijing.com.cn/2007-09-11/100029938.html.   
100 Examples of such non-permitted bases are claims arising from:  frustration of shareholders’ information 
rights, non-distribution of dividends, sustained company losses, failure to achieve a going concern or invalidation of 
the corporate business license.  (By implication, it would seem that Chinese shareholders after 2006 sued for firm 
dissolution on precisely these grounds.) 
101 These expanded claims are:  creditors’ claims seeking People’s Court confirmation of debts owed by a 
company subject to dissolution-liquidation, and creditors’ claims asserting the joint and several liability of 
shareholders and controlling shareholders arising from their misfeasance or manipulation of residual assets in the 
dissolution and liquidation process.  The most significant liberalizing Regulation of all might have been the 
Regulations finalized in Beijing a short time before adoption of the 2006 Company Law.  In 2003 and prior to the 
2005 amendments resulting in the 2006 Company Law, the Supreme People’s Court had distributed for comment the 
very extensive “Regulations on Several Issues Regarding the Hearing of Corporate Law Disputes (Draft for 
Comments)” which anticipated large portions of the 2006 Company Law including corporate veil piercing, 
derivative actions, shareholders’ information rights, fiduciary duties, liquidation procedures, invalidation of 
corporate resolutions, etc.  If the Company Law had not been amended in late 2005, and this Comment Draft had 
been actually issued by the Supreme People’s Court as a Regulation, then that Regulation would have provided the 
basis for a whole host of claims and procedures going far beyond the spare legal bases explicitly set forth in the 
1994 Company Law, effectively changing the Company Law entirely by Supreme People’s Court Regulation. 
102 Because of a 2004 report by the head of the Hubei Provincial Higher People’s Court warning of 
“irregular activity” and the “loss of state assets” through such transfers of non-performing loans, the People’s Courts 
simply stopped accepting, hearing or ruling on such cases in early 2005.  In February of 2005, central departments 
under the State Council (including the Supreme People’s Court, the commission overseeing state-owned assets, the 
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far weaker than a Regulation (or Explanation or Approving Response)103 merely urging 
subordinate People’s Courts to start accepting creditors’ claims on such transferred non-
performing loans.104   
Significant controversy continues regarding the normative effect of Supreme People’s 
Court pronouncements.  In the view of many judicial officers and academics, these Supreme 
People’s Court Regulations not only craft and make concrete the application of Laws 
promulgated by the National People’s Congress, but are a condition precedent to application of a 
specific Law by any institution governed by the Supreme People’s Court.  Thus, many Chinese 
academics, lawyers and judges hold firmly to the idea that important provisions of the 2006 
Company Law, such as corporate fiduciary duties, veil-piercing, or the derivative law suit 
mechanism, may not be employed or even invoked until Regulations specifically addressing the 
provision in question have been issued.  The Supreme People’s Court naturally supports this 
view as it assures competence and coherence in application of new Law, but also buttresses the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Ministry of Finance, the China Banking Regulatory Commission and the People’s Bank of China (China’s central 
bank)) produced a draft proposal of considerations on the question, but only in April of 2006 did the Supreme 
People’s Court produce a “comment draft” for the proposed Regulations.   In October 2007, that draft was reported, 
over the strenuous objections of some of the key central players listed above, to the State Council for approval, 
which approval was never rendered because of the controversy between leading departments.  By October of 2008, 
the Supreme People’s Court was still unable to produce a final set of Regulations on the important question, and 
able only to muster “Important Meeting Minutes” (huiyi gaiyao) after a contentious and rather secretive meeting on 
Hainan Island attempting to address the State Council’s concerns on the matter.  See Zhang Yuzhe & Zhang Man, 
Buliangzichan Chuzhe Xin Guiding Liangnan [Two Difficulties for New Regulation of Non-performing Asset 
Arrangements], CAIJING, Nov. 24, 2008, at 60, 61 [hereinafter Two Regulation Difficulties]. 
103 With the awkward title familiar from so many so-called normative documents in modern China, 
“Several Opinions on Judicial Protection and [Using] the Law in Service of Continuing to Develop the Nation’s 
Financial Security and Overall Economic Coordination”. 
104 See Ye Doudou, Buliangzichan Zhuanrang Susong “Jie Dong” [The “Unfreezing” of Litigation 
Relating to Transfer of Non-performing Assets], CAIJING, Dec. 8, 2008, at 28, available at 
http://Caijing.com.cn/2008-12-04/110034693.html [hereinafter Unfreezing Litigation].  This last example is both a 
good expression  of how the People’s Court bureaucracy works via Regulations and internal notices on substantive 
adjudication matters, but also an excellent demonstration of:  (i) how the subordinate Courts react, on their own, in 
cases which touch on overtly political concerns (even where the rights and interests of the strongest international 
financial institutions are directly concerned—as many purchasers of bundles of discounted non-performing loans 
from the Chinese Asset Management Companies were foreign investment and commercial banks increasingly 
frustrated in their efforts to collect on the transferred debt); (ii) the normative authority of a Supreme People’s Court 
pronouncement calling for the re-start of case acceptance and decision when encountering articulated, voluntary, 
subordinate-level refusal, and (iii) the ongoing resistance from local-level Courts even in the face of central-origin 
instruction and policy direction.   
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Court bureaucracy’s central position and authority.  This relation is seen in an utterance by an 
official at the No. 2 Civil Division of the Supreme People’s Court just after the 1st Judicial 
Regulations on the new Company Law were issued in May 2006:  “… after implementation of 
the “Company Law” [starting January 1, 2006], the litigation type cases the People’s Courts will 
have to hear shall increase greatly, and many issues will have to be the subject of judicial 
explanation in accordance with legislated principles”.105 
Although Supreme People’s Court Regulations, Explanations and Approving Responses 
play an important role, sub-national People’s Court systems also issue their own “Opinions” on 
specific Laws.106  For example, in June 2003 the Shanghai Higher People’s Court issued its own 
internal107 “Opinion of the Shanghai Higher People’s Court on Handling Certain Issues 
Regarding Hearing Company Law Related Cases”108 addressing the 1994 Company Law form, 
only the first part of which is directed to procedural rules and standards for the application of the 
Company Law.109  The Opinion explicitly bars Shanghai People’s Courts’ from consideration of 
certain cases.  Thus, with respect to shareholders’ petitions seeking judicial invalidation of board 
or shareholders’ resolutions the Shanghai People’s Courts are instructed to “temporarily” not 
accept cases where the subject entity is a company limited by shares with listed capital.110  The 
Shanghai Company Law Opinion also strongly counsels caution and conservatism in applying 
                                                 
105 SPC Press Conference 2006, supra note 61, at 4 (emphasis added).   
106 Such Court-system specific instructions/opinions are not unique to Shanghai.  See for example in the 
Company Law sphere similar documents issued with respect to application of the 1994 Company Law by the 
Beijing Higher People’s Court (February 9, 2004) and the Jiangsu Province Higher People’s Court (June 3, 2003), 
collected at SHANGHAI HIGHER PEOPLE’S COURT 2006, supra note 7, at 236-48.  Judges, scholars and lawyers in the 
PRC often allude to the high quality, “modernity” and coherence of the Jiangsu Province Opinion on the 1994 
Company Law.   
107 Shanghai Higher People’s Court No. 2 Civil Division 2007, supra note 8, at 48. 
108 SHANGHAI HIGHER PEOPLE’S COURT 2006, supra note 7, at 231-36.   
109 The second and third parts review implementation problems “in recent years” and offer unified 
approaches to frequently-encountered difficulties. 
110 Shanghai Company Law Opinion, supra note 7, at part I, § B, para. 2.  This instruction was reversed in 
conjunction with the 2006 Company Law, although pretty grudgingly.  See infra notes 324 and 358 and 
accompanying text.  See also infra notes 308 to 356 and accompanying text on the more generalized rejection of 
cases involving companies limited by shares cases and listed companies. 
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novel doctrines to corporate law disputes.111  Yet the same Shanghai Company Law Opinion 
conversely works to expand the scope of the Shanghai Courts’ adjudicatory powers, for instance 
by setting forth extremely detailed instructions on judicial veil-piercing112 and derivative 
actions,113 neither of which had any legal basis in the 1994 statute or any subsequent Supreme 
People’s Court pronouncement.114  Finally, the Shanghai Opinion on the 1994 Company Law 
highlights important values which must be vindicated in application of the same Law.115 
                                                 
111 The Shanghai Company Law Opinion not only forbids outright acceptance of certain kinds of cases, but 
also contains direct warnings against the People’s Courts acting too aggressively in the use of novel doctrines.  
Thus, while the Opinion offers very detailed instructions on how to undertake veil-piercing adjudication, it also 
cautions the Shanghai Courts about moving too aggressively in acting to disregard the corporate form and assert 
direct shareholder liability in creditors’ suits to pierce the corporate veil.   
112 For example:  “In veil-piercing cases, when determining shareholder liability, the People’s Court must 
carefully discover the facts so that certain kinds of defects in shareholder behavior do not become the basis for the 
disregard of limited liability protection.  Thus, in cases where companies are initially undercapitalized but 
shareholders have increased capitalization, or in respect of project companies where in the course of operations such 
companies have been subsequently capitalized in excess of their declared registered capital (by retained earnings 
from the project), then this subsequent capitalization must be understood as adequate capitalization at the relevant 
time; Or, in respect of inquiries regarding the looting of corporate assets, an evaluation must be made of the 
appropriate level of assets for the company; In addition, [it should be understood that] the transfer of equity to 
another shareholder, or the contribution of shareholder equity to another company, do not have any impact on the 
assets of the company (even where the transfer has not been registered); Finally, where in the course of litigation the 
corporate form is disregarded, that judicial characterization does not result in de jure elimination of the corporate 
form status or dissolution by operation of law, but is only a question relative to whether or not shareholders shall 
bear unlimited liability, which should be determined on a case by case basis.”  See Shanghai Company Law Opinion, 
supra note 7, at part I, § D, para. 3. 
113 For example:  “… the plaintiff must be a current shareholder, and the defendants should be the relevant 
controlling shareholder, senior management person(s) or transaction parties which have undertaken the inappropriate 
or harmful action; once the derivative suit has been initiated, the People’s Court must notify the company that it is 
involved in a lawsuit as a ‘third party’; Second, the People’s Courts must determine whether the company’s interests 
have suffered real harm, whether or not the defendants have engaged in inappropriate behavior which has given rise 
to a serious imbalance in the parties’ respective rights and obligations, whether or not there is a causal relationship 
between the defendant’s inappropriate action and the harm suffered by the company,  where there are a number of 
defendants sued for a collective transaction whether some of the named defendants acted in good faith, and whether 
or not the company is controlled by the allegedly wrongful actor to the extent that the company cannot bring the 
action itself;  Third, when the parties raise a settlement proposal in the course of the litigation, and the People’s 
Court determines that the proposed settlement will harm the interests of other shareholders or the company, then the 
settlement should not be approved and the litigation should continue.  Fourth, once the plaintiff’s pleadings are 
established, the People’s Court may order the unwinding of offending transactions, and may award damages for the 
company to be paid by those who are adjudicated to have undertaken the inappropriate action and other parties 
involved in the relevant transactions; in addition, the People’s Court may award appropriate compensation for the 
plaintiff shareholders to be paid by the company.”  See Shanghai Company Law Opinion, supra note 7, at part I, § E, 
para. 2. 
114 The only colorable basis for the derivative action was an “Approving Response” from the Supreme 
People’s Court in the mid-1990s, responding to an urgent request from the Jiangsu Province Higher People’s Court, 
entitled “With Respect to External Economic Contract Disputes Arising at Chinese-foreign Equity Joint Ventures, 
and the Foreign Party that Controls the Joint Venture has a Conflict of Interest with the [Technology] Seller, The 
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Local-level People’s Courts in fact do more.  One senior Shanghai Higher People’s Court 
official acknowledged to me that the Shanghai People’s Court system issues what the official 
loosely called “judicial explanations”  (sifa jieshi), sometimes publicly, most often internally.  
Perhaps most interesting from an institutional perspective is the official’s view that such local-
level instructions, while normatively not as authoritative as Supreme People’s Court Regulations, 
are in reality far more determinative in the actual handling of cases at the non-central (e.g., 
Shanghai Municipal) level.116  The same Higher People’s Court judge also stated that such local-
level documents are in many cases issued before the national-level Supreme People’s Court 
instructions see the light of day, and thereby gain authority by virtue of their prior existence and 
the relative void in central instruction.  The phenomenon described by the Shanghai official  
seems well-accepted in the PRC, where many judges, scholars and even lawyers point to the 
quality and technical accomplishment of some local-level, preemptively-issued, judicial 
explanations—such as the highly-regarded Jiangsu Province Higher People’s Court “Provisional 
Opinion” on application of the Company Law of June 3, 2003.117  Overall, the use of local-level 
Court “Opinions” or other instructions to expand the authority and asserted competence of a 
                                                                                                                                                             
Chinese Party Should In Whose Name Bring Suit in the People’s Courts”.  See GONGSIFA XINXING YINAN ANLI 
PANJIE 114 (Beijing Higher People’s Court ed., 2007) [hereinafter NEW COMPANY LAW ISSUES].  As the perfectly 
descriptive title indicates, the Supreme People’s Court allowed derivative actions in a very limited circumstance:  
where the foreign partner in a Chinese-foreign equity joint venture—while also a technology licensor (or “seller”) to 
the joint venture—exercised control over the venture (through its majority registered capital interest and resulting 
chairmanship of the board and power over the corporate seal or “chop”) and blocked the corporate legal person from 
suing the foreign partner qua technology provider for non- or deficient performance, then the Chinese partner could 
bring suit “in the name of” the venture itself.  The author knows from personal experience that this Approving 
Response was applied in an extremely strict manner, and did not  provide a basis for derivative actions where the 
non-performing partner cum vendor in the Chinese-foreign joint venture context was Chinese as opposed to foreign, 
much less in the context of any other kind of enterprise legal person establishment like a “company”.   
115 For instance, the Shanghai Company Law Opinion nicely emphasizes the PRC’s entirely appropriate 
preoccupation with shareholder oppression, most often at the hands of controlling shareholders, via explicit 
warnings against Court approval of pressurized “settlements” in derivative lawsuits.  Here, the Shanghai Higher 
People’s Court effortlessly understands the pernicious structural defect at work in the lop-sided capital structure of 
controlled Chinese corporations, the very defect which makes the derivative suit mechanism so necessary.  See 
supra note 113, and the excerpted language from “Third, when the parties…” 
116 Judge A, Shanghai Higher People’s Court (Oct. 2008) (notes on file with the author). 
117 For the text of the Jiangsu Opinion, see SHANGHAI HIGHER PEOPLE’S COURT 2006, supra note 7, at 240-
48.  
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specific People’s Court systems shows two things.  First, it shows non-central consideration and 
instruction for corporate law adjudication every bit as rich as Supreme People’s Court directions.  
Second, it demonstrates how local-level People’s Court bureaucracies do not wait for Supreme 
People’s Court judicial Regulations on many apparently non-justiciable items.  These 
pronouncements, and their demonstrated effectiveness, in turn provide a useful barometer of the 
bureaucratic autonomy exercised by the Shanghai People’s Courts as a bureaucratic agency, even 
before that agency’s Courts move onto specific adjudicatory tasks.  
  A final category of non-central government origin instruction distributed by and inside 
the People’s Court systems, usually internally, pertains to general adjudication tasks and not the 
application of a specific Law or regulatory system under Law.  For example, during the 
worldwide financial crisis commencing in the second half of 2008, when many of China’s 
export-oriented producers and suppliers located in the Shanghai-Yangtze River Delta area 
experienced extreme financial difficulties, the Shanghai Higher People’s Court issued an eleven-
point document entitled “Several Opinions on an Active Approach to Economic Development 
During the Financial Crisis.”  That document exhorted the Shanghai People’s Courts to conform 
to national social policy, and exercise heightened sensitivity to the impact of decisions on 
distressed industries, allow reduction or elimination of litigation fees, protect the ability of 
distressed litigants to file their claims equally under law (i.e., exempting them from litigation 
fees and deposits), and emphasize speedy adjudication of distressed enterprises labor rights and 
compensation cases, and enforcement proceedings.  A very micro-level identity of the same kind 
of instruction was seen on December 2, 2008 when a single Intermediate People’s Court, the 
Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court, issued its own complementary ten-point document 
explaining how it would conform to the policy commands enunciated by the Higher People’s 
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Court’s eleven-point plan, including unified and accelerated financial crisis-related case 
acceptance, hearing and enforcement, a sensitivity to the capacity of enterprises to bear 
enforcement actions or asset attachment, and attention to what case law opinions identify as one 
of the highest values in PRC corporate law adjudication:  finding a way for distressed enterprises 
with any future potential to keep operating even if technically in default of specific obligations or 
insolvent.118  In these lower-level, non-Law specific, People’s Court system pronouncements, 
opinions and notices, the PRC judiciary’s function as a unified bureaucracy-administrative 
agency is clearer—one easily contrasted with an autonomous court system which hears and 
decides on specific cases based on applicable law and in formal disregard of national or regional 
policy concerns. 
 These various species of bureaucratic instruction are critical in evaluating the relative 
institutional autonomy of the People’s Courts in the PRC.  The mere existence of local-level 
“Opinions” shaping adjudication of cases for which there is no statutory authority or Supreme 
People’s Court Regulation demonstrates significant normative autonomy for such local-level 
institutions.  In these circumstances, the local-level People’s Courts are in effect declaring 
(within the Court system and not publicly) that they will proceed to adjudicate claims which lack 
the legal or bureaucratic “basis” that usually issues from superior bureaucratic institutions or is 
contained in “Law.”  Moreover, any indication of the actual acceptance and handling of cases by 
the People’s Court in the absence, or in contravention, of Supreme People’s Court Regulations is 
very strong evidence of judicial autonomy. 
This high degree of autonomy is precisely what seems to be at work in the Shanghai 
People’s Courts’ Company Law adjudication before 2006 and, with important qualification, 
beyond.  Just as in respect of the application of orthodox corporate fiduciary duties by the 
                                                 
118 See Accelerated Hearings, supra note 9.  
2010] CORPORATE LAW IN THE SHANGHAI PEOPLE’S COURTS  339 
 
 
Chinese courts nationally,119 there is evidence that the Shanghai People’s Courts accept and 
dispose of corporate law claims even when the Company Law provides no legal basis for such 
case disposition, and/or there is no Supreme People’s Court Regulation addressing the issue.120  
Before 2006 and with the absence of explicitly-named corporate fiduciary duties of care and 
loyalty in statute, much less standards for evaluation of such duties or business judgment rule 
protection, the Shanghai People’s Courts proved able to accept and handle fiduciary duties 
claims and doctrine, both in divining and directing remedies for breach of corporate fiduciary 
duties generally121 and competently explicating a fiduciary’s duty of care.122  In one pre-2005 
                                                 
119 See Doctrine That Dared Not, supra note 20. 
120 This evidence is confirmation of the implications offered by the Shanghai Company Law Opinion, 
which addresses, and counsels acceptance by the Shanghai People’s Courts of, actions at a time where there was no 
national or Supreme People’s Court-issued Regulations (for instance on derivative actions). 
121 The Shanghai Courts do this in many cases where there is also a breach of contract in evidence, which 
less autonomous judicial institutions might have happily relied upon before invoking more controversial notions of 
corporate fiduciary duties.  For the application of corporate fiduciary duties before 2005, see Shanghai X. Elec. Co. 
v. Mr. A, et al. 2005 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 114-17 (Shanghai No. 2 Interm. People’s Ct., 2003), 
(showing that a Japanese director of a Chinese-foreign equity joint venture which at time of suit is converted into a 
wholly PRC-invested limited liability company because of Japanese partner’s sale of equity is liable for return of 
RMB 324,000 yuan (and interest) taken from the joint venture and transferred to another Japanese party-controlled 
company and then the director’s personal account without joint venture board approval or joint venture investor 
(shareholder) approval); Shanghai Jingfa Enter. Dev. Co. v. Shanghai Haining Petroleum Prod. Co., 2004 NIAN 
SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 299-309 (Shanghai No. 2 Interm. People’s Ct., 2003), (showing that in 
shareholder deadlock case, director representing one shareholder’s interest who extracts funds to fund that 
shareholder’s (and corporate vehicle’s) business activities is in breach of fiduciary duties, even before the Company 
Law provides for the same), aff’d, Shanghai Higher People’s Ct. (2003); Shanghai A. Co. v. Wang X, SELECTED 
COMPANY LAW CASES 96-98 (Shanghai Hongkou District People’s Ct., 1995), (showing a shareholder cum 
corporate director who acted in violation of a shareholders’ agreement expressed in a shareholder’s resolution acted 
(i) beyond his corporate-contractual scope of authority and (ii) in violation of the obligation under Article 59 of the 
1994 Company Law of “directors, supervisory board members and general managers to abide by the company 
articles of association, and faithfully [or “loyally”] perform their functions”, in amending corporate articles of 
association and using corporate funds to establish a subsidiary company in the same business), settled, Shanghai No. 
2 Interm. People’s Ct. (1996).   
122 As the (civil law tradition’s) “cautious and diligent management” of entrusted assets.  See Guangxi 
Xineng Sci.and Tech. Co. Ltd. v. Guotai Sec. Co. Ltd, 2004 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 211-12 
(Shanghai Higher People’s Ct., 2003), (showing an assets management contract case—not a corporate fiduciaries or 
trust case—but where contract standard is divined to include this duty of care standard, the same standard as that 
described by the Shanghai Higher People’s Court in its post-January 2006 discussion of application of the corporate 
law), aff’d, Supreme People’s Ct. (2003).  See also Shanghai Jingfa Enter. Dev. Co., Enter. Dev. Co. v. Shanghai 
Haining Petroleum Prod. Co., 2004 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 303 (Shanghai No. 2 Interm. People’s 
Ct., 2003), (showing that in a shareholder deadlock case, director representing one shareholder’s interest who 
extracts funds to fund that shareholder’s (and corporate vehicle’s) business activities is in breach of “shareholder’s 
duty of loyalty, and duty of due care of a good manager (shanliang guanli) of, and cautious attention (qinshen zhuyi) 
to company’s property and interests”), aff’d, Shanghai Higher People’s Ct. (2003); SHANGHAI HIGHER PEOPLE’S 
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case123 providing evidence of substantial autonomy, the Board Vice Chairman and Factory 
Operations Director of a factory transformed into a limited liability company in August 1997 
formed three competing companies in March 1999, November 2000 and (after his resignation of 
all positions at the original company) May 2001.  The limited liability company sued for breach 
of duty of loyalty pursuant to Article 61 of the 1994 Company Law,124 and damages calculated 
based on the wayward director/officer’s unjust enrichment (not the harm suffered by the 
company).125  The Shanghai Nanshi District People’s Court and an unidentified appeals-level 
Intermediate People’s Court seemed completely unrestrained in handling the fiduciary duties 
claims all the way through to appeal.126 
After the adoption of the 2006 Company Law and explicit inclusion of corporate fiduciary 
duties at Articles 148 and 149, the Shanghai Higher People’s Court likewise seems perfectly able to 
describe fiduciary standards which are to be employed by Shanghai judges even in the absence of 
Supreme People’s Court Regulations on the application of such doctrines.127  Similarly, even before 
                                                                                                                                                             
COURT 2006, supra note 7, at 4 (strengthening the duty of care and duty of loyalty imposed on directors, supervisors 
and senior management).   
123 Shanghai Shenmao Dianci Factory v. Wang Longbao, 2006 HU YI ZHONG MIN SAN (SHANG) ZAI 
ZHONG ZI NO.1, 2004 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 324-27 (Shanghai Nanhui District People’s Ct., 
2004), aff’d, Shanghai No. 1 Interm. People’s Ct. (No. 3 Civ. Div.) (2004), overruled by, Shanghai No. 1 Interm. 
People’s Ct. (No. 3 Civ. Div.) (2006), also available at http://www.hshfy.sh.cn/fyitw/sweb/.   
124 1994 Company Law, supra note 4, at art. 61 (expressing the non-competition thread of duty of loyalty:  
“The directors and manager may not engage in the same type of business as the company, whether for their own 
account or that of others, nor may they engage in activities which are harmful to the interests of the company.”). 
125 Id.  “If a director or the manager engages in [the same type of] business or activities [as the company], 
the revenue so obtained [by the director or manager] shall belong to the company.” 
126 If rather badly in the technical sense.  The two Court levels rejected the plaintiff company’s claim 
because (i) the first and second competing company establishments were “never operational,” and (ii) the third 
competing company establishment was started three months after the defendant left the employ and board of the 
plaintiff company, and thus (in the Courts’ view) outside of the period when the defendant owed a duty to the 
plaintiff.  Further, these Shanghai People’s Courts incorrectly rejected (in theory only, because they have found no 
breach) the notion of unjust enrichment stipulated in 1994 Company Law Article 61 in favor of a more traditional 
remedy of damages suffered by the party towards which the duty is owed.   
127 The Shanghai Higher People’s Court document goes a step further in divining substantive standards, or 
the beginnings of such standards, for application of fiduciary duties law when the Company Law is silent on just 
such standards:  “In addition, [the amended Company Law] strengthens the duties of loyalty and care of directors, 
supervisory board members, and senior management personnel.  The amended Company Law places great emphasis 
on the two above-described [sets of] duties for directors, supervisory board members and senior management 
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2005 the Shanghai Courts128 were apparently long in the business of corporate veil-piercing,129 
autonomous action ratified by the local Shanghai-level Opinion of June 2003.130  This specific area 
                                                                                                                                                             
personnel…. stressing that directors and senior management personnel etc. must strictly abide by the principle of 
good faith (yanshou chengxin yuanze), must take as their point of departure [in decision-making] the interests of the 
company, and should perform their jobs cautiously and diligently.”  SHANGHAI HIGHER PEOPLE’S COURT 2006, 
supra note 7, at 4.  Some of this is taken from the CSRC’s elaboration of fiduciary duties standards in CSRC 
regulation and CSRC-promulgated Guidance Articles of Association for Listed Companies, but—as in that 
regulation and standard form material applicable to securities-issuing companies—fails to describe a risk-
encouraging, business judgment rule-protected, duty of care.  See Doctrine That Dared Not, supra note 20. 
128 With many other PRC People’s Court nationally, see GONGSI SHENPAN SHIWU YÜ DIANXING ANLI 
PINGXI 142-54 (Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court No. 4 Civil Division ed., 2005) [hereinafter 
ADJUDICATING COMPANY LAW CASES], and for Shanghai-based plaintiffs.  For an example of a Shanghai plaintiff in 
a non-Shanghai People’s Court trying to pierce the corporate veil, see China East. Airlines Co. Ltd. Xiamen Enter. 
Dep’t v. Xiamen Mun. Renshan Airlines Ticket Agency Co., XIN GONGSIFA ANLI PINGXI 65-88 (Wang Xiaochuan, 
ed., 2006) [hereinafter NEW COMPANY LAW CASES] (Xiamen People’s Cts., 2002).  This is an especially egregious 
case, where the Xiamen People’s Court notes a whole series of share transfers and serial corporate establishments 
designed to avoid creditor obligations, as well as evidence of undercapitalization, bad faith, etc., and states that 
regardless of what statute allows, the defendant controlling shareholder simply cannot be allowed to injure the 
lawful rights of good faith creditors.  Accordingly, and on the basis of “fairness, justice, and good faith” described in 
Article 4 of the General Principles of the Civil Law, the defendant controlling shareholder is adjudicated as having 
direct liability to corporate creditors.  This use of Article 4 of the General Principles of the Civil Law is noted infra 
in the section describing the Shanghai People’s Court own equity court-style adjudication practices which seek to 
provide justice and fair outcomes for PRC corporate case litigants. 
129 See Fan Jinxing v. Fu Chenghua, 2004 MIN MIN ER (SHANG) ZAI CHU ZI NO. 5 (Minghang Dist. 
People’s Ct. (No. 2 Civ. Div.), 2004), (showing the corporate veil of guarantor pierced to investors who have 
falsified capitalization of guarantor) available at http://www.hshfy.sh.cn/fyitw/sweb/; Shanghai Sitong Power 
Equip. Co. v. Fujian Zhongli Real Estate, 2000 HU YI ZHONG JING CHU ZI NO. 163 (Shanghai No. 1 Interm. 
People’s Ct., 2000), (recognizing the possibility of piercing the corporate veil, but refuses to pierce to the Japanese 
natural person behind a debtor wholly foreign owned enterprise (“WFOE”), because the original loan contract is 
illegal and without effect, and the natural person defendant has no investment or equity in the corporate defendant), 
available at http:///www.lawyee.net; Shanghai Bund City Real Estate Comprehensive Dev. Co. v. Zhu Haimao, 
2006 HU ER ZHONG MIN SAN (SHANG) ZHONG ZI NO. 461 (Shanghai Jiading Dist. People’s Ct., 2004), (ruling on a 
December 18, 2003 corporate veil piercing by the Shanghai Hongkou District People’s Court (2002 HONG ZHI ZI 
NO. 3301) because shareholders of company in existence from 1995 to 2003 have either depleted capital or not fully 
capitalized it; that initial veil piercing in favor of creditor reversed by Intermediate People’s Court because of 
evidentiary questions about who is a shareholder, and whether the shareholders’ held themselves out as actually 
capitalizing the company), reh’g granted, Shanghai Jiading Dist. People’s Ct. (2005), rev’d, Shanghai No. 2 Interm. 
People’s Ct. (No. 3 Civ. Div.) (2006), remanded to, Shanghai Jiading Dist. People’s Ct. (2006), appeal filed, 
Shanghai No. 2 Interm. People’s Ct. (2006), available at http://www.hshfy.sh.cn/fyitw/gweb/; Shanghai Bonded 
Prod. Materials Mkt. China Commc’n Prod. Exch. Ctr. v. Shanghai Baoan Enter. Co., 2004 NIAN SHANGHAI 
FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 278-86 (Shanghai Pudong New District Peoples Ct., 2003), (recognizing liability of former 
investors in joint operation (not corporate) guarantor) aff’d Shanghai No. 1 Interm. People’s Ct. (2003); Xishan City 
Chemical Prod. Mfg. Co. v. Shanghai Aoshi Enter. Co., NEW  COMPANY LAW CASES 293-99 (an unidentified 
Shanghai Dist. People’s Ct., 2000), (permitting the creditor to pierce the corporate veil of a limited liability company 
to assess joint and several liability on several shareholders, including initial promoters who had fraudulently 
undercapitalized the company and their subsequent transferees, for overdue payment of RMB 3.0 million yuan, but 
liability of defendant shareholders to third party creditor is on appeal limited to the difference between actual 
capitalization and subscribed-for capitalization; in the case, even the state Audit Bureau that licensed the accounting 
firm which certified the original non-contributions has liability to the extent that the contributions from defendant 
shareholders are inadequate to satisfy awarded damage), aff’d, a Shanghai Interm. People’s Ct. (2000); Shanghai 
Guanghua Animal Feed Co. v. Shanghai Paer Gen. Co., 2000 HU ER ZHONG JING ZHONG ZI NO. 1209 (Shanghai 
Yangpu Dist. People’s Ct., 2000), (piercing corporate veil to assert liability of non-contract party because of 
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of autonomous action by the Shanghai People’s Courts is definitively confirmed in a Shanghai 
Higher People’s Court 2006 policy statement which praises the new Company Law’s explicit 
addition of a corporate veil-piercing mechanism as statutory ratification of doctrine already 
“implemented for many years”.131   
There is also evidence that the Shanghai Courts applied the veil-piercing doctrine 
robustly.  One 2000 case shows two levels of the Shanghai judiciary supporting a very 
aggressive corporate-veil piercing remedy, through to the shareholders at the time of suit but also 
to former shareholders who had some time before transferred their shares to good faith 
purchasers.132  In a second case decided in 2003, the Shanghai Higher People’s Court acted not 
only autonomously but with some political courage by allowing piercing on a sensitive land 
condemnation and relocation case through to a government department which controlled the 
hollow corporate form established to sign the condemnation compensation contract the plaintiff 
land occupiers wished to enforce.133  Regardless of the Shanghai People’s Courts’ lack of 
technical competence, more noteworthy is how they acted without authorization in statute, 
without any instruction from the Supreme People’s Court under formal Regulation, and without 
any other indication of the all-important “legal basis.”  The Shanghai Higher People’s Court 
                                                                                                                                                             
common Legal Representative and shared premises), rev’d, Shanghai No. 2 Interm. People’s Ct. (2000), available at 
http://www.lawyee.net/. 
130 The Shanghai Company Law Opinion explicitly allowed Shanghai People’s Courts to rule whether or 
not corporate investors were obligated to recapitalize companies when faced with claims from tort or contract 
creditors, or simply be deprived of limited liability protection (regardless of the corporate form established) with 
respect to such creditors.  SHANGHAI HIGHER PEOPLE’S COURT 2006, supra note 7, at 9.   
131 Id. at 6-7.        
132 Those original shareholders were determined by the Courts to have acted fraudulently by falsely 
capitalizing (or not capitalizing) the company at the time of their initial investments.  See Xishan City Chemical 
Prod. Mfg. Co. v. Shanghai Aoshi Enter. Co., NEW  COMPANY LAW CASES 304 (discussing false capitalization and 
stating that, because the original shareholders engaged in false capitalization and “violated the principle of good 
faith (chengxin yuanze),” they should also be liable for the company’s obligations). 
133 Shanghai Kangpaisi Enter. Gen. Co. v. Shanghai Municipal Admin. of Indus. and Com. Huangpu Dist. 
Branch, 2004 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 349-56 (Shanghai No. 2 Interm. People’s Ct., 2001), aff’d, 
Shanghai Higher People’s Ct. (2003).  
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ruefully recognizes this high degree of autonomy (and the prevalence of the abuse it was meant 
to check) when celebrating the 2006 Company Law veil-piercing mechanism:   
Unfortunately China’s 1994 Company Law did not include a veil-piercing 
mechanism.  In reality, the abuse of corporate limited liability by shareholders, 
sham capital investment, looting of corporate assets, diversion of company 
profits, the use of enterprise corporatization to create empty shells, and harm to 
the interests of creditors, etc. occur regularly in China’s economic life, and easily 
result in relatively large cases where losses could not be compensated.  In many 
cases, and although approaching the problem in good faith, much of China’s 
judiciary used, introduced and employed the principles and spirit of a veil 
piercing mechanism to disregard the corporate form [but] without any legal basis 
whatsoever.134 
 
As noted by both the PRC State Council and the National People’s Congress at the time of 
passage of the 2006 Company Law135 and the Shanghai Higher People’s Court in a 2006 policy 
statement136 one of the major policy aims behind the amended Company Law of 2006 was 
enhanced protection of third party creditors.  It should come as no surprise then that the Shanghai 
People’s Courts continued to use the veil-piercing doctrine after January 1, 2006, only with the 
slightly stronger legal basis provided by a new statutory provision (albeit with continued lack of 
specific authorizing Regulations).137   
                                                 
134 SHANGHAI HIGHER PEOPLE’S COURT 2006, supra note 7, at 7.     
135 LAO Company Law Explanation, supra note 19. 
136 SHANGHAI HIGHER PEOPLE’S COURT 2006, supra note 7.  
137 One example of veil-piercing from 2007 demonstrates this, and is incidentally another elaboration of 
political independence by the Shanghai People’s Courts because the piercing reaches to a centrally-funded SOE in 
Beijing.  See Shanghai Huaxin Elec. Wire and Cable Co. v. China Tietong Group Co., 2007 HU GAO MIN ER 
(SHANG) ZHONG ZI NO. 145 (Shanghai No. 2 Interm. People’s Ct. (No. 4 Civ. Div.), 2007) (RMB 32 million yuan 
creditor pierces to the Beijing-based SOE parent of a Shanghai limited liability company debtor where the parent has 
undercapitalized the debtor by RMB 38 million yuan, specifically upholding the assertion of parent liability “by 
litigation” and invoking “misuse of the corporate form” under Article 20 of the 2006 Company Law), aff’d, 
Shanghai Higher People’s Ct. (2007), available at http://www.hshfy.sh.cn/fyitw/gweb/.  A second 2007 proceeding, 
a criminal prosecution, shows both the lower-level Shanghai People’s Court and the Shanghai Higher People’s 
Court on appeal engaging in classic corporate veil-piercing to fix criminal liability on an SOE cadre/manager guilty 
of diverting funds to a limited liability company established with his wife and several confederates, but operated and 
capitalized solely by the defendant cadre.  See PRC v. Xue Henghe, 2007 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 
447-52 (Shanghai Rail Transport Interm. People’s Ct.), (diversion of assets from “enterprise department” subsidiary 
entity of SOE to defendant-dominated limited liability company is criminal diversion of state-owned assets by 
individual defendant), aff’d, Shanghai Higher People’s Ct. (2007).  In this case, it is perhaps somewhat disturbing 
how the People’s Courts pierce the corporate veil without the benefit of Article 20 of the 2006 Company Law, and 
instead rely on the incoherent Article 4 of the 1994 Company Law, which inter alia provides that those who 
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  It is also likely that the Shanghai People’s Courts’ allowed the equivalent of derivative 
lawsuits before the 2006 Company Law provided the explicit basis for such suits.138  Only 
“likely” because there is ample evidence of such cases nationwide in the same period,139 
Shanghai judges proclaim their abundance,140 and the Shanghai Company Law Opinion provides 
detailed application rules for such actions,141 and yet there are only a few reported cases 
permitting derivative suits in Shanghai specifically before January 1, 2006.142  In the period 
before that date, the existence of such cases once again demonstrates the autonomy of the PRC 
People’s Courts because the acceptance and adjudication of such cases was not authorized in 
statute or by Supreme People’s Court Regulation.143  After adoption of the 2006 Company Law, 
the nationwide People’s Courts continued to accept, or allowed the structuring of claims in 
                                                                                                                                                             
capitalize corporate entities will enjoy profits, major decision-making power, and management rights in accordance 
with the proportion of their equity contribution.      
138 See supra note 114 and the description of the only thin basis for such litigation, an “Approving 
Response” from the Supreme People’s Court in the mid-1990s, responding to an urgent request from the Jiangsu 
Province Higher People’s Court, entitled “With Respect to External Economic Contract Disputes Arising at 
Chinese-foreign Equity Joint Ventures, and the Foreign Party that Controls the Joint Venture has a Conflict of 
Interest with the [Technology] Seller, the Chinese Party Should in Whose Name Bring Suit in the People’s Courts,” 
NEW COMPANY LAW ISSUES, supra note 114, at 114.  
139 See ADJUDICATING COMPANY LAW CASES, supra note 128, at 74-85 (derivative action by remaining 
directors against board chairman who refused to step down upon the termination of his term); id. at 172-83 
(derivative action by foreign shareholder of Sino-German joint venture against Chinese partner which illegally 
occupied joint venture’s property); Doctrine That Dared Not, supra note 20, at 237-42 (“Beijing Self-dealing 
Case”).  Some of the cases noted may be Shanghai proceedings, although this collection of derivative suits does not 
identify the jurisdiction where the cases arise.  
140 Statements of Shanghai Higher People’s Court judges at “Company Controversies and Judicial 
Remedies” Conference held at East China University of Politics and Law, Shanghai, PRC (Dec. 5, 2008) (notes on 
file with the author).   
141 See SHANGHAI HIGHER PEOPLE’S COURT 2006, supra note 7. 
142 See, e.g., Shanghai Tap Water Co.v. Shanghai Huihuang Enter. Co., NEW COMPANY LAW ISSUES  111-
16 (Shanghai No. 1 Interm. People’s Ct. (No. 3 Civ. Div.), 1999), (two plaintiff shareholders can sue third defendant 
shareholder in limited liability company “in the name of” the limited liability company for non-perfected 
contribution of capital (land use rights) and misappropriation of corporate funds, even though defendant 
shareholder—through majority ownership, board chairmanship and appointment as company Legal 
Representative—seeks to block the limited liability company from acting as plaintiff against himself).  This is a 
profound and interesting case, and would seem to indicate that the plaintiffs saw no remedy in suing on the 
“contract” which formed the limited liability company, because that would only provide a remedy for the non-
perfected capital contribution claim, and not the corporate claim for misappropriation of corporate funds by the 
controlling shareholder defendant. 
143 Their existence also ties into the claims developed below regarding perceived common law and equity 
court-type adjudication, in that such cases see the implementation of a structural-procedural remedy supporting 
equitable justice and shareholders’ claims against breaching fiduciaries, and thus a pathway to substantive remedies 
against opportunistic use of the company form.  See infra notes 157 to 180 and accompanying text. 
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accordance with, the classical derivative action—only then, as in the case of veil-piercing, with 
explicit statutory authorization but the continued lack of Supreme Court Regulations (or in the 
case of Shanghai, pursuant to the conditions and remedies elaborated in the local-level Shanghai 
Company Law Opinion).144     
 Corporate fiduciary duties, veil-piercing and derivative suits are not the only areas where 
the Shanghai People’s Courts exercised significant autonomy in the corporate law sphere.  The 
data I reviewed shows that the People’s Courts in Shanghai also worked in other similarly 
unauthorized areas, including:  promoters liability,145 judicially-directed dividend 
distributions,146 ESOP-type “employee stock ownership meetings” (zhigong chigu hui) in 
Chinese corporate establishments,147 and the contribution of human capital/personal services to 
corporate establishments as equity.148  
 Notwithstanding these real assertions of autonomy, the Shanghai People’s Courts and the 
entire Chinese judiciary by their own judgment still have a long way to go in fully realizing the 
fruits of such tentative assertions of authority.  The Shanghai Higher People’s Court alludes to 
                                                 
144 This is the same for derivative suits in the People’s Court nationally.  See, e.g., ANALYSIS OF NEW 
CASES, supra note 94 at 307-11 (Beijing case rejecting plaintiff’s derivative action on the ground that plaintiff did 
not first make statutorily required demand on the board); id. at 329-33 (Beijing case permitting shareholder 
derivative action because the statutory demand requirement is excused); id. at 334-39 (Nanjing case holding there is 
“nothing improper” in a shareholder bringing action against the management to preserve his own shareholder 
rights).  
145 Before the PRC Company Law was amended to include specific provisions identifying such liability 
(2006 Company Law, supra note 5, art. 95).  See Shanghai Yongqi Beauty and Hairdressing Ltd. v. Shanghai New 
Concepts Beauty and Hairdressing Ltd., 2004 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 265-69 (Shanghai Luwan 
Dist. People’s Ct., 2003), (recognizing that a personal contract signed by promoter of company must be performed 
by subsequently-formed company especially where assets purchased under the contract are contributed into 
company as capital investment by individual), appeal filed, Shanghai No. 1 Interm. People’s Ct. (2003). 
146 See Huang Ziyu v. Guan Feng, 2004 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 310-18 (Shanghai 
Pudong New Dist. People’s Ct.), aff’d, Shanghai No. 1 Interm. People’s Ct. (2003), discussed infra note 170; Co. A 
v. Co. B, SELECTED COMPANY LAW CASES 142-44 (Shanghai Huangpu Dist. People’s Ct.), (holding for 25% 
shareholder who sues company under control of another minority shareholder for distribution of dividends per 
company Articles of Association), aff’d, Shanghai No. 1 Interm. People’s Ct. (1997).  
147 Before a mechanism for the determination of direct stock ownership was defined (2006 Company Law, 
supra note 5, art. 33).  See X. Fang v. Y. Info. Tech, Co., Ltd., 2005 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 59-
65 (Shanghai Yangpu Dist. People’s Ct., 2005), (showing that ESOP provides employees only with dividends 
expectation, not “disposition” property rights with regard to the underlying stock).  
148 See infra notes 266 to 269 and accompanying text. 
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some of the other constraints at work in its evaluation of veil-piercing doctrine as applied in 
concrete adjudication tasks: 
… China at the present time does not have specific or employable decision 
standards sufficient to [allow judges to] rule on disregard of the corporate form….  
These standards must be based in a very high degree of freedom in adjudication 
given to judges in the course of their adjudication practice.   What must be 
emphasized [here] is that—looking at China’s current environment—the 
conditions needed for determination of these standards are not yet ripe.149 
 
A final barometer of this aspect of judicial autonomy—adjudication without Supreme People’s 
Court authorization or in contravention of what Supreme People’s Court Regulation permits—
and specifically applicable to the period immediately after January 1, 2006, is the extent to which 
the Shanghai judiciary used the new Company Law and its expanded remedies on controversies 
where the underlying claims arose before the effective date of the new statute.  This is relevant to 
consideration of the power of Supreme People’s Court authorization because the 1st Supreme 
People’s Court Regulations on the 2006 Company Law150 were issued to direct the national 
People’s Courts on the appropriate handling of these straddling claims.  The issue cannot be an 
easy one for the People’s Courts, as the 2006 Company Law contains not only substantive 
innovations (e.g., fiduciary duty of care (qinmian yiwu)) but also procedural changes and 
associated remedies (e.g., derivative actions).  The Supreme People’s Court’s 1st Company Law 
Regulations addressing this question are somewhat opaque, and seem to leave the People’s 
Courts with a good deal of room to handle pre-2006 claims under post-January 1, 2006 norms.  
Certainly there is evidence of the Shanghai People’s Courts acting in accordance with a strict 
                                                 
149 SHANGHAI HIGHER PEOPLE’S COURT 2006, supra note 7, at 9-10.  This lament echoes Frank Easterbrook 
of the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals writing about application of the same difficult doctrine and its negative 
effect on predictability:  “Such an approach [Frederick J. Powell’s three-part test for veil piercing from 1931], 
requiring courts to balance many imponderables, all important, but none dispositive and frequently lacking a 
common metric to boot, is quite difficult to apply because it avoids formulating a real rule of decision.  This keeps 
people in the dark about the legal consequences of their acts.”  Secon Serv. Sys., Inc. v. St. Joseph Bank & Trust 
Co., 855 F.2d 406, 414 (7th Cir. 1988). 
150  SPC COMPANY LAW REGULATIONS, supra note 94, at 3. 
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understanding of these bifurcated worlds.  For instance, in 2006 the Shanghai Higher People’s 
Court took a very firm line on this when it chastised the Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate People’s 
Court for using 2006 Company Law provisions to adjudicate shareholders’ rights of first refusal 
where the challenged transfer occurred before January 1, 2006.151  That scolding from the Higher 
People’s Court may have caused the No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court itself to invoke the 
Supreme People’s Court’s 1st Regulations in another 2006 proceeding, where the Intermediate 
People’s Court instructs the District level People’s Court that dissident shareholders’ challenges 
to allegedly defective shareholders’ resolutions adopted before 2006 may only be construed 
under the 1994 Company Law.152   
 Notwithstanding these exhortations in individual cases, the Shanghai Higher People’s 
Court’s own data show something radically different, and in fact much more aggressive 
application of the 2006 Company Law to claims arising before January 1, 2006 and thus 
technically under the 1994 statute.  In the Higher People’s Court’s consideration of Company 
Law adjudication in calendar year 2006,153 the Court reports that for the 318 cases producing a 
judgment after a first hearing, 164 (51.57%) used the PRC Company Law in arriving at a 
judgment.  In addition, of the 164 cases invoking the Company Law, 102 (62.20%) issued a final 
judgment on the basis of the 2006 Company Law while only 62 cases (37.80%) issued judgments 
using the pre-amendment 1994 Company Law.  This was true even though fully 88.46% of the 
Company Law litigation arose from events and establishments that occurred prior to January 1, 
                                                 
151 Shanghai Huipu Zhiye Co. v. Ling Shuzhao, 2006 HU GAO MIN ER (SHANG) ZHONG ZI NO. 76, 
ANALYSIS OF NEW CASES 216 (Shanghai No. 1 Interm. People’s Ct. (No. 3 Civ. Div.), 2005), (recognizing that 
transfer of shares in limited liability company still valid, and must be fully performed, and is not invalidated because 
non-selling shareholder’s did not exercise rights of first refusal, or because of a separate (Tianjin) People’s Court 
judgment blocking sale), aff’d, Shanghai Higher People’s Ct. (2006), also available at 
http://www.hshfy.sh.cn/fyitw/gweb/. 
152 Yu Xiaoqi v. Shanghai Changxin Accountancy Ltd., ANALYSIS OF NEW CASES 185 (Shanghai No. 1 
Interm. People’s Ct., 2006). 
153 Shanghai Company Law Report, supra note 8, at 37-51.  
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2006.  This variance (only 21% of claims arose after 2006, yet 62% of the judgments use the 
post-2006 Company Law to arrive at a decision) provides a strong indication that the Shanghai 
People’s Courts felt relatively unconstrained in aggressively implementing the new Company 
Law.  This is an indication confirmed rhetorically in the same report by the Shanghai Higher 
People’s Court, when the Court proudly alludes to one case where it applied the expanded legal 
rights bestowed in the 2006 Company Law, even though the subject claim arose before January 
1, 2006 when only the much narrower rights granted in the 1994 law were available.154 
 There is one blemish in the otherwise rosy picture of increased autonomy sketched out 
above, and it arises in the post-January 1, 2006 world of corporate law adjudication.  That 
blemish is identifiable because of the relative lack of certain kinds of cases in the Shanghai 
Courts after 2006 discussed infra,155 and noted in an unreleased report commissioned by the 
Supreme People’s Court on implementation of the new Company Law.  It appears that even with 
a proper legal basis for claims under the corporate law, the People’s Courts are in some cases 
bending over backwards not to accept or adjudicate such claims—even though they heard the 
same cases in prior years when there was no legal basis.156  If this is true, and it is difficult to 
                                                 
154 The example the Court uses is the enforcement of broader information rights for shareholders against 
recalcitrant corporate insiders, even though such insiders were only bound to provide—and in fact did provide—the 
narrower scope of information under the 1994 Company Law.  Shanghai Company Law Report, supra note 8, at 39. 
155 And distinct from the forbearance or instructed rejection of public company-companies limited by 
shares cases also discussed infra, such as the avoidance of corporate fiduciary duties claims. 
156 See Zhu Ciyun, Professor of Law, Tsinghua Univ. Law Sch., Remarks at East China University of 
Politics and Law Symposium: Corporate Law Forum 2008, Disregard of the Corporation and Liability to Third 
Parties in China’s Corporate Law from a Corporate Governance Perspective, (Nov. 3, 2008) (on file with author) 
(citing an internal Supreme People’s Court study contracted to law academics which indicated that China’s People’s 
Courts have shied away from accepting veil-piercing and derivative lawsuits after those same mechanisms were 
formally established in the 2006 Company Law, at least in comparison to the pre-January 1, 2006 period, when there 
was no “legal basis” for accepting such cases).  One possible example of this dynamic is a case straddling 2004-06, 
Shanghai Bund City Real Estate Comprehensive Dev. Co. v. Zhu Haimao, 2006 HU ER ZHONG MIN SAN (SHANG) 
ZHONG ZI No. 461 (Shanghai No. 2 Interm. People’s Ct., 2006), available at http://www.hshfy.sh.cn/fyitw/gweb/.  
In that case, an initial ruling by the Shanghai Hongkou District People’s Court from March 2003 permitting 
corporate veil piercing is reversed by the Intermediate People’s Court after January 1, 2006 because of highly 
technical evidentiary questions about who is and is not a shareholder, and whether the defendant shareholders held 
themselves out as actually capitalizing the company. 
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prove in the Shanghai survey with respect to case acceptances because it requires proof of a 
negative, then it appears that the expansion of legal bases for litigation in the 2006 Company 
Law may have created the possibly unintended consequence of further constraining People’s 
Court action, but largely in the way of self-constraints (because no superior governmental body 
has issued instruction commanding non-acceptance of cases where there is now a legal basis). 
 
B. The People’s Courts Act in “Equity” or in a Common Law Fashion 
 
 A second demonstration of autonomy may be seen in the way Shanghai Courts act 
entirely on their own to develop law and procedure and create remedies in the interest of what 
they call “fairness,” “rationality,” “appropriateness,” or to punish the breach of (commercial) 
“good faith.”  Thus, the Shanghai People’s Courts act with creativity and power to affirm 
equitable procedures and legal claims to serve “justice,” stretch the application of law (again to 
provide “justice”), dismiss form to privilege function, “make law” based upon their autonomous 
conception of who or what the statutory framework is designed to serve, devise non-statutory 
legal standards for application of corporate law doctrine, and create remedies out of whole cloth.  
When adjudicating in this way, the Shanghai People’s Courts most often invoke the all-purpose 
(commercial) “good faith” provision in Article 4157 of the 1986 General Principles of Civil Law 
(minfa tongze) (“GPCL”)158 as the broad basis for equitable resolution of corporate and property 
rights cases.159  This posture is daring in the PRC, as Article 4 of the relatively outmoded GPCL 
                                                 
157 This is the Roman Law concept of commercial “good faith” translated from reformed German Law of 
the late nineteenth century (the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (“BGB”)), to Japanese law at the start of the twentieth 
century (when Meiji Japan translated the BGB word for word and called it the Meiji Commercial Code), and then to 
Chinese law in the 1930s during Guomindang rule.   
158 CLC, supra note 5, at 1-111 – 1-123. 
159 For an invocation of the broad civil law “good faith and fair dealing” basis in Article 4 of the General 
Principles of Civil Law by the Shanghai People’s Courts in deciding corporate law cases, see Shanghai Guanghua 
Animal Feed Co. v. Shanghai Paer Gen. Co., 2000 HU ER ZHONG JING ZHONG ZI NO. 1209 (Shanghai No. 2 Interm. 
People’s Ct., 2000), (piercing corporate veil to make liable non-contract party sharing common Legal Representative 
and shared premises, on the basis of “good faith and fair dealing” (chengshi xinyong) and “principles of fairness and 
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is extremely commodious, and the GPCL is not the purpose-built statute anointed to govern 
corporate law matters.160  Invocation of the GPCL and its Article 4 may be seen in two 
aggressive veil-piercing cases from 2000 and 2003.  One has already been described above in the 
section on veil-piercing without statutory or Regulatory authorization, where liability is enforced 
not only against the ultimate shareholders at the time of suit, but also the original transferors to 
those defendants.161  As the written opinion by the lower-level Pudong New District People’s 
Court in the other, 2003, case makes clear, this far-reaching assignment of liability is justified 
because the transferring equity holders had depleted the capital of the direct guarantor, and had 
not in the first place made their full capital contributions to the guarantor but disposed of their 
equity interests to good faith purchasers under the false impression that the shares were fully-
capitalized, and most critically:   
... from the standpoint of principles of fairness (gongping yuanze), even though 
there was an agreement that liabilities [of the guarantor] would be transferred 
along with transfer of equity [in the guarantor], as the original shareholders who 
had not fully contributed their [subscribed for] capital to the guarantor, those 
[original shareholders] cannot because of the transfer of that defective equity be 
completely exempt from their responsibilities to [the guarantor entity]; thus, 
                                                                                                                                                             
rationality” (gongping heli de yuanze)), available at http://www.lawyee.net; Shanghai Jingan Food & Beverage 
Serv. Co. v. Shanghai Foreign Econ. Serv. Co., SELECTED COMPANY LAW CASES 86-93 (Shanghai Jingan Dist. 
People’s Ct., 1999), (court of first instance only, broad General Principles of Civil Law view cut back completely on 
appeal by Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court), rev’d, Shanghai No. 2 Interm. People’s Ct. (2000); and for a 
veil-piercing case which arises not in the Shanghai People’s Courts, but involves a very important Shanghai 
plaintiff, see China East. Airlines Co. Ltd. Xiamen Enter. Dep’t v. Xiamen Mun. Renshan Airlines Ticket Agency 
Co., NEW COMPANY LAW CASES 65-68 (Xiamen People’s Cts., 2002), (holding, on the basis of Article 4 of the 
General Principles of the Civil Law, the defendant controlling shareholder has liability to corporate creditors).  Note 
this is a different basis for the provision in the GPCL used as the source for claims in tort—“rights” or “property” 
infringement.  
160 The GPCL was in fact promulgated almost a decade before the PRC’s first Company Law. 
161 See Xishan City Chemical Prod. Mfg. Co. v. Shanghai Aoshi Enter. Co., NEW COMPANY LAW CASES 
293-99 (Shanghai Dist. People’s Ct., 2000), (trade creditor pierces corporate veil of limited liability company to 
assess joint and several liability of several shareholders, including initial promoters who have fraudulently 
undercapitalized the company and their subsequent transferees, for trade payable of RMB 2.9 million yuan, but 
liability of defendant shareholders to third party creditor is on appeal limited to difference between actual 
capitalization and subscribed-for capitalization; in this case, even the state Audit Bureau which licenses the 
accounting firm that certified the original non-contributions has contribution liability), aff’d, Interm. People’s Ct. 
(2000).  See also Shanghai Bonded Prod. Materials Mkt. China Commc’n Prod. Exch. Ctr. v. Shanghai Baoan Enter. 
Co., 2004 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 278-86 (Shanghai Pudong New Dist. Peoples Ct.), aff’d 
Shanghai No. 1 Interm. People’s Ct. (2003). 
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where the transferee shareholders cannot meet the obligations of the [guarantor] 
company, then these two [original] shareholders still have liability to make up the 
guaranty obligations.162 
 
This application of law can be derided as bad, or incompetent,163 but it is nonetheless an 
impressive demonstration of one basic level Shanghai People’s Court over-riding corporate and 
contract law norms to serve “the principles of fairness.”  The same orientation can be seen in 
another 2003 case where the Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court—with no basis in Law 
or judicial Regulation—ordered the “put” of equity by complaining shareholders back to 
company promoters who acted opportunistically and possibly fraudulently.164  As that Court said 
in evaluating the plaintiff shareholders’ suit for relief (and the ordered put), the put proposal is 
“fair, rational and feasible” (gongping, heli he kexing).165  In a 2006 example straddling the 
effectiveness of the 1994 and 2006 Company Laws, the Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate People’s 
Court wrote forthrightly that, in addition to what the statute commands, the court must also 
consider the “appropriateness” (zhengdangxing) and “rationality” (helixing) of a remedy as 
significant as dissolution.166    
 As discussed above, the Shanghai Courts use creative adjudication to fashion justice-
delivering procedural remedies in the form of derivative lawsuits, which were implemented 
                                                 
162 Shanghai Bonded Prod. Materials Mkt. China Commc’n Prod. Exch. Ctr. v. Shanghai Baoan Enter. Co., 
2004 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 282 (Shanghai Pudong New District Peoples Ct., 2003), 
(recognizing liability of former investors in joint operation (not corporate) guarantor) aff’d Shanghai No. 1 Interm. 
People’s Ct. (2003).   
163 Construed correctly under contract law principles, the transferee shareholders have a right in contract 
against the transferor shareholders, but only after paying out the guarantee made by the legal person guarantor they 
are invested in. 
164 Shanghai Jingfa Enter. Dev. Co. v. Shanghai Haining Petroleum Prod. Co., 2004 NIAN SHANGHAI 
FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 299-309 (Shanghai No. 2 Interm. People’s Ct., 2003), (holding court-ordered buyout of 
complaining shareholders is the “only remedy” and an “appropriate request” (on the part of plaintiffs) in light of 
shareholder deadlock and the failure of private ordering), aff’d, Shanghai Higher People’s Ct. (2003).   
165 Id. at 304. 
166 Addressed below in the discussion of lack of autonomy (identified deference to national economic and 
social policy):  Tang Chunxiao v. Zhou Huizhong, 2007 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 143 (Shanghai 
No.1 Interm. People’s Ct., 2006), (rejecting the plaintiff’s request for the dissolution of the corporation). 
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without statutory or bureaucratic authorization.167  Equally indicative is the way the Shanghai 
People’s Courts make frequent use of equitable principles to skillfully invoke “fairness” and 
privilege function over form.168  See how the Shanghai Courts handle the prickly question of 
judicially-directed profit distributions in flat contravention of statute (before 2006), contract or 
conforming resolution where (i) the company is taken hostage by one shareholder-director,169 
and (ii) even where the oppressed plaintiff has not properly contracted for the privilege or taken 
up its statutory rights.170  For an example of the latter situation, in 2003 the Pudong New District 
People’s Court and the Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court ordered the distribution of 
dividends to a former shareholder who had not contracted for profits or managed to convene a 
shareholders’ meeting to authorize such distribution.  Three significant obstacles would seem to 
                                                 
167  See supra notes 138 to 144 and accompanying text. 
168 See, e.g.,  Tang Chunxiao v. Zhou Huizhong, 2007 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 138-44 
(Shanghai No.1 Interm. People’s Ct., 2006) (ruling against plaintiff because of something akin to “unclean hands”); 
Shang A. v. Lü B., 2006 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 107-09 (unidentified Shanghai Interm. People’s 
Ct., 2006), (holding that plaintiff, widow of original named capital provider in “equity cooperative” (gufen hezuo) 
entity, who becomes a hidden shareholder (i.e., one whose interest is held in the defendant’s name) in post-
transformation limited liability company has the right to be listed as a named shareholder on the shareholder register 
of the post-transformation company, and vote at shareholders’ meetings, etc., because this is the “fairest” way to 
handle the problem), appeal dismissed, Shanghai Changning Dist. People’s Ct. (2006); Yu Xiaoqi v. Shanghai 
Changxin Accountancy Ltd., ANALYSIS OF NEW CASES 184, (Shanghai Changning District People’s Court and 
Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court, 2006) (reading into the Company Law a notice period which starts 
from the “receipt” of notice by shareholders, and not “distribution” of notice by parties convening the meeting); 
Shanghai Shenmao Dianci Factory v. Wang Longbao, 2006 HU YI ZHONG MIN SAN (SHANG) ZAI ZHONG ZI NO.1, 
2004 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 324-27 (Shanghai Nanhui District People’s Ct., 2004), aff’d, 
Shanghai No. 1 Interm. People’s Ct. (No. 3 Civ. Div.) (2004), (Intermediate People’s Court first (before over-ruling 
itself) sees forced buy-out of stock in “non-profit” stock cooperative upon plaintiff’s leaving employ a breach of 
good faith and fair dealing, even though consistent with regulation and the Articles of Association), overruled by, 
Shanghai No. 1 Interm. People’s Ct. (No. 3 Civ. Div.) (2006), also available at http://www.hshfy.sh.cn/fyitw/sweb/. 
169 See Co. A v. Co. B, SELECTED COMPANY LAW CASES 142-44 (Shanghai Nanshi Dist. People’s Ct., 
1997), (25% shareholder sues company under control of another minority shareholder for distribution of dividends 
from distributable profits per company Articles of Association, but not distributed because control party wants to 
redirect earnings to cash-poor beer plant asset), aff’d, Shanghai No. 1 Interm. People’s Ct. (1997).  But note contra 
and more conservative approach in Guo Chaoxu v. Shanghai Saiyang Textile Sci. & Tech. Co., SELECTED COMPANY 
LAW CASES 260-65 (Shanghai No. 2 Interm. People’s Ct., 2000), (refusing to order dividends distribution to 20% 
equity holder because, per the 1994 Company Law, this is a matter for a resolution of the shareholders’ meeting,—at 
which the 80% shareholder is assured to vote against dividend distribution,—and such shareholders’ resolutions can 
only be challenged in court where they are “in breach of law or administrative regulation, or infringe upon the 
lawful rights of shareholders”). 
170 See Huang Ziyu v. Guan Feng, 2004 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 312 (Shanghai No. 1 
Interm. People’s Ct., 2003), (judicially-directed profit distribution, even though there was no specific stock transfer 
agreement between plaintiff and defendant, because a stock transfer agreement nevertheless deemed to exist as the 
parties made their intention clear in a shareholder resolution).    
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have blocked such judicially-commanded dividend distributions:  formal adherence to the 1994 
Company Law made unavailable such distribution (because no shareholders’ meeting was 
convened), the complaining shareholder should have ensured his rights by contract, and the 
People’s Court did not at that time have the statutory power to direct such dividend 
distributions.171  Notwithstanding these recognized obstacles, and in the interest of vindicating 
the implied profit expectation making up a part of the shareholder’s bundle of property rights, the 
two Courts deemed that expectation triumphant over a more formalistic approach to the problem.  
In effect, these two Courts said that the status of shareholder in the corporation trumps the 
exercise of specific shareholders’ rights granted in statute or agreed in contract.172     
The Shanghai judiciary also uses equity court or even common law-like reasoning to 
“make law.”  One 2006 example173 shows the Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court using 
a sophisticated rationale to determine the date upon which a shareholder notice response period 
should start—from “receipt” and not “distribution” of the notice.  The Court reasons that because 
the point of notice is actual notification to shareholders so they can exercise their statutory rights 
and the Court must take into consideration the differences in physical location of shareholders, 
the Company Law notice provision, as written, must be interpreted so as to advantage 
shareholders or at least not injure them.174   
                                                 
171  A power explicitly gained in the 2006 Company Law, supra note 5, at art. 75(1). 
172 The Shanghai Higher People’s Court, in its commentary on the case, distinguishes between the 
“abstract” right to dividend distributions, and the “specific” right to the same—saying that the former triumphs over 
the latter in a situation where the corporate form itself acts to frustrate the ability to exercise the abstract right.   
Huang Ziyu v. Guan Feng, 2004 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 316 (Shanghai No. 1 Interm. People’s 
Ct., 2003). 
173 See Yu Xiaoqi v. Shanghai Changxin Accountancy Ltd., ANALYSIS OF NEW CASES  187, (Shanghai 
Changning Dist. People’s Ct. and Shanghai No. 1 Interm. People’s Ct., 2006).  Sadly, this judicial elaboration of the 
bald corporate law statute invalidates a special meeting and the entire lawsuit of a dissident shareholder group 
against a controlling shareholder/Legal Representative who has already been proven in breach of law and his 
corporate fiduciary duties.     
174 The Shanghai Court system has separately read into the Company Law a 30 day exercise (response) 
period for limited liability company shareholders’ exercise of a right of first refusal on a notified and approved 
transfer, and a one year statute of limitations on un-notified transfers (from registration of the transfer).  Nowhere do 
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 The People’s Courts in Shanghai also are adept at fashioning legal standards for 
application of the Company Law.  For instance, with regard to implementation of new Article 
183 (shareholders’ dissolution suits) in the 2006 Company Law, the Shanghai Higher People’s 
Court announced its own judicially-developed standards, or clarification as to what functions as a 
trigger for a viable dissolution claim (“no other remedies available” is valid, mere “injury to 
[plaintiff] shareholders” is not).175  More autonomously, the Shanghai Higher People’s Court 
confirmed doctrinal importations which do not appear anywhere in the statute, such as the 
standard which holds that the Courts will only dissolve companies pursuant to shareholder 
application when the board and shareholders’ meeting are no longer able to function in 
overseeing operations or agree corporate resolutions.176  A similar style of elaboration is at work 
when the Shanghai People’s Courts overreach to apply legal standards slightly beyond what the 
Law allows—for instance in examining a challenged shareholders’ resolution not only against 
Article 111 of the 1994 Company Law177 but in light of whether the suspect resolution might 
implicate the more generalized “deprivation of [shareholders’] rights.”178   
   The Shanghai Courts also fashion non-statutory remedies.  For example, although 
Articles 200 and 201 of the 2006 Company Law provide a legal basis for the levy of fines on 
investors who do not capitalize a limited liability company or fully pay-up their shares, the 2006 
                                                                                                                                                             
these provisions appear in the 2006 Company Law, but are instead entirely “judge-made” and apparently necessary 
because of the imperatives of “commercial transaction efficiency and the stability of legal relationships”.  Shanghai 
Higher People’s Court No. 2 Civil Division 2007, supra note 8, at 42.     
175 Id. at 45.   
176 This is one area that received specific doctrinal elaboration subsequently in the 2nd Judicial Regulations 
on the new Company Law issued in May of 2008.  See SPC COMPANY LAW REGULATIONS, supra note 94, at 7-11 
(these 2nd Regulations issued by the Supreme People’s Court address how the judiciary should handle People’s 
Court-directed firm dissolution, including the circumstances under which the People’s Courts should hear such 
cases, and the procedures for the settlement of liabilities and assets of the dissolved corporation).      
177 Under the statute, only invalid if violative of a law, an administrative regulation or the Articles of 
Association.   
178 Guo Chaoxu v. Shanghai Saiyang Textile Sci. & Tech. Co., 2000 HU ER ZHONG JING ZHONG ZI NO. 
280, SELECTED COMPANY LAW CASES 260-65 (Shanghai Hongkou People’s Dist. Ct., 1999), aff’d, Shanghai No. 2 
Interm. People’s Ct., (2000) (applying a standard which goes to “deprivation of shareholders’ rights), also available 
at http://www.lawyee.net/.   
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Company Law does not provide a civil remedy for such breaches (particularly for third parties 
dealing with the investee company at arms-length).  Accordingly, in 2006 the Shanghai People’s 
Courts allowed such a breach of funding obligations to support a third party creditor’s claim to 
pierce the corporate veil, and assessed joint and several responsibility for the liabilities of the 
company against the defaulting investor-shareholders.  Similarly, Article 31 of the 2006 
Company Law addresses only the joint and several liability of other shareholders to replenish in 
the event that a single shareholder’s in-kind contributions are deficient or initially overvalued.  
Noting that the same problem can occur when a cash-contributing investor does not make its 
contributions in a timely way, the Shanghai People’s Courts extended the joint and several 
liability of the other shareholders to replenish.  The People’s Courts of Shanghai also fashioned 
their own tough remedies for successful derivative actions, proclaiming the power to void 
challenged transactions or assess damages for the company against persons adjudicated to have 
acted improperly (the directors and officers pleaded as defendants in the derivative action) and 
even other persons involved in the same transactions.179   
 A final example in this line shows the almost passive-aggressive autonomy of Shanghai 
judicial officers on remedies issues, in which they are forced to decide a case in a highly 
formalistic manner, but instead openly push the litigants into re-pleading and in the direction of 
better alternative remedies.  In a 2006 judicial dissolution case, the Xuhui District People’s Court 
refused to order dissolution of a limited liability company, and further refused to consider sua 
sponte evident breaches of corporate fiduciary duties in the same case.  The District People’s 
Court then happily proceeded to remind the plaintiffs they can and should avail themselves of 
other remedies.  As the Court said:   
                                                 
179  Shanghai Higher People’s Court No. 2 Civil Division 2007, supra note 8, at 45.    
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... in addition, with respect to the seven plaintiffs’ belief that the three defendants 
have engaged in inappropriate behavior, [plaintiffs] are completely able to protect 
their lawful rights through the exercise of the shareholders’ rights bestowed upon 
them, such as information rights, compensation rights, etc.180 
 
C. The De Facto Partnership Problem and Autonomous Application of Substantive Law 
 
 A third major demonstration of autonomy in Company Law adjudication is the highly 
expert application of law and non-statutory legal principles that are sourced in common law-like 
considerations, and that seemingly contradict formal substantive law.  Between 1992 and 2008, 
this phenomenon is exemplified by both negative and affirmative action from the Shanghai 
People’s Courts.  In this period, they show a stubborn and correct refusal to apply substantive 
corporate law to entities established under the embrace of the Company Law but really 
organized as partnerships (or what Western business association law and doctrine distinguish as 
“close corporations”), and instead apply—seemingly out of thin air—universal partnership law 
principles to what are formally called corporations.181   
 A large amount of investment and commercial activity undertaken even in Reform-era 
China is through arrangements and vehicles that are neither corporate nor have anything much to 
do with the PRC Company Law, of whatever vintage.182  Although purely domestic investment 
and capital aggregation has exploded in China over the past 15 years, much of that is based in 
contract (and often not even contract law), such as “agreements” (xieyi), “joint operation” 
(lianying), “cooperative (hezuo)” or non-legal person “partnership” (hehuo)” arrangements.  
                                                 
180 See Yang Lizhi et al. v. Cao Chengjie et al., 2007 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 208, 
ANALYSIS OF NEW CASES 359  (Xuhui District People’s Ct., 2006), (holding that “compensation rights” 
(peichangquan) can include remedies for breach of corporate fiduciary duties). 
181 This is merely one aspect of the very difficult hand dealt to the PRC People’s Courts in the so-called 
corporate law cases, which includes the inability to apply the Company Law to large-scale companies limited by 
shares with a diffuse shareholder base (the whole reason for amendment of the Company Law).  See discussion infra 
notes 308 to 356 and accompanying text. 
182 See Donald C. Clarke, How Do We Know When an Enterprise Exists? Unanswerable Questions and 
Legal Polycentricity in China, 19 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 53, 61 (2005-06) (stating “there can be no doubt that courts 
and government agencies in China do grant de facto recognition to business organizations and other entities that 
have no solid statutory basis.”). 
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Even when something resembling a business organization is established, and even if formal 
“enterprise legal person” status is conferred on the entity by registration with the appropriate 
bureau of the State Administration of Industry and Commerce, the resulting firm often has no 
legal basis in the PRC Company Law, the various foreign-invested enterprise (“FIE”) statutes 
and implementing regulations promulgated since the late 1970s, or the “Regulations of the PRC 
on Administration of Company Registration.”183  Indeed, the enterprise legal person landscape in 
China today is populated by an unusual collection of business forms.  Sometimes these entities 
have a prior legal basis, as is the case with “collectively-owned enterprises.”  Sometimes they 
have a precarious legal basis, such as the entities based on local government-promulgated 
“limited partnership” statutes pre-dating and/or at variance with the PRC Partnership Enterprise 
Law.  And often they have no legal basis whatsoever, as is the case for the “stock cooperative” 
(gufen hezuo) form,184 “domestic equity limited liability joint venture companies” (guonei hezi 
                                                 
183 Promulgated by the PRC State Council on June 24, 1994, and amended by the State Council on 
December 18, 2005.  These are not just enterprises formed under the 1986 “Law of the PRC on Industrial 
Enterprises Owned by All of the People” (widely known as the PRC’s “State-owned Enterprise Law,” adopted by 
the 1st Session of the Seventh National People’s Congress on April 13, 1988, and effective as of August 1, 1988), 
the 2000 “Law of the PRC on Individual Proprietorships” (adopted at the 11th Meeting of the Standing Committee 
of the Ninth National People’s Congress on August 30, 1999 and effective as of January 1, 2000 ), or the 1997 “Law 
of the PRC on Township Enterprises” (meant to replace a separate law and a good deal of regulations on so-called 
“collectively-owned enterprises” (jiti suoyouzhiqiye), adopted at the 22nd Meeting of the Standing Committee of the 
Eighth National People’s Congress on October 29, 1996 and effective as of January 1, 1997).  For the presence of a 
collective in the sample, see Shanghai Jinzhu Agric. Trade & Commerce Co. v. Shanghai Weisirui Co., NEW 
COMPANY LAW ISSUES 279-82 (Shanghai No. 1 Interm. People’s Ct., 2000), (adjudicating a dispute over a purported 
equity transfer agreement with respect to interests in a “factory” converted into a collectively-owned enterprise). 
184 Alluded to by the Shanghai Higher People’s Court in its Company Law Opinion, SHANGHAI HIGHER 
PEOPLE’S COURT 2006, supra note 7, at 231-36, and discussed in several cases in the sample.  For a post-2006 
example, see Shanghai Shenmao Dianci Factory v. Wang Longbao, 2006 HU YI ZHONG MIN SAN (SHANG) ZAI 
ZHONG ZI NO.1, 2004 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 324-27 (Shanghai Nanhui District People’s Ct., 
2004), (forced buy-out of stock in “non-profit” stock cooperative upon Vice Chairman’s leaving employ pursuant to 
board regulations, shareholders’ resolution and Articles of Association not a violation of shareholders’ rights), aff’d, 
Shanghai No. 1 Interm. People’s Ct. (No. 3 Civ. Div.) (2004), overruled by, Shanghai No. 1 Interm. People’s Ct. 
(No. 3 Civ. Div.) (2006), also available at http://www.hshfy.sh.cn/fyitw/sweb/, where the Court cites not the PRC 
Company Law but instead a set of 1997 guidelines issued by the now-extinct Ministry-level Commission on the 
Restructuring of the Economic System (“CRES”) and Shanghai “Provisional Measures” on stock cooperatives and 
collectives. 
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youxian zerengongsi),185 the “private single shareholder enterprise” (siying duzi qiye),186 or the 
“enterprise groups” (jituan), which may or may not have independent legal personality or 
ownership of formal equity in their so-called “subsidiaries.”  China has the additional problem of 
a very large number of corporate forms set up not by commercial actors, investors, or 
shareholders, but directly by government departments—not just the “wholly state owned 
company” genus of the limited liability company permitted under the 1994 and 2006 Company 
Laws,187 but also direct establishments by very local-level governments.188  Chinese opinion-
writing judges and PRC scholars refer to all of these business association forms, both those 
formed by informal contract and those holdovers from the completely state-owned and controlled 
economy, as “issues left [to us] from history.”  However, they are not merely of historical 
import; they are encountered constantly in modern-day corporate law and commercial disputes, 
and very often where informal or state-tied investment arrangements have ripened into a 
corporate or enterprise legal person establishments and been registered as such.   
                                                 
185 Alluded to in one Shanghai opinion reviewed by the Supreme People’s Court, see Zhang Qingzhao v. 
Zhang Wenhu, 55:1 RENMIN FAYUAN ANLI XUAN 234-41, 235 (Supreme People’s Court China Practical 
Jurisprudence Research Institute, ed., 2006) [hereinafter SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT REPORTS] (Shanghai Baoshan 
Dist. People’s Ct., 2002), aff’d Shanghai No. 2 Interm. People’s Ct., 2004, another from 2000 by the Shanghai 
Higher People’s Court, Zhu Liqun v. Hong Bangyao, NEW COMPANY LAW ISSUES 194 (Shanghai Changning Dist. 
People’s Ct., 2000), aff’d unidentified Shanghai Interm. People’s Ct., (2000), and a 2008 case Ding Guangjian v. 
Yan Haibo, HU GAO MIN YI (MIN) ZHONG ZI NO. 49 (Shanghai Higher People’s Ct., No. 1 Civ. Div., 2008), 
available at http://www.hshfy.sh.cn.  The reference is usually to a limited liability company with only PRC 
investors, and thus not a limited liability company with foreign investment (which would make the entity subject to 
the PRC’s FIE laws), but how one wishes the Courts would simply refer to “Chinese capital limited liability 
companies” (zhongzi youxian zeren gongsi) without introducing the FIE joint venture term of art “joint venture” 
(hezi). 
186 Referred to, and deemed subject to registration, by the Shanghai Higher People’s Court in Shanghai 
Huayuan Real Estate Dev. Co. v. Shanghai Shenji Food & Beverage Enter. Mgmt. Co., NEW COMPANY LAW ISSUES 
152 (Shanghai Higher People’s Ct., No. 2 Civ. Div., 2002). 
187 See 1994 Company Law, supra note 4, at arts. 64-72; 2006 Company Law, supra note 5, at arts. 65-71. 
188 See Shanghai Kangpaisi Enter. Gen. Co. v. Shanghai Mun. Admin. of Indus. & Commerce Huangpu 
Dist. Branch, 2004 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 49-56 (Shanghai Higher People’s Ct., 2003), 
(adjudicating a case in which the defendant and contract party that was sued for performance of a condemnation and 
relocation agreement was the Huangpu District Office of the Shanghai Municipal Administration of Industry and 
Commerce).   
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 Accordingly, any analysis of the application of the (formal) Company Law in the 
People’s Courts cannot be limited to how the People’s Courts handle issues which are neatly 
identified by some authoritative actor, or even the disputants themselves, as within the purview 
of the Company Law or corporate norms.  Instead, analysis of contemporary China must focus 
on how informal (and often illegal) economic organizations, all very significant drivers of 
China’s recent growth and global expansion, are shaped and affected by the formal legal system 
and institutions, even when a seemingly obvious mismatch between indigenous forms and 
“modern” legal structures exists.189  In fact, the subjects of much interaction between the judicial 
system and the Company Law are entities which are not corporations but corporate-style 
partnerships, close corporations, or something akin to the Limited Liability Company or “LLC” 
form known in the United States.190   
                                                 
189 A good, and very specific, example of this mismatch is the linguistic oddity often seen when Chinese 
companies refer to their board of directors.  Instead of using the statutory term “board of directors’ meeting” 
(dongshi hui) (akin to the UK term for shareholders that is the “general shareholders’ meeting”), many companies—
even in public documents—call that central organ the “board of directors bureau” (dongshi jü).  For example, see the 
public notice issued by the board of directors of the electronics concern “Gome” in November 2008 when the 
company chairman was detained on suspicion of stock manipulation, in which the board refers to itself as the 
“dongshi jü”, at DONGFANG ZAOBAO [ORIENTAL MORNING NEWS], Nov. 24, 2008, at B9.  This may seem obscure to 
non-Chinese speakers, or even Chinese speakers who have so internalized the truth of Chinese corporate governance 
they do not see the difference, but the use of the character “jü” (bureau) instead of “hui” (meeting) gives the organ 
the taste of a central policy directing body (perhaps acting on behalf of a controlling shareholder), not a body meant 
to represent the entire shareholders’ meeting.  Thus, the linguistic oddity might inform not only different 
assumptions, but also different applications of legal doctrine.   
190 See, e.g., Zhang Qingzhao v. Zhang Wenhu, SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT REPORTS 234-41 (Shanghai 
Baoshan Dist. People’s Ct., 2002, No. 2 Interm. People’s Ct., 2004), (looking through apparent corporate 
establishment to impose general partnership rules); Shi Jianjia v. Shanghai Fuxing Mingfang Accountancy Firm Co., 
2004 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 319-22 (Shanghai Luwan Dist. People’s Ct., 2002), (holding that a 
limited liability company accountancy is in effect a corporate partnership based on the Articles of Association, with 
shareholders meeting as its highest authority, and when leaving the employ of the accountancy and thus 
disassociating himself, plaintiff must sell his interest to other continuing partners), aff’d Shanghai No. 1 Interm. 
People’s Ct., 2003; China Textile Mach. Co. v. Shanghai Mach. Imp. Exp. (Group) Co., NEW COMPANY LAW CASES 
239-43 (unidentified Shanghai Dist. and Interm. People’s Cts., 2001), (entity established before 1994 Company Law 
on the basis of a “joint investment agreement”, eventually with separate Articles of Association and “enterprise legal 
person” registration); Shanghai 100 Group Real Estate Co. v. Shanghai Aofeng Trade Dev. Group, NEW COMPANY 
LAW ISSUES 191-93 (Shanghai No. 1 Interm. People’s Ct., 1997), (parties established a limited liability company 
which was really a loose general partnership focusing on a real estate project, revealed when one of the parties tried 
to transfer a square-meter portion of the real estate assets theoretically “under” (owned by) the partnership, rather 
than an equity interest in the limited liability company); Yu Xiaoqi v. Shanghai Changxin Accountancy Ltd., 
ANALYSIS OF NEW CASES 178-87, (Shanghai Changning District People’s Court and Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate 
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 This is not the place to describe the reasons for the hardy persistence of the small-bore 
partnership form in the PRC business landscape, except to note that the phenomenon strongly 
recalls the persistence of the same forms in late imperial and pre-1949 China.191  It is closely tied 
to post-1978 economic reforms which saw initial privatization of smaller-scale SOEs and 
“collectively-owned enterprises”192 into various forms of non-state and non-collective 
ownership, especially “stock cooperatives” (gufen hezuo) or “stock cooperative companies” 
(gufen hezuo gongsi)193 with no legal basis whatsoever.194  Nor is this the place for a long 
                                                                                                                                                             
People’s Court, 2006), (subject firm is established as a “limited liability company” under the 1994 Company Law 
but—pursuant to the firm’s Articles of Association—has all the attributes of a limited liability partnership:  i.e., the 
entity has a board of directors, but the highest organ of authority in the entity is the shareholders’ meeting (which the 
board or a certain percentage of investors calls into session); voting rights tied to individual identity, not amount of 
equity contribution;  shareholders’ have a non-compete obligation and thus a duty of loyalty to the entity and the 
other members; upon death, retirement or transfer to another job, members’ interests are redeemed (or “sold to the 
company” on a mandatory basis) for a return of capital which is an individual’s participation in net partnership 
assets; some shareholders’ have agency power for the entity, etc.); Chen Zhijin v. Shanghai Kaikai Enter. Co., Ltd., 
1998 HU ER ZHONG JING ZHONG ZI NO. 729 (Shanghai Jingan Dist. People’s Ct., 1998), (plaintiff’s “internal” 
(employee’s) shares in company limited by shares properly subject to mandatory buy-back upon plaintiff’s leaving 
employ of company because the entity is really a close partnership), partially aff’d, Shanghai No. 2 Interm. People’s 
Ct., (1998), available at http://www.lawyee.net.   
191 It is a strong echo of the persistence of private, customary, and traditional partnership (hehuo) 
formations in China through the end of Qing rule, the Beiyang Government, and Nationalist Party rule, 
notwithstanding four separate company statutes and company registration procedures (1904, 1914, 1929 and 1946), 
the lack of a statute actually authorizing partnerships, and the conferral of shareholder limited liability only for 
registered “companies”.  See HISTORY OF CHINESE CORPORATE THOUGHT, supra note 39, at 36-37; MADELINE 
ZELIN, THE MERCHANTS OF ZIGONG: INDUSTRIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN EARLY MODERN CHINA 51-58 (2005) 
(describing lease/partnership arrangements in the Sichuan salt industry); id. at 84-94 (describing how an efficient 
management organization helped promote expertise, centralize control in a large group, and facilitiate vertical 
integration in salt conglomerates); Teemu Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship: Comparative Law 
and Development Theory in a Chinese Perspective, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1599, 1621 (2000) (suggesting that “clan 
corporations were also "true" corporate entities and ought to be viewed as predecessors of modem Chinese 
corporations.”). 
192 Thus not the large, line Ministry-run, SOE systems of productive and social assets which garnered so 
much world attention and the bulk of  formal “corporatization” efforts. 
193 NICHOLAS LARDY, CHINA’S UNFINISHED ECONOMIC REVOLUTION 21-24 (1998). 
194 With respect to explicitly-named “collectives”, see Shang A. v. Lü B., 2006 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN 
ANLI JINGXUAN 107-09 (Shanghai Changning Dist. People’s Ct., 2006), (plaintiff/original named capital provider in 
“equity cooperative” (gufen hezuo) entity who becomes hidden shareholder (i.e., share interest held in defendant’s 
name) in post-transformation limited liability company), dismissed, Interm. People’s Ct. not identified (2006); 
Shanghai Shenmao Dianci Factory v. Wang Longbao, 2004 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 324-27 
(Shanghai Nanhui Dist. People’s Ct., 2004), (forced buy-out of stock in “non-profit” stock cooperative upon Vice 
Chairman’s leaving employ pursuant to board regulations, shareholders’ resolution and Articles of Association is not 
a violation of shareholders’ rights, where the Court cites not the PRC Company Law but instead a set of 1997 
guidelines issued by the now-extinct Ministry level CRES and Shanghai “Provisional Measures” on stock 
cooperatives and collectives), aff’d, Shanghai No. 1 Interm. People’s Ct. No. 3 Civ. Div. (2004), rev’d on reh’g, 
Shanghai No. 1 Interm. People’s Ct. No. 3 Civ. Div. (2006), also vailable at http://www.hshfy.sh.cn/fyitw/gweb/.  
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exegesis on the fundamental differences between partnerships and corporate establishments, or 
the necessarily separate norms which govern them in a coherent manner.195  Those differences 
touch on every major area of enterprise law, including fiduciary duties (both for orthodox 
corporate fiduciaries and shareholder-investors), the ease and justification of asserting liability 
against promoter-shareholders (veil-piercing), the relationship between management/employee 
(contract) status and ownership (property) rights, and the adaptability of the enterprise upon the 
defection of any owner-operator.  The very obvious problem with the PRC Company Law and 
China’s relatively new company system is that the formal “Company” Law makes little of these 
fine distinctions, potentially leaving the deeply-disadvantaged People’s Courts in a position 
                                                                                                                                                             
For entities that “grow out” of collectives, see Yu Xiaoqi v. Shanghai Changxin Accountancy Ltd., ANALYSIS OF 
NEW CASES 178-87 (Shanghai Changning Dist. People’s Ct. and Shanghai No. 1 Interm. People’s Ct., 2006), 
(transferring limited liability company into a collectively-owned enterprise, with uncertain application of internal 
governance mechanisms arising from corporate law over former collective participants).  One authoritative Shanghai 
judge, the President of the Changning District People’s Court, offered a somewhat circular explanation for the 
abundance of partnerships established as limited liability companies which explanation invokes such “stock 
cooperatives” (gufen hezuo).  He stated in December 2008 that because such “stock cooperatives” continue to exist 
in such numbers in China, it is natural that a good number of disputes concerning their operation and internal 
governance enter the People’s Courts (remarks on file with the author).  This is only a partial explanation, because 
as this writing makes clear so much of the energy behind the application of partnership law principles in China is 
directed at close corporation-type business organizations formed long after the implementation of the 1994 
Company Law, where there was no question of rogue “stock cooperative” establishments or transformation of 
collectives or small SOEs into anything other than companies. 
195 Partnerships are the expression of an intimate, non-owner-alienated, business association, where the 
relatively few partners will participate in the running of the business and have confidence in the trustworthiness and 
technical competence of their co-venturers—a confidence based on knowledge about the other partners, their past 
performance in business, their skill-sets, etc.  That intimate association is recognized in the default partnership 
norms which distribute ownership and management authority equally to all of the partners, give full agency powers 
in regards to the partnership to each partner, and dictate that the partners share profits, and bear the burden of losses, 
equally.  Contrast with the partnership or sole proprietorship the orthodox corporate forms where powers attendant 
to the ownership right are parceled out among directors (centralized management), officers (day-to-day operations 
and management) and the mere capital providers (and residual interest rights holders) the share-“owners”—which 
shareholders are alienated from management authority, have no agency powers with respect to the corporation, and 
have a right to distributed profits only in accordance with the equity investment represented by their share capital, all 
in exchange for limited liability protection.  Yet one difference arising from the distinction is with respect to the 
costs of partnering (as contrasted with a corporate establishment):  the peculiar lack of adaptability seen in the 
partnership establishment, where per the default rule all partners have to agree on significant matters and 
disassociation (often resulting from inability to agree) by one partner leads to the dissolution of the association, and 
pay-out to the partners (redemption via liquidation).  Contrast the pure corporate form, where centralized 
management by the board of directors (requiring only a majority vote of the directors, and not unanimity) and their 
appointed management, and continuity of life of the entity, are undisturbed by the disagreement of even a significant 
proportion of shareholders or the departure of any mere “owner” via transfer of its share interest or—if permitted—
by stock redemption.     
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where they cannot apply, or must mis-apply, “corporate” law doctrine to what are in fact limited 
liability “partnerships”.196  As the Shanghai Higher People’s Court noted in 2003 when faced 
with this mismatch between legal form and enterprise reality,197 in corporate law matters the 
courts simply have to be experts in construing the rights and obligations relevant to the many 
business forms in play, whether or not the Courts have a legal or doctrinal basis. 
 Thus, it is a significant demonstration not only of judicial autonomy but also of real 
competence to see the Shanghai People’s Courts refuse to apply formal corporate law to so-
called “corporate” establishments and instead apply decision principles that conform to the 
reality underlying Chinese business organization and participant expectations.  In one well-
handled 2004 case, the Shanghai Baoshan District People’s Court (upheld by the Shanghai No. 2 
Intermediate People’s Court) looked through a de jure “corporate” establishment to understand a 
de facto “partnership” and ruled on the parties’ rights accordingly.  It did so not in conformity 
with the flawed PRC Partnership Enterprise Law but instead with universal partnership 
principles.198  In this very impressive work, the District-level People’s Court boldly disregarded 
the form of corporate establishment (including a “Shareholders Agreement” between the 
                                                 
196 This problem leads many analysts to think that China’s courts should not be applying the Company 
Law—which seeks to cover both closely-held corporate partnerships (or “limited liability companies” (youxian 
zeren gongsi)) and large, often publicly-held, companies limited by shares (gufen youxian gongsi)—to such close 
corporate partnerships, at least not with the formal tools they are given for their larger, public, cousins.  The 
obvious, but presently impossible, remedies to this problem are (i) a new set of statutes which apply specifically and 
separately to partnerships, LLC-type entities, close corporations (corporate partnerships), and orthodox joint stock 
corporations, etc., or (ii) People’s Court-led development of different doctrine which can be applied to different 
forms.  At the present time, neither of these remedies is realistic, with China having only recently amended its 
Company Law, the Supreme People’s Court working hard to compose Regulations for implementation of the 2006 
Company Law, and the People’s Courts not part of a system which would allow them to develop nationally-binding 
doctrine through cases opinions even if they possessed the requisite competence. 
197 Alluding to the difficulties encountered in dealing with “stock cooperative” (gufen hezuo) entities under 
the Company Law.  Shanghai Company Law Opinion, supra note 7, at 231. 
198 Zhang Qingzhao v. Zhang Wenhu, SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT REPORTS 234-41 (Shanghai Baoshan 
Dist. People’s Ct., 2002), (formal corporate establishment to be disregarded, and investors to be seen as general 
partners, with liquidation and distribution rights determined accordingly), aff’d Shanghai No. 2 Interm. People’s Ct. 
(2004).  The Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court opinion is summarized at length in the attached Case 
Reports Appendix. 
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investors) to rule that the entity is in fact a kind of general partnership and order equal partner 
distributions of the residual assets (rather than different proportions of the residual assets 
determined by the investors’ notional “equity” investment). 
 The same smart application of law can be identified after January 1, 2006.  For instance, 
for calendar year 2006 the Shanghai Higher People’s Court reported a large number of cases in 
which company Articles of Association provide for expulsion of shareholders by the 
shareholders’ meeting upon the occurrence of certain events, including infringement upon the 
rights of other shareholders, failure to fully pay-in capital, withdrawal or termination of human 
capital contributions, and the like.  The 2006 Company Law countenances no such possibility, as 
is correct under corporate law doctrine.  The Higher People’s Court reported much litigation 
arising from this contradiction, where the expelled shareholder says he or she simply cannot have 
his or her status as a shareholder extinguished (absent redemption of his or her share interest at 
the initiative of the shareholder).  The respondent company commonly answers by portraying the 
Articles of Association as the shareholders’ agreement and the full contractual expression of 
almost sacred “private ordering,” so that when one contract party fails to abide by its obligations 
the other contract parties can exercise the remedies set forth in the contract (expulsion from the 
company).  The Higher People’s Court supported the latter jurisprudence in explicit terms 
because the result protects the power of “private ordering”199 and “freedom of contract” in 
China’s new semi-marketized economy.200  Yet, what the Shanghai Higher People’s Court was 
                                                 
199  See infra notes 205 to 225 and accompanying text. 
200 And under the condition that the expulsion mechanism does not contravene any mandatory rule of law, 
or harm the interests of creditors, see Shanghai Higher People’s Court No. 2 Civil Division 2007, supra note 8, at 
46-47.  See how the Shanghai Courts achieve the same emphasis in Shanghai Yingdafang Serv. Co. v. Shanghai 
Yingdafang Zhangjiang Serv. Co. et al., 2007 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 190-95 (Pudong New Dist. 
People’s Ct., 2005), aff’d Shanghai No.1 Interm. People’s Ct. (2005), (summarized in the Case Reports Appendix); 
Yu Xiaoqi v. Shanghai Changxin Accountancy Ltd., ANALYSIS OF NEW CASES 178-87 (Shanghai Changning Dist. 
People’s Ct., 2006), aff’d Shanghai No. 1 Interm. People’s Ct. (2006), (a limited liability company which has all the 
properties of a partnership).  
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actually doing is something far more profound than a hymn to self-ordering:  it was exercising a 
high degree of autonomy (and not a little “legal realism”) in supporting application of company 
law in conformity with the underlying identity of China’s firms, or “partnerships.”  This may be 
a bit of a travesty in corporate law terms but shows a technical skill and autonomy  not generally 
associated with the Chinese People’s Courts in their history. 
 A related instance of autonomous and commendable misapplication of the law is one case 
from the mid-1990s in which the Shanghai Higher People’s Court—in an initial hearing and then 
re-hearing—bent over backwards not to invalidate a share transfer agreement between the 
shareholders of a two-shareholder entity which would have resulted in a single-shareholder 
limited liability company, something not permitted under the 1994 Company Law.201  In a 
remarkable opinion, the Higher People’s Court offered various remedies to the technical problem 
at issue—the legal impossibility of a single shareholder company—with helpful suggestions, one 
of which is plainly illegal.  The Court blithely suggested that the resulting sole shareholder can 
(i) actively find another shareholder, (ii) change the company into an unlimited liability entity, 
(iii) liquidate the company, or (iv) continue to operate the company as a single shareholder 
company.  As the Shanghai Higher People’s Court, the apex of the Shanghai judicial system, 
wrote with some degree of understatement, “the three first ideas are legal, and the fourth idea has 
some degree of illegality.”202  The Shanghai Court then went even further afield with the 
assurance that external creditors of a single shareholder company will be protected because they 
can “avail themselves of the [protective] remedy that is disregard of the corporate form.”  This is 
equally odd jurisprudence because, at the time, corporate veil-piercing had no formal legal basis 
                                                 
201 Shanghai Huayuan Real Estate Dev. Co.  v. Shanghai Shenji Food and Beverage Enter. Mgmt. Co., 
NEW COMPANY LAW ISSUES 148-52 (Shanghai Higher People’s Ct., No. 2 Civ. Div., 2002), (shareholders’ 
agreement which will result in a single shareholder limited liability company is legal and binding, and local bureau 
of industry and commerce should register resulting entity).  
202  Id. at 151 (emphasis added). 
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(statutory or Regulatory).  The Court then came to a final, dizzying, turn, by arguing in favor of 
spontaneously-formed single shareholder companies203 as a necessary legal-structural remedy for 
shareholder-deadlocked companies because the other remedy in corporate law—a shareholder’s 
suit to ask for judicial dissolution of the entity—“has no legal basis under the Company Law.”  
In the space of a few lines in one opinion, the Higher People’s Court has counseled “some degree 
of illegality,” provided assurances to creditors based on a mechanism which the People’s Courts 
are not authorized to apply, and then argued again in favor of the admitted illegality because the 
only other legal claim is unauthorized.  Yet, this exercise of extreme autonomy has a 
praiseworthy aspect when compared with the many post-2006 cases demonstrating hostility to 
judicially-directed deadlock resolution.204  The remedy suggested in this decision, which slides 
up against (and over?) the line of illegality and doctrinal incoherence, is a rational technique 
allowing two warring shareholders to re-deploy their capital investment to better productive uses 
and escape the straightjacket of a badly-drafted 1994 Company Law. 
 
D. Protecting Firm Autonomy and Private Ordering 
 
 Fourth, the Shanghai Courts express their autonomy by acting as the guardian of 
corporate and commercial autonomy itself.  In recent years each of the State Council, the 
National People’s Congress205 and the Shanghai Higher People’s Court206 has pointed to the 
enabling of this function as a key policy aim behind the 2006 Company Law amendments.  Thus, 
China’s law drafters apparently hoped that the new Company Law would protect the autonomy 
                                                 
203 The problem under the 1994 Company Law was that even limited liability companies required two 
initial promoters.  The Shanghai Higher People’s Court is saying here that it will permit companies which are 
established with the requisite two shareholders but spontaneously become single shareholder entities with post-
establishment transfer of all shares into the hands of one shareholder. 
204 And the overwhelming concern with what the Shanghai People’s Courts call “market stability” and 
entity preservation at all costs.  See infra notes 233 to 245 and accompanying text.  
205  LAO Company Law Explanation, supra note 19.  
206  Shanghai Company Law Opinion, supra note 7, at 5.  
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of corporate legal persons and also the parties who form and operate them, a position in direct 
contrast to the legal positivist “business regulation” philosophy underpinning both the 1994 
Company Law and much of China’s substantive law and regulation produced from the start of 
the Reform era.  This idea is most often exemplified in opinion rhetoric and case outcomes 
which uphold the idea of “market autonomy” against state power/regulation, and the equally 
sustained support for “private ordering” and “self-regulation” versus mandatory business 
regulation.   
 This orientation seems to have been in effect even before the 2005 amendments.207  A 
2004 case presenting a situation all too common in Chinese corporate dealings—the frustration 
of corporate decision-making by failure of a board chairman (and Legal Representative (fading 
daibiaoren)) to convene a shareholders’ or board meeting—is lost by plaintiffs because the 
Shanghai Luwan District People’s Court privileged the entity’s Articles of Association208 (which 
give the board chairman in question the exclusive authority to convene such meetings), despite 
clear evidence that the same chairman was protecting the shareholding group he represented 
against the other shareholders in the company and in clear breach of his/their corporate fiduciary 
duties to the company.209  The Court issued a mini-sermon on the virtues of strict deference to 
private arrangements such as Articles of Association over “public authority” (i.e., bedrock 
corporate law principles applied by judicial institutions): 
                                                 
207 But not uniformly.  See, e.g., Co. A v. Co. B, SELECTED COMPANY LAW CASES 142-44 (Shanghai 
Nanshi Dist. People’s Ct., 1997), (25% shareholder sues company under control of another minority shareholder for 
distribution of dividends from profits per company Articles of Association, but not distributed because control party 
wants to redirect earnings to cash-poor beer plant asset), aff’d, Shanghai No. 1 Interm. People’s Ct. (1997).  In that 
case, on appeal the defendant argued that the plaintiff shareholder should not be able to sue the company for failure 
to distribute dividends because the problem should have been resolved at the shareholders’ meeting or board 
meeting level, and only if the resulting resolutions in some way infringed upon the lawful rights of the plaintiff 
shareholder could the plaintiff sue under Article 111 of the 1994 Company Law.  The Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate 
People’s Court rejected this solid statutory argument, and ordered the distribution of dividends with interest in line 
with the plaintiff’s inherent right (also described in the Articles of Association) to 25% of after tax profits. 
208 Based, however, on the formal articles of the 1994 Company Law which direct the same. 
209 See the same result in X. Fang v. Y. Information Tech. Co., Ltd., 2005 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI 
JINGXUAN 59-65 (Shanghai Yangpu Dist. People’s Ct., 2005). 
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This case demonstrates another issue, the connection between public authority 
(gongquanli) and internal corporate governance.  The main bases for the Court’s 
decision [in this case]… are the effectiveness of the Articles of Association and 
the shareholders resolutions.  Corporate law invests great authority in corporate 
Articles of Association and the shareholders’ meeting, which is an expression of 
the principle of self-regulation [autonomy] of corporate legal persons.  [There is] 
[o]ne important pre-condition however, and that is that no mandatory prohibition 
of law is contravened.  [Thus,] even if there are aspects that are not completely 
rational, we will in the end let them be self-resolved by shareholder resolution in 
accordance with the company’s own development process, the increasing 
understanding between the shareholders, and the progressive perfecting of the 
Articles of Association.  The public authority must not impose judgments 
directing that [shareholders’] resolutions produced by legally-conforming 
procedures be [changed] this way or that way, and must not exceed its power by 
interfering in a company self-governance scheme or its ability to make decisions 
regarding its own internal affairs (assuming that they comply with law).210 
 
The Yingdafang case from 2005, which is briefed in the Case Reports Appendix, also shows a 
perhaps wrongly-decided case where self-ordering—as expressed in company Articles of 
Association—completely swallows the quasi-immutable statutory/legal norms of fiduciary duty 
of loyalty.211   
 The orientation of the Shanghai courts as guardian of corporate autonomy is stronger 
after 2006.  In its 2007 analysis of more than 750 Company Law-related opinions rendered in 
2006, the Shanghai Higher People’s Court confirms one side of the achieved result, asserting the 
“exhaustion of internal remedies” as one of the principles perceived at work in post-January 1, 
                                                 
210 X. Jiyin Chip Co. et al. v. Y. Group Co., Ltd., 2005 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 75 
(Shanghai Luwan Dist. People’s Ct., 2001).  This rhetorical position is countered by the result from the Shanghai 
No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court in the A. Inv. Dev. Co. v. Wang case alluded to below, infra note 214, where the 
Court has to choose between a fraudulent, albeit privately-ordered, stock transfer contract (and the interests of a 
good faith purchaser), on one side, and the preemptive rights bestowed on existing shareholders in the Company 
Law, on the other—coming down firmly on the side of the Company Law, probably because of the presence of fraud 
in the underlying transfer contract. 
211 Shanghai Yingdafang Serv. Co. v. Shanghai Yingdafang Zhangjiang Serv. Co., 2007 NIAN SHANGHAI 
FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 190-95 (Pudong New Dist. People’s Ct. and Shanghai No.1 Interm. People’s Ct., 2005).  
See also Guo Shaoqu v. Shanghai Saiyang Textile Sci. and Tech. Co., 2000 HU ER ZHONG JING ZHONG ZI NO. 280, 
SELECTED COMPANY LAW CASES 260-65 (Shanghai Hongkou People’s Dist. Ct., 1999) (People’s Courts refuse to 
order dividend distribution to 20% equity holder because, per the 1994 Company Law, this is a matter for a 
shareholders’ meeting resolution (which 80% shareholder is assured of passing against dividend distribution) and 
such shareholders’ resolutions can only be challenged in court where they are “in breach of law or administrative 
regulation, or infringe upon the lawful rights of shareholders”), aff’d, Shanghai No. 2 Interm. People’s Ct. (2000), 
also available at http://www.lawyee.net. 
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2006 corporate law jurisprudence.212  This assertion means that parties involved in corporate 
disputes were encouraged and permitted to take full advantage first of internal (i.e., intra-
shareholder) remedies before having recourse to procedures and mechanisms directed by public 
institutions, such as derivative actions, or lawsuits seeking judicially-ordered equity transfers or 
dividend distribution.213  Confirmation of this new dogma appears in the Shanghai No. 1 
Intermediate People’s Court 2007 commentary on a pre-2006 Company Law case,214 in which 
the adjudicating Court is deemed to have chosen “incorrectly” between protection of the existing 
shareholders’ right of first refusal on transfer, on one side, and the rights of a good faith third 
party stock transferee under a fraudulently “shareholder-approved” transfer agreement, on the 
other.  The People’s Court’s post-January 1, 2006 commentary on the case makes clear the 
extent to which judges working in the Shanghai system are to prioritize private ordering over the 
statutory framework:     
First and foremost, the thing we must clarify is this:  the jurisprudential logic 
underlying the giving of priority to the shareholders’ preemptive rights of 
purchase over the [good faith] purchase rights of the transferee is absolutely not 
because the former right is in statute, and the latter is merely a contract right.  
This is because statutory rights are not always superior to contract rights—in fact, 
it is just the opposite.  Approaching it systemically, and adhering to the 
orientation which protects private ordering, regulation of the market requires that 
the formulation of law fully respects the freedom to contract, so as to encourage 
successful transactions.…  The amendments resulting in the 2006 Company Law 
                                                 
212 Those other two principles identified are: (i) priority to commercial law (shang fa) over civil law (minfa) 
in adjudicating corporate law cases (see infra notes 301 to 303 and accompanying text for the meaning of this idea 
in the PRC context); and (ii) distinguishing between internal (governance) and external (third party) corporate 
interactions. 
213 For a post-2006 expression of what the Shanghai Higher People’s Court deems a new line, see Yu 
Xiaoqi v. Shanghai Changxin Accountancy Ltd., ANALYSIS OF NEW CASES 185 (Shanghai Changning Dist. People’s 
Ct. 2006), (striking down contested shareholder resolutions passed at dissident special shareholders’ meeting 
because they were defective under a strict reading of the company’s Articles of Association, which are given priority 
over the corporate law), aff’d, Shanghai No. 1 Interm. People’s Ct. (2006). 
214 See A. Inv. Dev. Co. v. Wang, 2005 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 106-09 (Shanghai No. 1 
Interm. People’s Ct., on appeal, 2003), (shareholder resolution approving transfer of 83% of company stock by one 
shareholder without exercise of preemptive rights by other shareholders pursuant to Article 35 of the 1994 Company 
Law is forged for beneficiary of rights by application of forged seal for the beneficiary; the higher Court then 
invalidates the original transfer contract to a third party, giving the Company Law preemptive right precedence over 
the falsely-approved contract).  
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with respect to issues regarding transfer of shares in limited liability companies 
especially emphasize:  “Where the Articles of Association make other stipulations 
on share transfers, those other stipulations shall govern.”  There is significant 
meaning in this.215 
 
This is a remarkable view of state-issued norms in the context of recent Chinese history, and 
certainly a departure from the view of Chinese law even through the 1990s.  The same 
orientation is seen in other post-January 1, 2006 Shanghai Company Law cases.  A case decided 
on appeal in 2006 shows heavy privileging of apparent self-ordering via Articles of Association 
and entity “regulations” approved by the board, where the result is to disenfranchise someone 
clearly a shareholder.216  A late 2006 case arising in Shanghai’s Changning District shows the 
extraordinary weight placed on a company’s partnership agreement-like Articles of Association, 
as an expression of “private ordering”, which triumphs absolutely over the larger default 
provisions or corporate law doctrines of the Company Law such as fiduciary duties.  In that case, 
even with public identification of (and administrative punishment for) breach of corporate 
fiduciary duties and fraud by a controlling shareholder/Legal Representative, resolutions passed 
by a dissident shareholders special meeting were ruled invalid because the dissident meeting was 
not convened, and the voting at the meeting was not effected, in technical conformity with the 
agreed Articles of Association.217  Finally, a 2007 Intermediate People’s Court218 went so far 
                                                 
215 Id. at 111. 
216 Shanghai Shenmao Dianci Factory v. Wang Longbao, 2006 HU YI ZHONG MIN SAN (SHANG) ZAI 
ZHONG ZI NO.1, 2004 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 324-27 (Shanghai Nanhui Dist. People’s Ct., 2004), 
(forcing buy-out of stock in “non-profit” stock cooperative upon Vice Chairman’s leaving employ pursuant to board 
regulations, shareholders’ resolution and Articles of Association not a violation of shareholders’ rights), aff’d, 
Shanghai No. 1 Interm. People’s Ct. (No. 3 Civ. Div.) (2004), rev’d on reh’g, Shanghai No. 1 Interm. People’s Ct. 
(No. 3 Civ Div.) (2006), also available at http://www.hshfy.sh.cn/fyitw/gweb/.  In this case, the defendant entity 
actually pleaded that assertion of “law” over the agreements in the board “regulations” and the Articles of 
Association amounted to “state interference.”  
217 The defects are very, very, arcane, and related to meeting notice, and the status of individuals who have 
died, redeemed their equity, or transferred their equity to third parties.  See  Yu Xiaoqi v. Shanghai Changxin 
Accountancy Ltd., ANALYSIS OF NEW CASES 187 (Shanghai No. 1 Interm. People’s Ct., 2006).. 
218 In Sun X. v. Li Y., described in Fayuan Nengfo Shouli Gudong Qingqiu Queren Gudonghui Jueyi 
Youxiao de Susong [Should the People’s Courts Accept Shareholders’ Suits Seeking Confirmation of Validity of 
Shareholders’ Resolutions?] in “GONGSI JIUFEN YU GONGSIFA JIUJI” YANTAOHUI – LUNWENJI, 28-29 [hereinafter 
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rhetorically as to see off its own role—judicial intervention—with the ringing admonition “the 
People’s Courts should not use the coercive power of the state to interfere with matters within 
the scope of a company’s self-governance.”219  
 There is one final angle from which to divine the approach of the Shanghai judiciary to 
the relative autonomy of firms as against the state, or state business regulation.  In this regard, 
the Courts act as cheerleaders for the transformation of business entities run as political 
departments to autonomous business enterprises aggregating property rights of investors.  An 
April 2006 opinion addressing one of many judicial dissolution cases on the Shanghai People’s 
Courts’ docket refused to grant shareholder plaintiffs the dissolution remedy, but took the 
opportunity in scolding dicta to lecture defendant directors of the limited liability company entity 
for their obvious failure to understand that they are no longer political cadres operating a 
collectively-owned enterprise, but really shareholders and corporate directors who have a 
radically different relationship to their co-investors (the former worker-participants in a 
collectively-owned enterprise): 
But, the People’s Court has also noticed that the three defendants, as directors of 
the company, have not really made the transition from their former role as leaders 
(lingdao jiaosi) of a collectively-owned enterprise to that of shareholders in a 
limited liability company.  For instance, in calling shareholders’ meetings they 
have not conformed to their notification obligations, have failed in bringing about 
discussion of corporate operating policies, and ignored the other related rights of 
the seven plaintiffs.  In addition, in managing corporate finances, there seems to 
be in evidence action which includes the transfer of corporate funds into personal 
accounts and the holding out of corporate vehicles as personal assets.  And, the 
expenditures by the company have not been handled transparently, etc.  The 
above-described actions by the defendants have certainly brought about the lack 
                                                                                                                                                             
COMPANY CONTROVERSIES] (Shanghai Higher People’s Court No. 2 Civil Division and East China University of 
Politics and Law, eds., 2008)  (Dist. People’s Ct. not identified), appeal filed Shanghai No. 2 Interm. People’s Ct. 
(No. 3 Civ. Div.) (2007 or 2008).  This is the same case invoked as a demonstration of judicial “conservatism,” see 
infra text accompanying notes 247 to 251. 
219 Id. at 28. 
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of trust by the plaintiffs, which has resulted in the disagreement [between 
shareholders].220 
 
This statement is a wonderful articulation by a Shanghai People’s Court—not a legislator, 
regulator or government official—of the new status, obligations and rights of the natural persons 
transformed from agents of the state into the subjects of corporate law who are fiduciaries for 
firm owners.221   
 Conversely, if the Shanghai Courts are in the business of protecting firm autonomy, and 
urging former political actors to participate in the new system as commercial actors (under law), 
they also function to disallow political actors the use of corporatization and the law as a shield.  
In a 2007 case, the lower-level People’s Court and the Shanghai Higher People’s Court 
dismissed two defenses:  one that sought to distinguish SOE-subsidiary “enterprise department” 
action from the interests of the SOE itself, and another that sought to protect a corrupt cadre from 
prosecution because he had diverted funds to a “commercial” limited liability company he 
promoted and controlled absolutely.222  A similar case, also from 2007, summarily dismissed a 
criminal defendant’s assertions that his corporate misfeasance (false accounts to boost manager 
bonuses, etc.) and breach of corporate law and regulation were unrelated to the crime of “private 
misappropriation of public assets” because they were the internal affairs of a corporate entity 
                                                 
220 Yang Lizhi v. Cao Chengjie, 2007 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 208, ANALYSIS OF NEW 
CASES 356-59  (Xuhui Dist. People’s Ct., 2006). 
221 And the real requirements for effectuation of the decade-long effort to “separate enterprise from 
administration” (zhengqi fenkai) under the Company Law in Reform-era China. 
222 See PRC v. Xue Henghe, 2007 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 447-52 (Shanghai Rail 
Transp. Interm. People’s Ct., 2007), (affirming that, under the principle “he who invests has property ownership 
rights” (shei touzi shei yongyou chanquan), the SOE subsidiary “enterprise department” is  “owned” (and governs 
assets belonging to) the SOE, even when administered independently; the corporation set up to receive diversion of 
assets from the same “enterprise department” is pierced because the corporation is entirely controlled by, and gives 
benefits to, the criminal defendant), aff’d, Shanghai Higher People’s Ct. (2007).  
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(albeit a registered SOE).223  The Court had none of this theory, and sentenced the defendant to 
several years in prison and return of diverted income.224  
 In sum, the Shanghai People’s Courts are simultaneously exercising increased autonomy 
in supporting the newly-enabled private ordering of firms that operate in China’s quasi-market 
economy and in frustrating the use of such new firms as shields for corrupt state cadre activity.225 
 
E. Exercise of Judicial Power 
 
 A fifth aspect of institutional autonomy demonstrated in Shanghai is the willingness of 
Courts to void or rearrange private arrangements, and exercise significant regulatory power.  The 
Shanghai People’s Courts demonstrated these powers very well even before 2006, in cases in 
which they: 
• liberally declared void ab initio share transfer agreements (and associated purchase 
obligations) which had not seen waiver of non-selling shareholders’ rights of first 
refusal;226  
 
• ordered, with great assurance, the buy-out of unhappy shareholders where there was 
strong evidence of opportunistic or even fraudulent behavior by promoter shareholders;227 
                                                 
223 PRC v. Wang Haiqing, 2007 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 437-42 (Shanghai Hongkou 
Dist. People’s Ct., 2007). 
224 This is consistent with the same sensitivity and approach taken in a 2001 criminal case, where the 
establishment of a new, private enterprise by an SOE manager designed to skim transfer value from the SOE’s 
sourcing transactions is a violation of the Criminal Law’s prohibition against “illegally engaging in the same 
business” (as an SOE where the criminal defendant is posted):  see PRC v. Shen XY, 2005 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN 
ANLI JINGXUAN 260-64 (Shanghai Higher People’s Ct., 2001).   
225 With respect to the affirmative protection of private ordering, there may be a less sanguine view of this 
adjudicatory orientation.  As noted below, the Shanghai People’s Courts may be using the enforcement of so-called 
private ordering to avoid employing their full powers to vindicate more abstract and de-stabilizing corporate law 
principles, like fiduciary duties.  This phenomenon is addressed below in the separate discussion of the identified 
constraints on autonomy of the Shanghai Courts.  See infra notes 284 to 307 and accompanying text. 
226 See Zhu Liqun v. Hong Bangyao, NEW COMPANY LAW ISSUES 194-97 (Shanghai Changning Dist. 
People’s Ct., 2000), (declaring void a share transfer agreement involving equity in limited liability company because 
approval of transfer not obtained from “all” shareholders), aff’d, Shanghai Interm. People’s Ct. (2000); Wu Yazhong 
v. Shanghai Xi Bin Clothes Mfg. Co., NEW COMPANY LAW ISSUES 203-05 (Shanghai Fengxian Dist. People’s Ct., 
2000), (share transfer agreement involving registered capital interests in Chinese-foreign equity joint venture void 
because approval for proposed transfer not sought from other participants (or their board appointees) pursuant to 
statute, the joint venture contract and articles of association, and the examination and approval authority governing 
such foreign invested enterprises), aff’d, Shanghai Interm. People’s Ct. (2000).  
227 Shanghai Jingfa Enter. Dev. Co. v. Shanghai Haining Petroleum Prod. Co., 2004 NIAN SHANGHAI 
FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 299, 303 (Shanghai No. 2 People’s Ct., 2003), (where judicial buyout of complaining 
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• ordered corporate actors to conform to their legal obligations in certain circumstances—
in one case so as to protect and elaborate the full range of property rights (transferability, 
right to profits, and voting rights) where a capital provider’s contribution had not been 
recognized by the investee company and the People’s Courts ordered the defendant 
corporations to undertake their registration obligations;228 
 
• adjudicated legal person entities as tortfeasors for the actions of their officers and 
employees;229 and 
 
• assessed criminal liability against control parties and key employees.230 
 
In fact, the Shanghai Courts on occasion seem too powerful in corporate adjudication.  In a 2006 
case, the People’s Courts criminalized an enthusiastic pursuit of the financial/advisory/asset 
management business (which is construed as the “public offering” of units in an investment fund 
in breach of the PRC securities regulatory regime).231  In a 2007 example, the People’s Courts 
effectively criminalized what looks like a simple ultra vires defect by defendants who had set up 
                                                                                                                                                             
shareholders is the “only remedy” and an “appropriate request” on the part of plaintiffs in light of shareholder 
deadlock and the failure of private ordering) aff’d, Shanghai Higher People’s Ct. (2003).  
228 Shang A. v. Lu B., 2006 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 107-09 (Shanghai Changning Dist. 
People’s Ct., 2006), (plaintiff/originally-named capital provider in “equity cooperative” (gufen hezuo) entity who 
becomes hidden shareholder (i.e., share interest held in defendant’s name) in post-transformation limited liability 
company has right to be listed as a name shareholder on the shareholder register of the post-transformation 
company, and vote at shareholders’ meetings, etc., unless such recognition violates a mandatory rule), appeal 
dismissed, unidentified Interm. People’s Ct. (2006). 
229 Wang A. v. Shanghai B. Pub. Transp. Co., 2006 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 7-10 
(Shanghai Luwan Dist. People’s Ct., 2006), aff’d and appeal denied, Interm. People’s Ct. (2006). 
230 See PRC v. Yang Demao, NEW COMPANY LAW CASES 460-65 (Shanghai Luwan District People’s Court, 
2003), (deeming preferential transfers by controlling shareholders out of company approaching liquidation either to 
loot company in breach of duties, or remove assets from creditors’ claims, as basis for the crime of “harmfully 
impeding liquidation”), aff’d, Shanghai No. 1 Interm. People’s Ct. (2003); PRC v. A. Internet Co., 2006 NIAN 
SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 305-09 (Shanghai Pudong Dist. People’s Ct., 2006), (corporate legal person 
criminally liable under PRC Criminal Law Article 366 crime of “unit (legal person) distribution of pornography for 
profit”, and same for those corporate officers and employees “having direct management responsibility” or who are 
“directly responsible”), aff’d and appeal denied, Interm. People’s Ct. (2006); PRC v. Shanghai X. Real Estate Jingji 
Brokerage Ltd., 2006 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 334-37 (Shanghai Xuhui Dist. People’s Ct., 2006), 
(limited liability company which has engaged in fraudulent real estate contracting and transactions assessed criminal 
liability), aff’d and appeal denied, unidentified Interm. People’s Ct. (2006); PRC v. X. Sec. Ltd., 2006 NIAN 
SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 340-45 (unidentified Shanghai Dist. People’s Ct.), (securities company building 
government-approved financial advisory and asset management business collects investment funds from a very 
broad public against promises of high “interest” return, and thus is engaged in illegal public offering of securities, 
commercial banking, etc., both company and executives and employees directly responsible have criminal liability), 
appeal denied, Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court (2006).   
231 PRC v. X Sec. Ltd., 2006 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 340 (unidentified Shanghai Dist. 
People’s Ct., aff’d and appeal denied, Shanghai No. 2 Interm. People’s Ct. (2006). 
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an unregistered equity trading business (dealing in unlisted stock).232  All of these outcomes 
demonstrate a Shanghai judiciary which acts not only with autonomy but a good degree of self-
confidence and raw institutional power in application of law as business regulation. 
 
IV. AUTONOMY CONSTRAINTS 
 
 In contrast with the demonstrations of significant judicial autonomy reviewed above, the 
Shanghai People’s Courts between 1992 and 2008 also faced serious constraints on that same 
hard-won autonomy in corporate law adjudication, three in particular:  (a) deference by the 
Courts to national social or economic policy and in contravention of what the Law commands or 
permits; (b) a multi-headed conservatism in implementation of the Company Law (including the 
seemingly toxic corporate fiduciary duties doctrine); and (c) the rejection (instructed or 
voluntary) of public company cases or cases involving companies limited by shares and thus 
non-application of the Company Law to those firms or their shareholders. 
 
A. Application of the Law to Support Public Policy in Contravention of Law 
 
In 2007 the Shanghai Higher People’s Court praised newly-inserted clauses of the 
Company Law designed to unblock deadlocked companies,233 in particular a new Article 183 
which allows shareholders to petition for firm dissolution.  In its focus on new Article 183 
however, the Higher People’s Court raised a concern which exemplifies a first constraint 
working on the autonomy of the Shanghai Courts.  Explicitly alluding to the importance of 
continued firm existence and operation for growth, employment, and social welfare, the Higher 
                                                 
232 PRC v. Fang Kun, 2007 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 419-26 (Shanghai Pudong New Dist. 
People’s Ct., 2007), (stating that trading in unlisted securities, including acting as agent-underwriter in public 
offerings, without CSRC approval and registration to engage in the securities business, constitutes the crime of 
“illegal business operations”), aff’d, Shanghai No. 1 Interm. People’s Ct. (2007). 
233 For instance:  greater ease in convening meetings, clearer legal person representation and agency 
principles, and better procedures for producing a vote on board and shareholder resolutions. 
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People’s Court worried that new Article 183 would force it to order firm dissolution in the event 
of deadlock, and lamented the apparent inability to instruct other less socially-costly remedies.234  
The concern of the Higher People’s Court in this regard is echoed in the values cum doctrinal 
choice by a Shanghai Intermediate People’s Court in the 2006 Tang Chunxiao judicial 
dissolution case235 briefed in the Case Reports Appendix—one which shows PRC People’s 
Courts consciously deferring to national social and economic policy rather than implementing 
formal corporate law or doctrine.236  It is the same values choice confirmed directly by the Chief 
Judge of the Shanghai Higher People’s Court No. 2 Civil Division in December 2008 when 
discussing the Shanghai Courts’ hesitancy in accepting and allowing dissolution-liquidation 
pleadings.237  In the Tang Chunxiao case, the Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court 
rejected the plaintiff’s suit for judicial dissolution of a thoroughly deadlocked company, even 
though the underlying real estate project had been shuttered for more than a year because of the 
inability of the two shareholders to agree.  The expanded reasoning behind the simple judgment 
is most important to note here, as the Court is loathe to order the dissolution of a corporate legal 
person because it would “necessarily impact in different degrees [on] market order and 
                                                 
234 Such as ordered settlement negotiations, settlement after trusteeship, auction and buy-out by existing 
shareholders, or judicially-ordered acquisition.  See SHANGHAI HIGHER PEOPLE’S COURT 2006, supra note 7, at 11-
12. 
235 Tang Chunxiao v. Zhou Huizhong, 2007 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 138-44 (Shanghai 
No. 1 Interm. People’s Ct., 2006), (case decided before the 2nd Judicial Regulations on the 2006 Company Law 
applicable to shareholders’ suits for dissolution were issued).   
236 It is the same doctrinal approach adopted two years later in the 2nd Supreme People’s Court Judicial 
Regulations on Application of the 2006 Company Law, see Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong “Zhonghua 
Renmin Gongheguo Gongsifa” Ruogan Wenti de Guiding (Er) [Supreme People’s Court Regulations (2nd) on 
Several Issues Related to Application of the “Company Law of the PRC”], 2008 FA SHI  No. 6, issued May 12, 
2008, SPC COMPANY LAW REGULATIONS, supra note 94, at 7-11, art. 5, which for petitions under Article 183 
directs the People’s Courts first to “emphasize” (zhuzhong) mediation, and then pushes the People’s Courts to 
support an agreed buyout among the shareholders, reduction of capital and exit of one or more partners, or any 
method which is not in contravention of mandatory law or administrative regulation, all in order to serve the priority 
of keeping the company in existence.  As such, the Tang Chunxiao case may show an example where lower-level 
People’s Court adjudication shaped Supreme People’s Court Regulation, and not the other way around.  
237 Remarks of Shanghai Higher People’s Court No. 2 Civil Division Chief Judge, Dec. 5, 2008 (“… we 
strive to keep the company in existence, we have to think about creditors, the social responsibility of the corporate 
person, and the fate of the employees…”) (notes on file with author). 
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stability”.238  Another 2006 judgment, in which shareholders of a limited liability company 
(converted from a collectively-owned enterprise) also sought judicial dissolution, evidences a 
similar approach by the Shanghai Xuhui District People’s Court.239  In that case, a petition 
seeking judicial dissolution was also refused because it was explicitly deemed a market-
disrupting remedy, and it would have altered arrangements for continued payment of salary to 
laid-off workers.  The Shanghai Higher People’s Court in its commentary on this case again 
lauds the result because of the negative impacts on “market stability” arising from firm 
dissolution and the attendant judicial and social costs.240     
This extra-legal, poly-centric, orientation was publicly proclaimed in late 2008 in the 
Shanghai Higher People’s Court’s eleven-point document entitled “Several Opinions on an 
Active Approach to Economic Development During the Financial Crisis” and the Shanghai No. 1 
Intermediate People’s Court’s own ten-point document.241  Each of these bureaucratic 
pronouncements directed the People’s Courts in Shanghai to serve the highest non-legal value in 
company law adjudication:  finding a way for distressed enterprises to continue operating even if 
technically in default of their obligations or insolvent.242  Regardless of the cause of this 
pronounced orientation, or the policy advisability of what is urged, the effect is clear:  
                                                 
238  Tang Chunxiao v. Zhou Huizhong, 2007 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 143 (Shanghai No. 
1 Interm. People’s Ct., 2006). 
239 See Yang Lizhi v. Cao Chengjie, 2007 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 205-10, ANALYSIS OF 
NEW CASES 356-59 (Xuhui Dist. People’s Ct., 2006), (plaintiffs’ application does not meet the high standard set 
forth in 2006 Company Law, Art. 183; in addition, plaintiff shareholders are encouraged to plead again defendant 
directors’ apparent breaches of corporate fiduciary duties). 
240 Id. at 209.  This result is not necessarily “bad” or “unjust” (as courts in the West are seeing in the 
proposed non-application of bankruptcy law or non-exercise against secured property for debtors in difficulty after 
the 2008-9 Financial Crisis), but only a clear example of PRC judicial institutions refusing to do what they are 
supposed to do under a strict reading of the law.  Each of these 2006 results is unsatisfactory to the economist or the 
lawyer.  From the economist’s standpoint, the redeployment of capital out of a deadlocked firm is something to be 
encouraged.  The strict lawyer’s approach would counsel that if the statutory standards for judicial dissolution are 
met, then the judiciary should grant the dissolution relief described in the law.  Yet each of the Shanghai People’s 
Courts involved in the cases cited here resist either of those approaches to privilege other, extra-legal and policy-
oriented, aims, e.g. continued firm existence and continued payments to previously laid-off workers. 
241 See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
242 Accelerated Hearings, supra note 9.  
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dimunition of judicial institution autonomy in the application of the law to vindicate private 
economic rights and arrangements.  The 2007 command of the Shanghai Higher People’s Court 
that Shanghai Courts “temporarily” not accept the invitation in Article 184 of the 2006 Company 
Law to oversee the establishment of firm liquidation committees, and the general non-utilization 
of the PRC Bankruptcy Law without a Supreme People’s Court Regulation authorizing 
application of that Law,243 are animated by the same worries behind the specific judgments and 
bureaucratic instructions above:244  a desire to stymie liquidation and termination of the firm, job 
losses, and other social costs. 245   
 
B. “Conservative” Adjudication 
 
 The Shanghai People’s Courts are conservative, and the degree of conservatism appears 
to increase after 2006 and promulgation of the new Company Law.  This so-called conservative 
orientation for the Shanghai judiciary consists of action, or inaction, which indicates a turn 
against the full exercise of autonomy granted in law or implied by the Courts’ institutional 
position.  Importantly, this action or inaction is not necessarily the result of political pressure, or 
                                                 
243 See supra note 98 and infra note 270 and accompanying text. 
244 The Higher Court’s justification focuses on competence, not autonomy, in that the Shanghai Courts 
“lack liquidation rules, and the Court’s affirmation of effective liquidation lacks a legal basis (falü yijü)”.  Shanghai 
Company Law Report, supra note 8, at 45.    
245 There is no reason to think that the Shanghai People’s Courts cannot act in the fully autonomous way 
posited above.  Contrast the two 2006 outcomes described here with the result in a pre-2006 Company Law case 
(decided under the 1994 Company Law which had no provision allowing shareholder suits for judicial dissolution):  
Shanghai Jingfa Enter. Dev. Co. v. Shanghai Haining Petroleum Prod. Co., 2004 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI 
JINGXUAN 299-309 (Shanghai No. 2 People’s Ct., 2003), aff’d, Shanghai Higher People’s Ct. (2003).  In that case 
the Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court orders the “put” of equity interests owned by complaining 
shareholders to the other (breaching) shareholders so the company may “continue normal operations” and continue 
to “maintain utilization of the company’s accumulated value”.  Id. at 304.  However, the court also implicitly allows 
redeployment of capital by the complaining shareholders to continuing and better productive uses.  The judicial 
rhetoric about “market stability” and “continued use of productive assets” in this case is roughly the same, but the 
2003 Court feels emboldened to fashion continued firm existence via its own, implicitly far more efficient, 
remedy—a remedy which speaks to the significant power and autonomy of the Court itself. 
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resource or competence constraints,246 but is very often an expression of studied Court avoidance 
of granted institutional powers.    
 A recent case reported by a sitting judge of the No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court No. 3 
Civil Division demonstrates the conservative adjudicatory style.247  Plaintiff Sun and Defendants 
Li and Shi acted as promoters in the formation of a limited liability company, the Shixin 
Company.  Defendant Li was originally named Legal Representative of the company.  In 
October 2006, the company convened a shareholders’ meeting at which each of the three 
shareholders of the company signed the meeting registry.  The shareholders at the meeting 
considered and voted on a resolution addressing (i) the removal of Defendant Li from all 
positions at the company, (ii) the validity of an agreement executed in September of 2006 with 
Plaintiff Sun, and (iii) the withdrawal of the company’s suit against Plaintiff Sun, with all 
litigation costs to be borne by Defendant Li.248  Both Plaintiff Sun and Defendant Shi signed the 
shareholders’ resolution, but Defendant Li refused.  Defendant Li rejected the validity of the 
shareholders’ resolution, but did not bring suit as permitted under the 2006 Company Law 
seeking to invalidate or declare the resolution ineffective.  Plaintiff Sun, however, did bring suit 
before the Shanghai People’s Courts asking that the resolution be declared effective.  The trial 
court, probably a District-level Shanghai People’s Court, rejected Sun’s lawsuit that sought a 
declaration of effectiveness for two reasons.  First, it was rejected for what the Court called a 
                                                 
246 In public statements, several Shanghai People’s Court judges noted obvious resource and competence 
constraints operating on their performing as proposed under the 2006 Company Law or other major statutory 
formulations, such as in liquidation proceedings under the Company Law or bankruptcy proceedings (reorganization 
or liquidation) under the new PRC Bankruptcy Law (Dec. 5, 2008) (on file with author). 
247 The case is Sun X. v. Li Y., Fayuan Nengfo Shouli Gudong Qingqiu Queren Gudonghui Jueyi Youxiao 
de Susong [Should the People’s Courts Accept Shareholders’ Suits Seeking Confirmation of Validity of 
Shareholders’ Resolutions?], in COMPANY CONTROVERSIES 28-29 (Dist. People’s Court not identified), appeal filed, 
Shanghai No. 2 Interm. People’s Ct. (No. 3 Civil Division) (2007 or 2008). 
248 Although never stated explicitly in the Intermediate People’s Court’s judge’s recitation of the facts, it 
would seem that the underlying dispute revolved around the ouster of Defendant Li from a leading position in the 
company, in favor of Plaintiff Sun, with Sun directing the company to withdraw its lawsuit against Sun (presumably 
after he or she gained control of the company pursuant to the September 2006 agreement). 
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“procedural” defect:  the 2006 Company Law and the company’s Articles of Association 
mandate that shareholders’ meetings should be reduced to meeting minutes.  Because the 
disputed resolution was not reduced to any form in the shareholders’ meeting minutes, it was 
deemed defective.  Second, the lower-level Court identified an evidentiary problem:  in a 
situation where one shareholder does not recognize a resolution and the only evidence offered to 
the Court is the actual resolution signed by just two of three shareholders, it is difficult, the Court 
said, to determine whether the shareholders’ meeting actually passed the resolution.249  
Therefore, said the Court, pursuant to Article 11 of the 2006 Company Law (which speaks to the 
binding effect of company Articles of Association) the plaintiff’s suit should be rejected.  
Plaintiff Sun appealed to an unnamed Intermediate People’s Court, likely the Shanghai No. 2 
Intermediate People’s Court where the judge reporting the case sits.  The appeals-level 
Intermediate People’s Court also rejected the plaintiff’s suit for a declaration of effectiveness, 
but on radically different grounds, declaring irrelevant the bases invoked by the District-level 
People’s Court.  The Intermediate People’s Court focused on Article 22 of the 2006 Company 
Law, that provision of the new statute which allows shareholders’ suits to challenge the validity 
of shareholders’ meeting resolutions because the resolution substantively violates law, regulation 
or the company Articles of Association, or the convening of the meeting or voting procedures 
violate law, regulation or the company’s Articles of Association.  As the Court noted, Article 22 
of the new Company Law bestows upon shareholders injured by a defective or illegal resolution 
the right to sue for a specific remedy to protect their rights.  However, the Court continued, if the 
injured shareholder does not bring suit under the 2006 Company Law to have the allegedly 
defective resolution declared ineffective, “the People’s Courts should not use the coercive power 
                                                 
249 The Court seems to be implying that shareholders’ resolutions should be passed unanimously, or in the 
alternative that all shareholders must be present and voting to establish a quorum. 
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of the state to interfere with matter within the scope of a company’s self-governance.”250  In the 
instant case, concluded the Intermediate People’s Court, the subject resolution is obviously 
harmful to the ousted shareholder, Defendant Li, yet he is not the person who has brought suit 
regarding the resolution.  Instead, the suit seeking an affirmative declaration of effectiveness (not 
a negative declaration of ineffectiveness) had been brought by Plaintiff Sun, one of the 
beneficiaries of the contested resolution.  Accordingly, the Court stated, Plaintiff Sun’s lawsuit 
“by nature does not conform to the conditions set for the acceptance of civil lawsuits by the 
People’s Courts, and in addition the suit lacks an appropriate [legal] basis (xiangying de yijü)”.251  
 The case nicely demonstrates one aspect of the very conservative orientation of the 
Chinese People’s Courts in accepting and hearing lawsuits on the 2006 Company Law.  
According to the analysis of the Intermediate People’s Court judge reporting the case, the Court 
had a choice in its approach.  A more autonomous judicial institution might have reasoned that 
the explicit legal basis for shareholders’ suits challenging resolutions set out in the Company 
Law does not mean that related suits without the exact same legal basis are prohibited.  Given the 
radically expanded justiciability of the 2006 Company Law, and in the absence of explicit legal 
bases for a large universe of legal claims, a more self-confident Court might not have thrown out 
the claim simply due to the lack of a very explicit legal basis for the action.  Furthermore, the 
judge notes, basic logic dictates that if lawsuits which have the effect of declaring resolutions 
ineffective are permitted, then by the same token lawsuits seeking declarations of effectiveness 
should also be allowed.  Finally, because there are so many disputes about the validity of 
shareholders’ resolutions, Courts must exercise a role in declaring the resolution effective or 
non-effective (i.e., there is no other state actor able to do this authoritatively).   
                                                 
250  Sun X. v. Li Y., COMPANY CONTROVERSIES 28 (Dist. People’s Court not identified), appeal filed, 
Shanghai No. 2 Interm. People’s Ct. (No. 3 Civil Division) (2007 or 2008).   
251 Id.  
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 The conservative view is just the opposite:  First, basic statutory interpretation holds that 
if, when the Company Law was amended, the PRC legislature chose not to provide an explicit 
legal basis for lawsuits seeking declarations of validity, then the legislature acted with some 
specific intent and did not want to provide for such a claim.  Second, shareholder meeting and 
voting procedures should be undertaken pursuant to the firm’s Articles of Association except if 
in violation of a mandatory article of law.  Accordingly, the content of shareholders’ resolutions 
should be decided, autonomously, by the company, and should only be disturbed if in violation 
of the company Articles of Association.  Thus, unless a dissident shareholder lawsuit seeks to 
declare a resolution invalid, the People’s Courts should not interfere with matters within the 
scope of company autonomy and self-ordering.  Third, those shareholders who seek confirmation 
of validity have other remedies under the Company Law against the shareholders (or the 
company under control of those shareholders) not complying with the allegedly effective 
resolution—e.g., a suit for damages.  The Intermediate People’s Court deciding this case adhered 
to a decidedly conservative view of the People’s Courts institutional role in corporate law cases.   
 The indications of conservative application of the law, or constrained autonomy, are 
multi-faceted and include limitation on common law or equity court-style decision making, 
judicial construction of enabling rules as mandatory stipulations, strict formalism or non-
application of the law in the absence of statutory or Regulatory authorization, and the non-
application, or a ferocious struggle to avoid implementation, of corporate fiduciary duties 
doctrine. 
 
i. Limitation on Equity Court-like Decision Making 
 
 In many cases the Shanghai People’s Courts limit the ability of litigants to take advantage 
of equity court-like elaboration or exceptions to statutory rules which remedy illegality or 
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opportunism.  In so doing, they stand stubbornly behind the bargain that is a business association 
established as a “company” under the Company Law.  One 2000 case252 rejected a 20% 
shareholder’s suit for distribution of dividends from a two-person corporation when the 80% 
shareholder-dominated shareholders’ meeting had already resolved not to make any 
distributions.  The reasoning was that the statutory standard for voiding a shareholders’ 
resolution under the 1994 Company Law is high, “breach of law or administrative regulation, or 
infringement upon the lawful rights of shareholders.”  In the absence of any breach of positive 
law, or direct rights infringement, and with a properly-convened shareholders’ meeting resolving 
in the interest of the 80% majority shareholder, the plaintiff minority shareholder subject to 
oppression had no case.  In this example, one of many, the Shanghai People’s Courts signaled to 
the participants in the corporate form that the judiciary will support inflexible aspects of the 
corporate law compact, and intervene only when a very high standard of breach/infringement is 
identified. 
 
ii. Enabling to Mandatory 
 
 A second and perhaps related expression of conservatism is the tremendous affection 
shown by the Shanghai People’s Courts for the rules set forth in the Company Law.  Here the 
Courts effectively take such rules from the enabling column and invest them with the character 
of mandatory rules which may not be contravened by private ordering.  For example, one 1995 
Shanghai case253 reversed the appointment in a company limited by shares of three new directors 
to the board pursuant to a clause in the Articles of Association granting the board the power to do 
                                                 
252 Guo Chaoxu v. Shanghai Saiyang Textile Sci. and Tech. Co., 2000 HU ER ZHONG JING ZHONG ZI NO. 
280, SELECTED COMPANY LAW CASES 260-65 (Shanghai Hongkou People’s Dist. Ct., 1999), aff’d, Shanghai No. 2 
Interm. People’s Ct., (2000), also available at http://www.lawyee.net. 
253 Zhang X. v. Shanghai A Co. Ltd., SELECTED COMPANY LAW CASES 229-31 (unidentified Shanghai Dist. 
People’s Ct., 1995), appeal filed, unidentified Shanghai Interm. People’s Ct. (1995). 
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just that.  Both the People’s Court of first instance and the Intermediate People’s Court on appeal 
held that Articles of Association which purport to vest in the board the power to appoint 
directors were “illegal” (weifa) and invalid, because they were contrary to the 1994 Company 
Law provision vesting the power to elect directors solely in the shareholders’ meeting.  The two 
Courts held to this judgment in the face of quite reasonable pleadings by the defendant company 
that the offending Articles of Association clause was passed by the shareholders’ general 
meeting, which the company asserted should be seen as a delegation of the shareholders’ 
statutory powers to elect directors to the board.  A later 2001 case similarly cast very serious 
doubt on the validity of a stand-alone shareholders’ capitalization agreement which is different 
from the Articles of Association (also setting forth capitalization requirements), by ruling that the 
contractual capitalization plan would implicate one of the investors in a violation of the 1994 
Company Law’s prohibition on passive investment of more than 50% of “net assets.”254  That 
single fact poisoned the enforceability of the private-ordering agreement.  
 
iii. Strict Formalism or Non-application 
 
 A third expression of conservatism, embodied in the Sun X. case detailed at the start of 
this section,255 is a strict formalism or case decisions determined by a Court’s view that there 
exists no explicit “legal basis” for implied rights in corporate law.  There are numerous 
examples of this kind of conservative adjudication.  A 1998 opinion ruled that an agreement 
transferring beneficial ownership of 20% of a company’s stock (and the expectation of annual 
dividends) is enforceable under contract law, notwithstanding the failure of the parties to make 
the transfer known or see to public registration of the share ownership change under corporate 
                                                 
254 Shanghai Minzu Music Instruments No. 2 Factory v. Shanghai Heli Trade Co., NEW  COMPANY LAW 
CASES 45-49 (unidentified Shanghai People’s Ct., 2001), (shareholders’ agreement is thus void ab initio, and even if 
not void, then without effect as against the company and the world at large (which the Articles of Association are)). 
255 See supra notes 247 to 251 and accompanying text.   
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law.256  The defendant’s argument that the shares (and dividend rights) were never really 
transferred in corporate law was deemed irrelevant in the face of a separate and entirely 
enforceable contractual promise by one party to pay over dividends to another.  Here the 
Shanghai People’s Court side-stepped a possibly messy corporate law/equitable rights transfer 
question by focusing solely on the formalistic action (or inaction) of the parties and a purported 
contractual obligation.  In a case from 1999-2000, the Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate People’s 
Court overturned the expansive view of the Jingan District People’s Court (and the latter’s 
invocation of Article 4 of the General Principles of the Civil Law)257 in a corporate shareholders’ 
suit, and pulled the parties back to a strictly formalistic approach to the corporate law and 
property rights.258  In that case, the court of first instance acted liberally in recognizing the 
plaintiff investor’s direct equity interest in a project company even though the plaintiff was a so-
called “hidden” (yinming) shareholder, i.e., merely in contract with a name shareholder of the 
company and maintaining no legal privity whatsoever with the corporate vehicle.  Aside from the 
broad invocation of Article 4 of the General Principles of the Civil Law, the lower court said the 
other declared shareholders in the company were estopped from denying the hidden 
shareholder’s interest because they had knowledge of the plaintiff’s investment participation in 
the company.  The Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court, seeking to correct the errant 
lower Court, took a much more formalistic approach to the problem, dismissing the application 
of vague Article 4 of the General Principles of Civil Law and declaring with enviable certainty 
                                                 
256 Shanghai Xinlu Battery Co. v. Shanghai Dongda Imp. Exp. Co., NEW COMPANY LAW CASES 231-33 
(unidentified Shanghai People’s Ct., 2001), (defendant obligor’s claim that stock transfer agreement with plaintiff 
transferee is not effective deemed irrelevant to enforceability of defendant’s obligation to pay over 20% of dividends 
to same plaintiff transferee shareholder). 
257 The catch-all (commercial) “good faith” clause which so often in the Chinese People’s Courts justifies 
equity court-style adjudication.  See supra notes 157-180 and accompanying text, the section entitled “The People’s 
Courts Act in “Equity” or in a Common Law Fashion”.   
258 Shanghai Jingan Food and Beverage Serv. Co. v. Shanghai Foreign Econ. Serv. Co., SELECTED 
COMPANY LAW CASES 86-93 (Shanghai Jingan Dist. People’s Ct., 1999), rev’d, Shanghai No. 2 Interm. People’s Ct. 
(2000).   
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that the agreement between the hidden and name shareholders was effective only between those 
two parties, and had no legal meaning against third parties or the world at large, including other 
name shareholders or the company itself.259   
 In a 2001 opinion upheld by the Shanghai Higher People’s Court, a District-level 
People’s Court refused to award an ESOP-like participating former employee any stock interest 
in a newly-established corporate entity promoted partially on the basis of the ESOP’s contributed 
shareholding interest in a predecessor company.  Both Courts justified the refusal with the 
rationale that participants in the dissolved ESOP were not identified in the share register of the 
new company.260  In 2004, the Shanghai Higher People’s Court struggled not to award the 
hidden investor in a Chinese-foreign joint venture an equity interest in a successor limited 
liability company, because the interest was booked to a different name and notwithstanding years 
of dividend distributions to the real investor and a written promise by the company 
acknowledging that the equity investment was put in the name of another only “temporarily” at 
the time of conversion of the legal entity into a limited liability company.261  The Higher Court’s 
opinion in the case was based on its view that recognition of the real investor’s US$2.17 million 
investment in the company was a matter to be sorted out between the name investors and the true 
parties in interest, which had a “direct legal relationship,” not by the company which had no 
legal privity with the capital provider.  This position is a stretch, as the company had itself issued 
                                                 
259 From a corporate law policy perspective, this is almost certainly the correct result in the case, as it is the 
only way to encourage parties in Shanghai to delineate and confirm, as a public matter, their purported property 
rights, and remove from the Shanghai docket a huge number of intent-determined property rights cases.  However, it 
also serves to over-turn the more accommodating, legal realist, adjudication of the lower People’s Court in the case. 
260 See X. Jiyin Chip Co. v. Y. Group Co., Ltd., 2005 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 71-77 
(Shanghai Luwan Dist. People’s Ct., 2001).  This result no doubt is one of the reasons for new Article 33 of the 
2006 Company Law, which stipulates that only those natural or legal persons identified in the share register of a 
limited liability company can “exercise the [full] rights of a shareholder.”  2006 Company Law, supra note 5, art. 
33. 
261 See Honghui Int’l Co. v. Shanghai Minfeng Inv. Co., Ltd., 2004 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI 
JINGXUAN 270-77 (Shanghai Higher People’s Ct., 2004), (equity interest by real investor in limited liability 
company not recognized over interest of name investor, because real investor must seek remedy not from issuing 
company but name investor). 
386 EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 5: 303 
 
a document acknowledging the real investor’s contribution of US$2.17 million to the company’s 
capital account, and promising to transfer the resulting interest into the name of the rightful 
investor.262  This example once again shows a Court in the Shanghai system striving not to use 
China’s corporate law in a flexible way, but instead in an entirely undiscerning and mechanical 
manner to avoid the exercise, or appearance of the exercise, of significant judicial power.  A 
similar 2006 case shows the Courts rejecting a dissident shareholders group request to order 
amended firm registration to status quo ante, even though the defendant’s re-registration was 
proven in separate proceedings to have been fraudulent.263  In that same case, the Courts 
awkwardly invalidated the dissident (but majority) shareholders’ meeting based upon a very 
minor defect in the notice given to the same dissident shareholders.264  It seems nonsensical for 
the Courts to invalidate a meeting organized by a group of shareholders because of a defect in 
notice to those shareholders, who never even pleaded the defect.  Clearly the Courts in this case 
were reaching for whatever safe harbor they could find to avoid involvement in a shareholder 
squabble and adjudication of somewhat abstract misfeasance (oppressive and opportunistic 
behavior by the defendant shareholder).       
 Even in areas where it is clear that litigation will arise, and even in the face of lower-level 
People’s Courts consciously trying to act more autonomously, the Shanghai People’s Courts 
often take the same conservative approach to issues where there is no clear legal or policy basis.  
A good example of this approach is the reaction of the Shanghai judiciary in 2006-2007 to the 
problem of contributed services (as capital).  Although Article 27 of the 2006 Company Law is 
                                                 
262 As a back-up to this argument, the Court holds that the original investment by the (Hong Kong-
domiciled) plaintiff in the company, when it was a Sino-foreign joint venture, was not in compliance with law (and 
thus would not be recognized in law ex post), because it was/would have been a capital contribution by a foreign 
investor into a foreign invested enterprise without the required approvals from the foreign investment review 
authorities.   
263 Yu Xiaoqi v. Shanghai Changxin Accountancy Co., Ltd., ANALYSIS OF NEW CASES 178-184 (Shanghai 
Changning Dist. People’s Ct., 2006), Shanghai No. 1 Interm. People’s Ct., (2006). 
264 Id. at 186-87. 
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silent on the permissibility of human capital contributions, the 2005 “Regulations of the PRC on 
Administration of Company Registration”265 specifically forbid the contribution of labor services 
(laowu).266  The Shanghai Higher People’s Court reported in 2007 that the Pudong New District 
People’s Court system had on its own already accepted a large number of cases concerning 
human capital or services contribution.  The Higher People’s Court duly noted that with no legal 
or regulatory basis for the definition of “human capital,” and no local People’s Government or 
“department-in-charge” policy guidance, the People’s Courts had found it very difficult to define 
the concept in practice.  This state of affairs was problematic for the Shanghai judiciary, said the 
Higher Court, because many company establishments in Shanghai are capitalized, whether in 
shareholders’ agreement or the Articles of Association of the company, by the contribution of 
personal knowledge, technical skills and ability, and the like.  Accordingly, in 2005 the Shanghai 
Municipal People’s Government had been forced to issue the District-specific “Pudong New 
District Provisional Measures on Human Capital Contributions” setting forth two legally 
cognizable mechanisms for the valuation of such contributions.267  As noted further in the report, 
upon promotion and establishment of companies accepting personal services contributions as 
equity, lawsuits invariably arose, most often in the context of individuals trying to leave a 
company or transfer the equity interest gained in exchange for their personal intangible 
investment.  At the same time, said the Court, very difficult questions concerning (potential) 
harm to third party creditors and undercapitalization of the firm partially capitalized with 
                                                 
265 See supra note 183.  
266 “A shareholder shall not make his capital contributions with labor service (laowu), credit (xinyong), the 
name of the natural person, goodwill, franchise rights (texu jingyingquan), secured property, or the like, at its 
appraised value.”  Id. at art. 14(2). 
267 Those being evaluated by a third party certified appraiser or agreed by the entire shareholders meeting.  
The Measures also set forth an accepted mechanism for paper confirmation of such valuation by an accredited 
capital verification institution.  The Higher People’s Court reported that historically all cases had relied on 
shareholders’ meeting agreement for the valuation of human capital contributions, done casually, even “blindly”, in 
a relatively uninformed way, and in a fashion where the opportunities for inaccuracy and undercapitalization were 
rife.   
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services were at issue.  Recognizing all that, and understanding the requirement that human 
capital contributions to corporate business organizations be permitted, and notwithstanding its 
praise for the solution implicit in the rogue District-level norms, the Higher Court in 2007 
nonetheless counseled the Shanghai People’s Courts to take a very cautious approach to the 
question268 and warned against “blind support and pursuit of a policy with very obvious 
defects.”269    
 The Shanghai judiciary appears to defer when faced with the lack of an explicit legal 
basis in at least two other areas.  The Shanghai Higher People’s Court report on the 2006 
application of the new Company Law states categorically that the Shanghai Courts are 
“temporarily” not to accept the invitation in Article 184 of the 2006 Company Law allowing 
them to direct the establishment of liquidation committees because “[the Shanghai People’s 
Courts] lack liquidation rules, and the Courts affirmation of effective liquidation lacks a legal 
basis (falü yijü).”270  In the same vein, one senior judge at the Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate 
People’s Court in 2008 called for an explicit legal basis to help in the handling of related party 
creditors in bankruptcy proceedings, or something similar to the doctrine of equitable 
subordination or the “Deep Rock Doctrine.”  That judge asserted that the PRC is a “civil law 
country” (chengwenfa guojia) and therefore any doctrine of equitable subordination, like any 
definition of related party creditors, can be introduced into judicial practice only via additional 
statute, or judicial Regulations.  In doing so he rejected out of hand any idea that the Shanghai 
                                                 
268 In the words of the Court, so as to serve the highest values of standardization (guifan) and promotion of 
healthy market development.   
269 Shanghai Company Law Report, supra note 8, at 46. 
270 Id. at 45.  Echoed in the remarks of the Chief Judge of the No. 2 Civil Division of the Shanghai Higher 
People’s Court noted infra.    
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People’s Courts might themselves develop such a doctrine for application in bankruptcy cases.271  
Yet another Shanghai judicial official, this time a Shanghai Higher People’s Court judge, asked 
for the same kind of direction in 2008 with respect to an implantation of a de facto merger 
doctrine, again discounting any possible elaboration of this concept by the judiciary or outside of 
Supreme People’s Court Regulations or legislative pronouncement.272  One interesting aspect of 
this push-back justified on the lack of any “legal basis” is that explicit examples appear more 
often post-2006 and thus after a legal basis had been provided in statute for an enforceable aspect 
of corporate law.273      
 The autonomy breakdown I note here is in many situations indicated by the explicit 
request for superior bureaucratic guidance in respect of difficult (and not so difficult) cases.  For 
instance, in its report on Company Law implementation in 2006, the Shanghai Higher People’s 
Court indicates with some apparent relief that in 2006 it never274 actually “pierced the corporate 
                                                 
271 Fu Yang, Pochanfa Miandui Guanlian Zhaiquan de Kunjing Yü Shenshi Yuanze de Yinrun [Problems 
Facing Related Party Creditors Under the Bankruptcy Law and Use of the Deep Rock Doctrine], in COMPANY 
CONTROVERSIES,  supra note 218, 184-91.   
272 Remarks of Yang Yisheng, Judge of the Shanghai Higher People’s Court, at “Company Controversies 
and Judicial Remedies” Conference held at East China University of Politics and Law, Shanghai, PRC (Dec. 5, 
2008) (notes on file with the author).  
273 Prior to 2006, one of the only explicit examples of such rejection is the 2001 opinion which fails to 
award a former employee of a collective any stock interest in a newly-established corporate entity promoted partially 
on the basis of the ESOP’s contributed shareholding interest in a predecessor company because the ESOP has no 
basis in PRC law.  See X. Jiyin Chip Co. v. Y. Group Co., Ltd., 2005 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 71-
77 (Shanghai Luwan Dist. People’s Ct., 2001). 
274 But see, after 2006, Shanghai Huaxin Elec. Wire and Cable Co. v. China Tietong Group Co., 2007 HU 
GAO MIN ER (SHANG) ZHONG ZI NO. 145 (Shanghai No. 2 Interm. People’s Ct. (No. 4 Civ. Div.), 2007) (RMB 32 
million creditor pierces to the Beijing-based SOE parent of a Shanghai limited liability company debtor where the 
parent has undercapitalized the debtor by RMB 38 million yuan, as confirmed by separate judicial decisions of 
Suzhou and Beijing People’s Courts, specifically upholding the assertion of parent liability “by litigation” and 
invoking “misuse of the corporate form” under Article 20 of the 2006 Company Law), aff’d, Shanghai Higher 
People’s Ct. (2007), available at http://www.hshfy.sh.cn/fyitw/gweb/.  The idea that the Shanghai People’s Courts 
are not handling piercing cases post-2006 and into the end of 2008 was vigorously disputed in December 2008 by 
Zou Bihua, the Chief Judge of the Shanghai Changning District People’s Court and a judge from the Shanghai No. 2 
Intermediate People’s Court, who stated that the workload of piercing cases has only increased with formal 
authorization in the 2006 Company Law (notes on file with author). 
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veil,” because all such cases were settled,275 withdrawn, or dismissed.  The Shanghai Higher 
People’s Court evidences some happiness at this result and openly wonders how, if piercing had 
happened, its subordinate Courts might have performed in specific aspects such as assessing 
liability for all shareholders (i.e., not just the controlling shareholder) of the discarded corporate 
form, the extent to which the Courts can keep on piercing (up through successive layers of 
limited liability), and how to define “misuse” of the corporate form.276  These aspects, and above 
all the factors determinative in disregarding the corporate form, remain mysterious to the 
Shanghai Courts, to the extent that the Shanghai Higher People’s Court requested that the 
Supreme People’s Court or the legislature provide guidance.277  The Shanghai Higher People’s 
Court explicitly sought the same kind of guidance on how to handle creditors’ suits for 
liquidation278 and situations in which the shareholders of a company in liquidation do not want to 
implement liquidation for the benefit of creditors, who want liquidation.279  As noted above, in 
2008 the Supreme People’s Court issued the 2nd Regulations on application of the 2006 
Company Law in just this area.  Still, the Chief Judge of the Shanghai Higher People’s Court No. 
2 Civil Division declared in December 2008 that the Shanghai Courts still feel at a complete loss 
in shareholder-instigated dissolution-liquidation proceedings and are still hesitant about 
accepting them.280  In much the same way, the Shanghai Higher People’s Court noted difficulties 
                                                 
275 Seen for example before 2006 in Xishan City Chem. Prod. Mfg. Co. v. Shanghai Aoshi Enter. Co., NEW 
COMPANY LAW CASES 293-99 (unidentified Shanghai Dist. People’s Ct., 2000), aff’d, unidentified Shanghai Interm. 
People’s Ct. (2000). 
276 The Higher People’s Court itself tries to identify some of the factors which might constitute “misuse”, 
including undercapitalization, high debt to equity (registered capital) ratios, and same premises, management 
overlap, etc.  In an indication of the direction they might be headed, the Higher People’s Court asserts that the same 
premises-shared management phenomenon is especially prevalent at SOEs that have formed subsidiary listed 
companies limited by shares.   
277 Shanghai Higher People’s Court No. 2 Civil Division 2007, supra note 8, at 48.   
278 Which it says it will not accept until there are judicial Regulations promulgated addressing the same. 
279 Shanghai Higher People’s Court No. 2 Civil Division 2007, supra note 8, at 49.   
280 Remarks of Ms. Yu Qiuwei, Chief Judge of Shanghai Higher People’s Court No. 2 Civil Division, Dec. 
5, 2008 (on file with author).  As noted above, this discomfort is ostensibly based on a self-perceived competence 
deficit, as much as constrained autonomy. 
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in actual application of the 2006 Company Law’s new resolution-invalidation mechanism.  
Although the statute provides precise shareholder level and period requirements for derivative 
lawsuits, no similar statutory requirements apply to lawsuits seeking to invalidate shareholders’ 
and directors’ resolutions.  While the Court acknowledged that it now must accept the latter kind 
of cases, even for publicly-listed companies, it also calls on its bureaucratic superior to set 
qualifications on the action, lest listed companies become subject to vexatious litigation or 
opportunistic strike suits by minority shareholders.281   
 On occasion, the Courts ask not for instructions from their bureaucratic superior, but 
from the legislature.  For instance, both the 1994 and 2006 Company Laws place an upper limit 
of 50 shareholders for the limited liability company form.  This limitation fans the widespread 
problem of hidden shareholders in China, individuals with an economic interest in a company 
who must conceal their formal shareholders’ interest so as not to exceed the maximum legal 
number of shareholders.282  In its report on Company Law application in 2006, the Shanghai 
Higher People’s Court urged PRC legislative institutions to create a legal basis for “trust” 
relationships, in which a single “trust” can be the name shareholder on behalf of a larger body of 
individuals with economic interests in the investee company.  Although the solution is a creative 
one, and it is a positive development to see a PRC judicial institution openly asking for more, 
and better, substantive law from the legislature, the appeal symbolizes how the People’s Courts 
have so far deferred from on their own creating such “trusts” for share ownership.283    
  
                                                 
281 Shanghai Higher People’s Court No. 2 Civil Division 2007, supra note 8, at 48. 
282 A problem especially prevalent at converted collectively-owned enterprises and state-owned enterprises 
which want to issue share interests to many former collective members or SOE employees.   
283 Shanghai Company Law Report, supra note 8, at 46.  Part of the concern here is not just institutional but 
political, as the Court is transparently worried about abuse of such “trust” shareholding arrangements as a way to 
hide prohibited personal official (political cadre) investment participation in companies. 
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iv. Avoiding Application of Fiduciary Duties Doctrine 
 
 A fourth and more specific expression of conservatism is the Shanghai judiciary’s 
struggle not to implement corporate fiduciary duties, and not to recognize corporate fiduciary 
duties breaches in cases in which there is relative safety (and no claim for the plaintiffs) in strict 
reliance on statute or regulation.   
 The aversion to implementation of corporate fiduciary duties, admittedly a complex and 
difficult task, is a bit of a puzzle.  The PRC People’s Courts clearly applied corporate fiduciary 
duties doctrines even before authorization in the 2006 Company Law,284 there is some evidence 
showing use of the doctrines in Shanghai,285 and the Shanghai Courts seem content to advertise 
their ability to handle such cases.286  Notwithstanding these proclaimed powers, the 2003 
Shanghai Company Law Opinion does not mention any such case in its review of a decade’s 
worth of corporate law adjudication in the period between 1993-2003.  The later 2007 report by 
the Higher People’s Court on 2006 adjudication admits that the People’s Courts under its 
jurisdiction took relatively few cases involving “corporate management rights and obligations”—
                                                 
284  See Doctrine That Dared Not, supra note 20.   
285 See supra notes 119 to 127 and accompanying text.  Note however that there are also pre-2006 
examples of the Shanghai Courts strenuously avoiding corporate fiduciary duties:  see China Textile Mach. Co. Ltd. 
v. Shanghai Mach. Imp. Exp. (Group) Co., NEW COMPANY LAW CASES 239-43 (unidentified Shanghai Dist. and 
Interm. People’s Cts., 2001), (at entity established before 1994 Company Law on the basis of a “joint investment 
agreement”, eventually with separate Articles of Association and “enterprise legal person” registration, one investor 
in not funding its full capital contribution and in transferring assets out of the arrangement without board or 
shareholder approval has breached its contractual obligations to the other investors, and infringed upon the rights of 
the other participants), appeal dismissed, unidentified Shanghai Interm. People’s Ct. (2001), likely decided in this 
corporate fiduciary duties-avoiding way because the subject entity is not, at inception, a formal corporation, but a 
legal enterprise person initially formed by contract and only registered later. 
286 In its 2007 report on application of the Company Law in the Shanghai Courts, the Shanghai Higher 
People’s Court celebrated the fact that after January 1, 2006 it could accept cases which were formerly dismissed 
because the underlying claims were without a “legal basis”.  Farther along in the same document, the Shanghai 
Higher People’s Court indicates that it accepts such suits, or expects to accept them, as it has set up a special case 
designation for the same, or “disputes in which the directors or senior management have infringed upon the rights of 
shareholders” and “disputes in which the directors or senior management have infringed upon the rights of the 
company.”  See Shanghai Company Law Report, supra note 8, at 50. 
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breach of corporate fiduciary duties—in calendar year 2006.287  And although as noted above 
there is evidence that the Shanghai People’s Courts have acted after 2006 to define fiduciary 
standards,288 my survey of Shanghai company law opinions found very little direct evidence of 
breach of corporate fiduciary duties cases for the Shanghai area.289  In fact, any application and 
enforcement of corporate fiduciary duties standards against directors, officers and controlling 
shareholders at all can only be understood by a close reading of the pleadings in cases ostensibly 
about something else,290 and in the context of CSRC enforcement actions against public 
company directors and officers.291  Most often, the defects alluded to even there relate not 
                                                 
287 Because of the relative degree of difficulty of hearing such cases.  See Shanghai Company Law Report, 
supra note 8, at 38. 
288 A. Precious Metal Co. v. China Indus. and Commercial Bank W. City X. Branch, 2006 NIAN SHANGHAI 
FAYUAN ANLI PINGXI 94-99 (Shanghai Luwan Dist. People’s Ct.), (District-level People’s Court investigates 
allegation of failure by entrustee/agent to conform to its “duty of cautious [investigation]” (jinshen zhuyi yiwu) 
(plaintiff’s claim) or “duty of care of a good manager” (shan liang guanliren de zhuyi yiwu) under Article 406(1) of 
the PRC Contract Law (Shanghai Higher People’s Court commentary), and finds no breach), appeal dismissed, 
unidentified Interm. People’s Ct. (2006).  How much happier the PRC People’s Courts would be in trying to apply a 
fiduciary duty of care if the National People’s Congress had passed the version first submitted to it which, at Article 
20, contained an expanded version of duty of care and a standard of application (taken from Taiwan’s Company 
Law and Taiwan’s Commercial Code, and already a part of CSRC-promulgated mandatory articles of association).  
See LAO Company Law Explanation, supra note 19, at 530.    
289 The reports are equally spare for other jurisdictions; see, e.g., Li Xiaozhong v. Jin Rongzhong, 
ANALYSIS OF NEW CASES 312-17 (Nanchuan People’s Ct., 2006), (Nanchuan Municipality: directors, supervisory 
board members and senior management duty of loyalty); Wuxi Weiyuan Co. v. Xu Naihong, ANALYSIS OF NEW 
CASES 322-28 (Jiangsu Wuxi Binhu Dist. People’s Ct., 2006) (Wuxi Municipality: senior management breach of 
duty of loyalty). 
290 See, e.g., Tang Chunxiao v. Zhou Huizhong, 2007 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 138-44 
(Shanghai No.1 Interm. People’s Ct., 2005); Yang Lizhi v. Cao Chengjie, 2007 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI 
JINGXUAN 205-10, ANALYSIS OF NEW CASES 356-59 (Xuhui Dist. People’s Ct., 2006).  . 
291 Usually as listed on the CSRC website, or occasionally reported in the Chinese press when a director or 
officer allegedly in breach (and subject to a CSRC fine) contests the administrative penalty.  See Wang Dianxue, 
Shanghai Gongsi Dongshi Beifa Zhuanggao Zhengjianhui [Penalized Director of a Listed Company Sues the 
CSRC], XINJINGBAO [NEW CAPITAL NEWS], June 4, 2008, at A24 [hereinafter Listed Company Director Sues], 
detailing a common situation:  Shenzhen Shenxin Taifeng Co., Ltd. was de-listed on March 25, 2008, when the 
board of directors issued a notice stating that the board chairman had been arrested for overstating the capital of an 
important subsidiary.  In August of 2007 the CSRC had announced that in its 2003 periodic reporting the company 
had:  falsely inflated its inventory by RMB 20 million yuan and its receivables by RMB 65 million yuan, failed to 
report the misappropriation of RMB 26 million yuan of company funds, and failed to disclose in a timely manner 
five external guarantees (no doubt for related party beneficiaries) or 72 pending litigations relating to the company.  
The CSRC fined the chairman of the board, all of the directors, and the president of the company.  Included among 
the punished directors was a Mr. Ding, who was fined RMB 30,000 yuan by the CSRC.  Mr. Ding brought suit 
against the CSRC in the Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court asking that the fine be overturned.  Mr. Ding’s 
lawyer pleaded for Ding’s exculpation because Ding was “only a director appointed by a shareholder, and did not 
really participate in operation and management of the company” and so did not directly administer or operate the 
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directly to breaches of corporate fiduciary duties per se, but to the failure to disclose breaches 
such as breach of a fiduciary duty of loyalty in undisclosed related party transactions, or false or 
misleading disclosure resulting from director or officer failure to exercise due care in signing off 
on disclosure documents.292   
 More compelling perhaps than lack of fiduciary duties cases is the affirmative evidence 
that Shanghai People’s Courts’ strive to avoid corporate fiduciary duties doctrine, or refuse to 
take judicial notice of clear corporate law aspects which are not specifically pleaded.  The 
following six cases are exemplary.  First, a 2003 case involved the transfer of RMB 6.1 million 
yuan out of a Chinese-foreign equity joint venture-owned RMB yuan account by and to the 
Chinese partner, without the joint venture legal person’s or the other investors’ approval.  The 
District People’s Court and then the Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court deemed the 
transaction “not inappropriate” and thus permissible because accounting regulations applicable to 
foreign invested enterprises seem to confer power of disposition of such domestic funds on the 
Chinese partner.293  A less deferential judicial agency might have been more sympathetic to the 
                                                                                                                                                             
company, or directly manage or operate the company, “the only two kinds of people who can be fined under the 
PRC Securities Law” (emphasis added).  The CSRC answered sternly in its counter-argument, stating that Ding had 
failed to demonstrate he had met his corporate/securities law “duty of care” (qinmian yiwu) in reviewing and 
approving the disclosure documents, or by failing to raise his disagreement with the false information once disclosed 
and put into the market.  As noted infra notes 330 to 331 and accompanying text, this report also provides insight 
into how Chinese citizens (not just lazy directors and their lawyers) understand the (non-) application of the 
Company Law to publicly-listed companies, and may account for the relative paucity of public company cases in the 
Shanghai People’s Courts.  For an entirely similar argument on the responsibilities of a public company non-
executive director, see the “Flower Vase” (Lu Jiahao) director case described at Doctrine That Dared Not, supra 
note 20, at 226-28.  
292 See Lu Jianming v. Shanghai Light Indus. Mach. Co., Ltd., ANALYSIS OF NEW CASES 189-94 (Shanghai 
Jingan Dist. People’s Ct., 2006), Shanghai No. 2 Interm. People’s Ct. (2006) (board resolution nominating director 
of listed company director not invalidated by board’s failure to disclose—in the resolution—that nominee formerly 
worked for listed company’s controlling shareholder and is defendant company’s Legal Representative’s wife), a 
case which normally would have been subject to CSRC enforcement.  The fact that the case made it into the 
People’s Courts is rare. 
293 See A. Co., Ltd. v. Shanghai B. (Group) Co., 2005 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 83-86 
(Shanghai No. 2 Interm. People’s Ct., 2003), (transfer of RMB yuan funds out of corporate account by and to 
Chinese investor permitted because of special nature of account use and accounting regulation giving Chinese 
partner disposition rights over the same; the accounts were established to fund social welfare obligations payable in 
RMB yuan to Chinese employees of the joint venture and were not included in the joint venture financial accounts).  
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plaintiff’s request for return of the funds, with interest, and then a reallocation of the same in 
accordance with the original partners’ respective equity interests in the corporate joint venture.  
In certain contexts this kind of deference by judicial actors might be admirable.  But here it 
eliminates the ability of those same judicial actors to intervene when participants in corporate 
legal persons opportunistically or oppressively use the corporate form to breach basic underlying 
corporate law obligations.294   
 Second, the late 2005 Yingdafang case briefed in the Case Reports Appendix shows a 
circumstance where multiple breaches of fiduciary duties are not recognized or punished because 
of a tightly constrained view of the sources of obligation (the Articles of Association of the legal 
person entity only) and a most exacting reading of the corporate law itself (limiting the 
application of non-compete prohibitions to directors and officers, not controlling shareholders in 
close corporations).295 
 Third, a subsequent 2006 case in which shareholders had their application for judicial 
dissolution denied by the first level People’s Court also refused to consider, in the same action, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Yet see the contra result in Shanghai X. Elec. Co. v. Mr. A, 2005 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 114-17 
(Shanghai No. 2 Interm. People’s Ct., 2003), (Japanese director of Chinese-foreign equity joint venture which at 
time of suit is converted into a wholly PRC invested limited liability company because of Japanese partner’s sale of 
equity is liable for return of RMB 324,000 yuan (and interest) taken from the joint venture and transferred to another 
Japanese party-controlled company and then the director’s personal account without joint venture board approval or 
joint venture investor (shareholder) approval).  The difference in the two cases lies perhaps in the nationality of the 
fiduciary absconding with funds from the corporate entity, but also because the funds in the latter case are 
indisputably those of the corporate entity, with no investor in the entity having any color of a disposition right, and 
because the funds are accounted for as cash assets on the books of the same legal person entity.  These cases are also 
interesting because they show that the Shanghai People’s Courts will accept cases regarding Chinese-foreign joint 
ventures and apply the PRC Company Law to them, except where there are specific laws or regulations governing 
such joint ventures differently.  Some national People’s Courts, and many business people and lawyers disagree with 
strict application of China’s corporate law to such foreign invested enterprises. 
294 See for example the much earlier case, Chen Zhijin v. Shanghai Kaikai Enter. Co., Ltd., 1998 HU ER 
ZHONG JING ZHONG ZI No. 729 (Shanghai Jingan Dist. People’s Ct., 1998), partially aff’d, Shanghai No. 2 Interm. 
People’s Ct. (1998), where the People’s Court supports a mandatory buy-back of so-called “internal” (employee) 
shares, and at a very low price of RMB 1.00 per share against net per share asset value at the time of buy-back of 
RMB 2.80 yuan, because the plaintiff has only challenged the buy-back and not “raised” the price issue.  
295 See Shanghai Yingdafang Serv. Co. v. Shanghai Yingdafang Zhangjiang Prop. Mgmt. Co., 2007 NIAN 
SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 190-95 (Shanghai Pudong New Dist. People’s Ct., 2005), Shanghai No.1 
Interm. People’s Ct. (2005), reported in detail in the Case Reports Appendix. 
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evidence of breach of corporate fiduciary duties by defendant directors (including transfer of 
corporate funds into personal accounts, diversion of assets sale proceeds into personal accounts, 
and some evidence of accounts manipulation).  Instead, the Court held very closely to the Article 
183 inquiry as pleaded.296 
 Fourth, in the complex dissident shareholder case invoked above297 the Shanghai 
People’s Courts avoided discussing clear fraud (already identified and punished by other public 
institutions) and breach of corporate fiduciary duties by a controlling shareholder/Legal 
Representative, and ruled out of order and ineffective shareholder self-help (resolutions produced 
at a special shareholders’ meeting) aimed at defeating the rogue partner.  The decision was based 
on the most technical grounds pertaining to compliance with detailed procedures in the 
company’s Articles of Association.   
 In a fifth case decided in 2006, Shanghai People’s Courts refused to identify how the 
failure to disclose a public company nominee director’s employment and personal relationships 
was a breach of the fiduciary duty298 to inform shareholders prior to the exercise of their voting 
rights.299 
 Finally in a sixth case, also from 2006, an appeals-level People’s Court subjected a 
shareholder to a mandatory buy-back of his stock in a “cooperative stock” entity, even though 
the first-level People’s Court and the appeals-level Court (in the first hearing and opinion) 
                                                 
296 Yang Lizhii v. Cao Zhengjie, 2007 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 205-10, ANALYSIS OF 
NEW CASES 356-59  (Xuhui Dist. People’s Ct., 2006). 
297 Yu Xiaoqi v. Shanghai Changxin Accountancy Ltd., ANALYSIS OF NEW CASES 178-87 (Shanghai 
Changning Dist. People’s Ct., 2006), Shanghai No. 1 Interm. People’s Ct. (2006). 
298 Think breach of “duty of candor” described in Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. Sup. Ct., 
1985).  
299 Lu Jianming v. Shanghai Light Indust. Machinery Co., Ltd., ANALYSIS OF NEW CASES 189-94 
(Shanghai Jingan Dist. People’s Ct., 2006), (board resolution nominating director of listed company director not 
invalidated by board’s failure to disclose—in the resolution or the accompanying notice—that nominee formerly 
worked for listed company’s controlling shareholder and is the wife of the defendant company’s Legal 
Representative), Shanghai No. 2 Interm. People’s Ct. (2006).  Here the Courts rule very narrowly on the specific 
question of whether the board resolution is “in violation of law or regulation,” or whether the content of the 
resolution violates the company’s Articles of Association as in effect at the time of the meeting. 
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identified the forced put as an opportunistic use of the shareholders’ general meeting highly 
indicative of breach of fiduciary duties and fair dealing in the close corporation context.300 
 In each of these cases, the People’s Courts involved stubbornly refused to take 
cognizance of facts and circumstances rather pregnant with breach of corporate fiduciary duties, 
and instead ruled very narrowly based upon whatever affirmative law, regulation or stipulation of 
the Articles of Association was available and/or specifically pleaded.  This evidence again 
suggests not only an institutional distaste for cases which require a high degree of technical 
competence, but more importantly a constraint on the autonomy of the Courts in reaching 
beyond contract, the Articles of Association or any other positive legal norm to apply powerful 
corporate law doctrines. 
 In its 2007 report on the first year of application of the 2006 Company Law, the Shanghai 
Higher People’s Court describes a basic adjudication principle which casts some light on why 
there is a paucity of corporate fiduciary duties cases (outside of those implicated in the almost 
blanket refusal to accept public company limited by shares cases discussed infra) and evidence 
of studied avoidance of such claims.  That basic principle is the priority given to commercial law 
(shangfa) over civil law (minfa) in corporate law cases.  The principle is a profound one in the 
workings of the Chinese legal system and civil law-family jurisdictions.301  In the Chinese case it 
holds that the People’s Courts should apply the directly related commercial law (e.g., the 
Company Law, the Securities Law, or the Contract Law) first, and only then having recourse to 
                                                 
300 Shanghai Shenmao Dianci Factory v. Wang Longbao, 2006 HU YI ZHONG MIN SAN (SHANG) ZAI 
ZHONG ZI NO.1, 2004 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 324-27 (Shanghai Nanhui Dist. People’s Ct., 2004), 
(forced buy-out of stock in “non-profit” stock cooperative upon Vice Chairman’s leaving employ pursuant to board 
regulations, shareholders’ resolution and Articles of Association not a violation of shareholders’ rights, where the 
Court cites not the PRC Company Law but instead a set of 1997 guidelines issued by the now-extinct Ministry level 
Commission on the Restructuring of the Economic System  and Shanghai “Provisional Measures” on stock 
cooperatives and collectives), aff’d, Shanghai No. 1 Interm. People’s Ct. (No. 3 Civ. Div.) (2004), rev’d on reh’g 
Shanghai No. 1 Interm. People’s Ct. (No. 3 Civ. Div.) (2006), also available at http://www.hshfy.sh.cn/fyitw/gweb/. 
301 This is not to say that the PRC’s legal system should be construed as a part of the civil law family of 
legal systems. 
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more generalized “civil” law if the specifically-tailored “commercial” law does not address the 
problem.  This principle is part of a conservative vision which seeks to dampen the People’s 
Courts’ enthusiasm for application of broad doctrines and remedies (such as the catch-all breach 
of (civil law-system) “good faith” (chengshi xinyong) or “infringement of rights” (qinquan) 
under the General Principles of the Civil Law) in favor of close adherence to what the Chinese 
legislature has offered in statute as legal causes of action and remedies.302  As an illustrative 
example, in a pre-2006 breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty context this guiding principle would 
counsel that judges identify a specific breach of bright-line loyalty provisions over invocation of 
a breach of abstract corporate fiduciary duties (cast as lack of “good faith” or “rights 
infringement” under the General Principles of the Civil Law).  This orientation perhaps 
illuminates the relative lack of fiduciary duties cases pre-2006.  For the post-2006 period, the 
similar lack of application indicates persistent adherence to the same underlying principle, 
regardless of new statutory authorization in the supposedly prioritized “commercial” law, and 
explains why some Shanghai judges are openly calling for a collapse of the unwieldy 
separation.303 
 Whatever the complex of reasons for this non-utilization of a key corporate law doctrine, 
it was obvious before 2006 that the implementation of such doctrines would be aided greatly by a 
broadly drawn and flexibly applied notion of corporate fiduciary duties in the Company Law 
                                                 
302 And yet it is interesting to note that even before wholesale amendment of the Company Law, the 
Chinese State Council and legislature recognized how the two apparently separate legal systems could not help but 
bleed into each other.  Thus the 2005 amendments were the product of input from both “civil” and “commercial” 
law specialists.  See LAO Company Law Explanation, supra note 19, at 526.  There is yet another genus of non-
criminal “civil” law in China, “economic law” (jingji fa), which is law concerning the relationship between the state 
and private economic actors.  Thus, traditionally, Chinese analysts and legal theorists would think of anti-trust or 
anti-monopoly law as “economic law” and company law as “commercial law”.  This distinction is rapidly fading in 
modern China, especially as the “commercial law” school is spawning sub-species of commercial law: “banking 
law,” “securities law,” “commercial instruments law,” “finance law,” etc. 
303 In December 2008, one Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court judge advocated a collapsing of this 
distinction, and permission for mixed civil-commercial law claims, as well as corporate law pleadings in the 
alternative.  Remarks of Yu Wei, Dec. 5, 2008 (notes on file with author). 
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itself.  Without doubt, this is one of the reasons the drafters of the new Company Law and the 
academics who advised them pushed so hard for new Article 148 and a newly-actionable Article 
149 in the 2006 statute.304  The hunger on the part of the judiciary for the ability to apply such 
broader corporate law principles is embodied in a 2003 opinion.  In that case, the Shanghai No. 2 
Intermediate People’s Court had to struggle with the overly bright-line articles of the 1994 
Company Law prohibiting fiduciaries’ looting to support the plaintiff’s claim that it was wrong 
for a director to take RMB 324,000 yuan (and interest) out of the company and pay it into his 
personal account without shareholder or board approval.305  Without a broad fiduciary duty 
principle to apply, and the very narrow focus of the bright line prohibitions of Article 50 of the 
1994 Company Law, the first-level People’s Court had no choice but to rely on the company’s 
Articles of Association and their requirement that certain “major matters” be approved by all 
shareholders.  This approach elevated the diversion of a relatively small quantum of funds to the 
director (who pleaded the transaction as the disbursement of his salary) into a qualitatively 
significant breach of the Articles of Association.  The Court, seemingly with a sigh of relief, was 
able to equate this transgression of the Articles of Association to a full-fledged “breach of the 
director’s duty of loyalty and obligation to protect the company’s interest.”306  It is easy to 
perceive the same ambition—and relief at the inclusion of new Articles 148 and 149 in the 2006 
Company Law—in the Shanghai Higher People’s Court post-January 1, 2006 commentary on the 
same case, celebrating how the new Company Law (and broader principles of corporate fiduciary 
duties) ensures that such diversions of funds by fiduciaries, whether as “salary” or something 
                                                 
304 See Doctrine That Dared Not, supra note 20.  
305 Shanghai X. Elec. Co. v. Mr. A, 2005 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 114-17 (Shanghai No. 
2 Interm. People’s Ct., 2003), (Japanese director of Chinese-foreign equity joint venture which at time of suit is 
converted into a wholly PRC invested limited liability company because of Japanese partner’s sale of equity is liable 
for return of RMB 324,000 yuan (and interest) taken from the joint venture and transferred to another Japanese 
party-controlled company and then the director’s personal account without joint venture board approval or joint 
venture investor (shareholder) approval). 
306 Id. at 116 (which judgment is upheld on appeal by the Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court). 
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else, are a new kind of “internal” or “private” corporate governance matter which can be attacked 
ex post through “public authority” judicial proceedings.307 
 
C. Absence of Public Company Cases 
 
 In all of my reviews of Shanghai Higher People’s Court reports, discussions of corporate 
law adjudication with Shanghai or Supreme People’s Court judicial officials, PRC academics 
and lawyers, or readings of published case collections and case opinions posted online by the 
Shanghai Higher People’s Court, I found very little evidence of (i) companies limited by shares, 
or (ii) such companies which have any part of their capital listed on stock exchanges, PRC or 
foreign.308  Indeed, in the many civil case judgments I reviewed for this study, only a few 
touched on disputes or shareholder actions arising in relation to companies limited by shares.309  
                                                 
307 Id. at 117.  In the alternative, the Chinese judiciary (and People’s Procurate) might have taken up a 
harder instrument in attacking such transactions, by criminalizing breaches of fiduciary duty.  See, e.g., PRC v. 
Yang Demao, NEW COMPANY LAW CASES 460-65 (Shanghai Luwan Dist. People’s Ct.),  (preferential transfers by 
controlling shareholders out of a company entering liquidation either to loot company in breach of duties, or remove 
assets from creditors’ claims, is judged the basis for guilt in the crime of “harmfully impeding liquidation”), aff’d, 
Shanghai No. 1 Interm. People’s Ct. (2003).  See also the prosecution of Guan Guoliang for continuing use of the 
criminal law to punish breaches of corporate fiduciary duties.  Luo Changping, Yu Ning & Luo Jieqi, Yi Shen Guan 
Guoliang [First Hearing for Guan Guoliang], CAIJING, Dec. 8, 2008, at 140-42 [hereinafter Guan Guoliang 
Criminal Prosecution].   
308 In addition, there is no evidence whatsoever in the Shanghai People’s Courts of (i) the wholly state 
owned sub-genus of limited liability company (2006 Company Law, supra note 5, arts. 65-71) or (ii) the new sole 
shareholder limited liability company (id. at arts. 58-64), including what many thought would be abundant veil-
piercing actions going to the personal assets of the sole shareholder (id. at art. 63).  The reason for the absence of 
wholly state-owned companies is perhaps more structural than political:  such companies do not actually have a 
shareholders’ general meeting or a board of directors responsible to the shareholders’ meeting, thus eliminating a 
whole host of possible plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ claims.  In addition, such wholly state owned companies are still run 
very much as SOEs under line ministries (even if the line ministries have been dissolved and a Ministry-level 
Commission has taken over formal authority with respect to the firms), and thus disputes and difficulties will be 
worked out in purely political fora or between government departments or administrative bodies.  The limited scope 
of the new sole shareholder firms probably explains why contract or tort creditors do not go to formal judicial 
institutions with small claims against such defendants. 
309 Two cases in the very thin pre-2006 and post-2006 sample are:  Zhang X. v. Shanghai A Co. Ltd., 
SELECTED COMPANY LAW CASES 229 (unidentified Shanghai Dist. People’s Ct., 1995), (ruling that delegation of 
statutory power to elect directors to board contained in Articles of Association through a shareholders’ meeting is 
invalid, as are related director “appointments” made by the board of directors), appeal filed, unidentified Shanghai 
Interm. People’s Ct. (1995); Lu Jianming v. Shanghai Light Indus. Mach. Co., Ltd., ANALYSIS OF NEW CASES 189-
94 (Shanghai Jingan Dist. People’s Ct., 2006), Shanghai No. 2 Interm. People’s Ct. (2006), (ruling that a board 
resolution nominating director of listed company director was not invalidated by the board’s failure to disclose in 
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The absence of such entities does not mean that companies limited by shares and their 
shareholders are not getting into trouble, or are being operated without discord and in perfect 
conformity with the highest standards of value generation, transparency, and good corporate 
governance.  In fact, malfeasance and worse can be divined by the literally daily reports of 
corporate governance failure, oppression, misappropriation, and sins too manifold to mention in 
China’s sophisticated and independent financial press.  Instead, these cases are absent from the 
Shanghai People’s Courts, which is after all the situs of the Shanghai Stock Exchange or China’s 
“Big Board”, for two primary clusters of reasons.  First, the People’s Courts simply do not accept 
such cases, either voluntarily, or because of bureaucratic instruction.  A good deal of this refusal 
posture is based in Party, state and Court fears about large group actions and their potential 
impact on the third rail of Chinese governance culture, “social stability”.  Second, shareholders 
and other affected parties do not bring such cases to the formal judicial system, but instead to the 
CSRC securities regulatory authority, or even the Exchanges.  This is partly rooted in the way 
Chinese public shareholders think about the property and legal rights represented by their stock 
interests in public companies, as well as the existence of a substitute regulatory regime perceived 
to reside in the CSRC as the PRC’s anointed securities regulatory authority.   
 
i. People’s Court Refusals – Voluntary and Instructed 
 
 The awkward interactions between the Shanghai People’s Courts and public companies 
have a long history, and date from the early corporatization effort, the creation of tradable quasi-
stock instruments, the later establishment of Exchanges and over-the-counter (“OTC”) 
markets,310 and what appears to be the proximate trigger, the promulgation of the form of 
                                                                                                                                                             
resolution and meeting notifications that nominee formerly worked for listed company’s controlling shareholder and 
was the wife of defendant company’s Legal Representative). 
310 For a pithy narrative of these developments, see CHINA’S STOCKMARKET, supra note 67, at 9-31.  
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China’s first Securities Law.  The Shanghai Courts’ rejectionist stance was embodied in the first 
public shareholders’ suit brought against a capital markets issuer (and its board, officers and 
accountants) for false and misleading disclosure and the posture famously taken by the Pudong 
New District People’s Court in response:311  Jiang Shuzhen v. Hongguang Industry Co., Ltd. 
Directors et al.  In May 1997, a Sichuan Provincial Government-promoted SOE previously 
transformed into a company limited by shares and named “Hongguang Industry Co., Ltd.” (here, 
“Hongguang”) went public on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and raised RMB 400 million yuan 
with an “A” share IPO.312  Six months after the IPO, a CSRC investigation confirmed that the 
Hongguang IPO was based on wholesale fraud and misrepresentation.313  In June of 1997, long 
before completion of the CSRC investigation and public announcement of CSRC sanctions 
against Hongguang, investor Jiang Shuzhen purchased 1,800 shares of Hongguang on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange for almost RMB 16,000 yuan.  When the CSRC announced the 
investigation and penalties for Hongguang in late 1997 and details of the fraud and 
misrepresentation in the Hongguang offering were revealed in the financial press, the firm’s 
share price dropped sharply.  Shareholder Jiang sold just after the CSRC announcement, 
suffering a loss of RMB 3,136.30 yuan on the Hongguang shares held between June and 
December 1997.  On December 14, 1998, or within the one-year statute of limitations period for 
general infringement of rights under Articles 106(2) and (3) of the General Principles of the Civil 
                                                 
311 The case and details are described consistently in a large number or PRC texts and articles.  See 
COLLECTED SECURITIES CASES, supra note 77, at 58-64.  
312 “A” shares are RMB yuan-denominated shares issued by PRC-domiciled companies and listed on the 
Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, initially allowed to be purchased and traded only by PRC individuals and 
institutions (but now accessed by a narrowly drawn group of foreign “qualified foreign institutional investors” 
granted quota participation in the wholly domestic capital markets and, very recently, certain other permitted foreign 
participants). 
313 On every front, from the issuer’s application for listing filed with the Sichuan Provincial People’s 
Government (and then the Shanghai Stock Exchange), to Hongguang’s legally-mandated disclosure and its complete 
failure post-IPO to comply with the “use of proceeds” described in its offering prospectus (only 16% of the IPO 
proceeds were assigned to uses described in the IPO prospectus, with 35% of the same proceeds going into 
speculative purchases of other Shanghai Stock Exchange-listed shares). 
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Law, Jiang brought suit in the Pudong New District People’s Court against Hongguang’s 
directors, officers, and outside accountants.314  In addition to the General Principles of the Civil 
Law, the lawsuit was loosely grounded in the 1994 Company Law.315  Although China’s first 
Securities Law had not yet come into effect, it had already been adopted by the legislature and its 
form published and heavily propagandized.   
 More than two months later, in March 1999,316 the Pudong New District People’s Court 
finally refused outright to accept the case, saying:  “The plaintiff’s case regarding behavior in 
violation of laws and regulations in the stock market should be handled by the CSRC.  The 
plaintiff’s suit regarding a securities dispute does not come within the jurisdiction of this 
People’s Court.”317  Regardless of the formal justification offered by the Pudong Court in 
1999,318 the Court’s rejection of the Jiang Shuzhen lawsuit is emblematic of how the entire 
                                                 
314 Although the issuer, Hongguang, was domiciled in Sichuan, the Shanghai Stock Exchange had already 
moved from Shanghai’s old Astor Hotel over the Suzhou Creek and across the Huangpu River—and the Bund—to 
the Pudong New District of Shanghai. 
315 No report the author has seen indicates which aspect of the 1994 Company Law was relied upon.  It is 
likely that the claim was generally based in the Company Law in the sense that natural persons and the artificial 
legal person that was Hongguang had done damage to the plaintiff through a legal form authorized and established 
under the Company Law.   
316 Notification was given only on April 2, 1999 after the lapse of the stipulated period for appeal, neatly 
blocking Jiang Shuzhen’s ability to appeal the Pudong New District People’s Court’s refusal to accept the case. 
317 The Pudong New District People’s Court’s refusal to accept the case did not impede the same Court 
from offering its view on the merits of the case, declaring in People’s Court-style dicta that there was no causal 
connection between the wrongs allegedly committed by Hongguang officers, directors and outside accountants and 
the damages suffered by Jiang and other shareholders who saw the value of Hongguang stock plummet.   
318 The formal justification of the Pudong New District People’s Court in 1999 seems to be the following 
(in my words):  “Laws may not be applied and interpreted by judicial courts because such laws (and the underlying 
claims) pertain to the stock market regulated (even if not exclusively) by the CSRC.”  While outside observers might 
think such a rationale unsustainable or plain silly, it is very close to the defense of the non-dutiful director noted 
supra, who tells a Beijing People’s Court that he cannot be in breach of his Company Law fiduciary duty of care at a 
public company because his alleged failure is governed by the Securities Law which imposes such a duty only on 
people who directly operate or manage the firm.  See Listed Company Director Sues, supra note 291.  Later, and in 
the context of the January 2002 Supreme People’s Court ban on private shareholders’ suits which preceded the 
January 2003 Supreme People’s Court Regulations allowing such suits, more credible justifications were offered:  
no legal basis for a private right of action; questionable technical competence of judges hearing corporate and 
securities law cases; or simply the overwhelming complexities of the new Socialist Market economy.  Even after 
lifting of the ban in January 2003 and allowance of shareholders’ suits for damages (only) in false or misleading 
disclosure cases, the securities regulatory authority (and the state, through the People’s Procurate) continues to 
monopolize every other aspect of public company and securities regulation and enforcement aside from false or 
misleading disclosure—such as stock manipulation or insider trading.  And even in cases brought the fines have 
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Chinese court system initially handled, or refused to handle, what all aspects of the PRC 
government feared would quickly become a flood of shareholders’ lawsuits brought throughout 
the nation, at all levels of the court system.319 
 In considering the critical question of the Shanghai Court system’s blanket refusal to 
accept a whole genus of cases, it is important to note that the Shanghai Courts both constrain 
themselves voluntarily and are limited by bureaucratic instruction.  It is well known that the 
Chinese People’s Courts act voluntarily to reject or cease hearing cases from the recent example 
of a nation-wide voluntary halt on hearing cases seeking enforcement of transferred non-
performing loans.320  That judicial strike commenced with a report by the President of a 
Provincial Higher People’s Court delivered to the central government in late 2005, and to date no 
central authority, even the Supreme People’s Court working in tandem with the State Council, 
has been able to prod the People’s Courts back into action.  With respect to formally instructed 
refusal, as noted herein I was able to find several explicit instructions before January 1, 2006 
                                                                                                                                                             
been low, with the CSRC deprived of the ability to bring civil suits against market actors.  Only in the Fall of 2008 
did the CSRC first levy a fine exceeding US$1.5 million for stock manipulation (coupled with confiscation of US$2 
million in illegal profits, and reference for criminal prosecution) in the Shoufang Financial Advisory-Wang 
Jianzhong “pump and dump” case.  See Manipulator Penalized, supra note 77.  This fine and reference for criminal 
prosecution was the high point in a six month period which saw very vigorous enforcement by the CSRC against 
market manipulators, corrupt funds trading, false disclosure, insider trading, etc., including the public investigation 
of the trading activities of one of China’s commercial superstars, the Chairman of the Guo Mei (“Gomei”) 
electronics concern.  See Penalties Imposed by CSRC, supra note 77, at B9 (detailing enforcement actions and fines 
levied between April 8 and November 21, 2008).  
319 That flood duly materialized, forcing the Supreme People’s Court to issue the ban on shareholders’ 
rights cases in January 2002, which was only lifted in January 2003 with the Supreme People’s Court Regulations 
permitting a narrow range of false and misleading disclosure cases into the Courts, but only after something like a 
determination of fact by the CSRC (or the Procurate for criminal faults), only with respect to evaluation of damages, 
and forbidding absolutely anything like class action suits (with lawyers’ contingency fee arrangements forbidden in 
regulations applicable to PRC lawyers).  See the ban of January 2002: Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shouli 
Zhengquan Shichang Yin Xujia Chenshu Yinfa de Minshi Qinquan Anjian Youguan Wenti de Tongzhi [Supreme 
People’s Court Notice Regarding the Issues Related to Acceptance of Civil Rights Infringement Cases Arising from 
False Disclosure in the Securities Markets] (issued on Jan. 15, 2002), at CLC, supra note 5, at 5-29 – 5-30; and the 
January 2003 limited permission: the MISREPRESENTATION IN SECURITIES MARKETS REGULATIONS, supra note 97.    
320 See supra notes 102 to 104 and accompanying text. 
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calling on the Shanghai People’s Courts not to accept certain types of public company cases.321  
But I found no evidence of written instructions, Regulations, Opinions or Approving Responses 
commanding the same after the 2006 Company Law became effective.  However, the President 
of one of Shanghai’s busiest and most expert District People’s Court systems did refer to some 
kind of internal instruction from the Supreme People’s Court (note, not the CSRC) forbidding 
acceptance of public company cases.322 
 There are at least two sets of rationales supporting such rejection.  One set of factors is 
relatively unique to the PRC political-legal circumstance, and largely unknowable for the 
external analyst.  The Shanghai People’s Courts may be loathe to accept public company cases 
because the controlling shareholders, directors or insiders of listed companies most likely to 
appear as defendants are in some degree powerful political actors, whether state or Party 
officials, or their family members.  Again, the validity of this supposition is extremely difficult to 
gauge, as it requires understanding the background of firms which are never actually dragged 
into open view before the People’s Courts.  Still, real world knowledge of who the promoters and 
powers behind listed firms often are, and the People’s Courts posture in cases with far less 
political sensitivity (e.g., the transferred non-performing loan collection cases), indicate that 
there must be substantial truth to these insights.  Interestingly, there seems to be no shyness 
whatsoever about accepting FIE-related disputes,323 which (on the Chinese side) often feature the 
                                                 
321 For example, the prohibition in the Shanghai Company Law Opinion on Shanghai People’s Courts 
hearing public company shareholder challenges to shareholders or directors’ resolutions.  See infra note 324 and 
accompanying text. 
322 Remarks of Judge B, Dec. 5, 2008 (notes on file with author). 
323 The Shanghai Courts have no particular problem dealing with the one limited liability company form 
which actually pre-dated the Company Law and China’s entire corporate law system, the foreign-invested enterprise 
forms comprising Chinese-foreign equity and cooperative joint ventures, wholly foreign-owned enterprises, and 
foreign-invested companies limited by shares, each of which have their own specific statute and/or regulations 
governing aspects of their legal identity, operations, and shareholder relations.  One of the reasons more FIE-related 
cases are not seen in the Shanghai People’s Courts is that foreign investors and their PRC co-investors almost 
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same cast of political-economically privileged characters.  Perhaps in the case of FIEs the 
People’s Courts and local governments are keen to show foreign investors the formal legal 
system at work and in the manner promised, and such benefits outweigh the costs of involvement 
in Court proceedings. 
 A second set of explanations is probably stronger, and much more easily divined from 
my study of the People’s Courts bureaucratic documents and adjudication practice.  These 
explanations hold that the People’s Courts are told to decline, or voluntarily refuse, listed 
company cases for fear of large plaintiff groups, and the perceived impact on social stability or 
maintenance of the “super-value” in Chinese administrative-political culture:  social harmony.  
The Shanghai Higher People’s Court notes the legal-political “redline” explicitly in saying that 
the Shanghai Courts after January 1, 2006 will accept petitions for invalidation of public 
company resolutions they previously refused to hear:    
In view of the fact that these kinds of cases may give rise to issues related to mass 
litigation (quntixing susong) and volatility in the securities markets, [the Shanghai 
People’s Courts] have taken an especially cautious attitude towards accepting 
these cases; in accepting these cases, we ask that the shareholders provide related 
evidence showing why the shareholders’ or board resolution is invalid or should 
be invalidated, and we will examine this evidence strictly so as to protect against 
vexatious shareholder litigation.324 
 
The same facial rationale was offered by the District People’s Court President cited immediately 
above who referred to an internal Supreme People’s Court instruction warning subordinate 
Courts off of public company cases.  He said the instruction was based largely on the desire to 
discourage vexatious shareholder litigation nationally.325  Certainly the Supreme People’s Court 
and the Shanghai Higher People’s Court express legitimate concerns in pointing to the battle 
                                                                                                                                                             
uniformly choose arbitration as the exclusive means of dispute resolution, thus depriving the Courts of any 
opportunity to hear such claims. 
324 Shanghai Higher People’s Court No. 2 Civil Division 2007, supra note 8, at 44. 
325 Remarks of Judge B, Dec. 5, 2008, (notes on file with author).  
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against “vexatious shareholder litigation,” but the concern seems over-estimated in the Chinese 
context, where there are no class actions suits, no lawyers’ contingency fees, and various judicial 
bureaus and just semi-autonomous lawyers’ associations have issued notices requiring caution in 
accepting large plaintiff group cases.326  The more authentic concern here is the problem of mass 
litigation or large plaintiff group lawsuits and their purported impact upon social and political 
stability, freely discussed in popular PRC journalism.327 
 
ii. Availability and Understanding of Substitute Enforcement 
 
 Another set of explanations for the absence of public company cases focuses not on the 
People’s Court bureaucracy, but the potential plaintiffs in such missing actions.  First, such cases 
may not make it into the formal Court system because of the existence of a substitute 
enforcement architecture for listed companies cases—that is, the public prosecutor (the People’s 
Procurate)328 and the CSRC (as prodded by the very effective and muckraking financial media in 
China).  That simple proposition, however, is not the same as saying that the substitute is 
adequate, that the substitute is not resource-constrained, or its coverage is unlimited.  Neither the 
public prosecutor nor the CSRC has the resources or the competence to be a fully adequate 
substitute for the judiciary in bringing the Company Law to act on China’s companies limited by 
                                                 
326 See Xin Tang, Protecting Minority Shareholders in China, in TRANSFORMING CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN EAST ASIA 153-58 (Hideki Kanda, Kon-sik Kim & Curtis Milhaupt eds., 2008). 
327 See Mass Compensation, supra note 52.  Ben Liebman has noted a related point, that refusal by the 
People’s Courts to entertain certain kinds of cases, even those merely politically “warm”, is an entirely rational 
response by institutions which feel that any kind of decision will only bring trouble or in most cases remain 
unenforceable (thus diluting their own power and legitimacy).  See Restricted Reform, supra note 21. 
328 For recent examples of the public prosecutor using the Criminal Law to punish corporate law violations 
(such as breaches of duty of loyalty) see the December 2008 hearing on the prosecution of New China (Xinhua) Life 
Insurance’s former chairman Guan Guoliang for embezzlement of over US$30 million in the Beijing No. 2 
Intermediate People’s Court, which included “financial advisory fees” paid to a financial consultancy established in 
Shanghai and controlled by Guan.  Guan Guoliang Criminal Prosecution, supra note 307, at 140. 
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shares, public or not.  This happens, for instance, in regards to ex post veil-piercing, derivative 
actions, or fiduciary duties litigation.329 
 The focus on potential plaintiffs leads to a second set of demand-side explanations.  As is 
true throughout the world, shareholders in PRC companies limited by shares do not bring actions 
because of familiar collective action problems.  These problems are heightened in China, due to 
the absence of class action lawsuits, contingency fee arrangements and other cost-spreading 
mechanisms.  More specific to China, many PRC shareholders do not bring such cases because 
they do not understand the People’s Courts, as contrasted with the securities regulator, as the 
appropriate forum for hearing their claims.330  This attitude is well expressed in the apparently 
sincere pleadings reported above in the discussion of fiduciary duties claims.331  In those 
pleadings, the defendant director, obviously negligent in fulfilling his corporate fiduciary duties, 
asserts that he is not one of the named persons who has a fiduciary duty under the PRC Securities 
Law—thereby completely ignoring the application of the Company Law to his role as a director 
of a company limited by shares with publicly-listed shares.  Translated, his claim is that listed 
companies are not subject to the Company Law, but instead the Securities Law and its 
                                                 
329 But see the rare CSRC-diminishing and judicial system-activist posture taken by the Shanghai No. 2 
Intermediate People’s Court in the case fully briefed in the Case Reports Appendix: Lu Jianming v. Shanghai Light 
Indus. Mach. Co., Ltd., ANALYSIS OF NEW CASES 189-94 (Shanghai Jingan Dist. People’s Ct., 2006), Shanghai No. 
2 Interm. People’s Ct. (2006), (ruling that a board resolution nominating the director of listed company was not 
invalidated by the board’s failure to disclose in resolution and meeting notifications that nominee formerly worked 
for listed company’s controlling shareholder and was the wife of defendant company’s Legal Representative). 
330 One Shanghai Higher People’s Court judge told the author that both the great proportion of closed 
company (limited liability company) cases and the absence of company limited by share/listed company cases are a 
result of the relative completeness and clarity of the Company Law in addressing companies limited by shares and 
because limited liability companies evidence recurring problems of small company shareholder oppression and 
shareholder-labor relations.  Judge A, Shanghai Higher People’s Court Judge (Dec. 5, 2008) (on file with author).  
This explanation seems dubious, especially if there is indeed some kind of policy guidance from the Supreme 
People’s Court constraining lower level People’s Courts from accepting such cases, as strongly hinted at by other 
Shanghai People’s Court system judges.  The first part of the statement about “relative completeness and clarity” of 
law embodies one view of law and regulation in Chinese legal-political culture which has a very long pedigree, 
holding that the more “scientific” a norm, the fewer disputes will arise in the governed sector. 
331 See Listed Company Director Sues, supra note 291, at A24.   
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enforcement apparatus under the CSRC.  Although the argument is flawed in the legal sense, it 
highlights a prevalent understanding and approach to the separate world of Chinese limited 
liability companies, on one side, and companies limited by shares with listed stock, on the other. 
 
iii. Negative Implications of the Public Companies’ Refusal 
 
 This unhappy bifurcation, or non-implementation of the Company Law with respect to 
companies limited by shares or listed companies, can be evaluated initially in two contradictory 
ways.  On the one hand, it begs for restructuring of China’s business organization law and 
creation of a conforming corporate partnership, LLC or “close corporation” type statute.  The 
Company Law would then be used solely for more suitable application to companies limited by 
shares and listed companies.  Very sadly, the situation today is the opposite of what it should be.  
That is, the state and the People’s Courts only rarely apply the Company Law to companies 
limited by shares or such entities with listed stock, and awkwardly apply the statute in the close 
corporation, or partnership, context.  Yet, as also noted above, the likelihood of such an 
adjustment in the near term is almost nil.  So, the phenomenon perhaps conversely suggests that 
there is a significant amount of room for the People’s Courts to begin engaging with corporate 
claims involving companies limited by shares and listed companies, using the doctrines that they 
have started to announce and apply in the less provocative close corporation/corporate 
partnership context.  This approach may in fact add to the space for future autonomous action by 
the People’s Courts in corporate and commercial cases. 
 Whatever the causes of the relative paucity of public company cases in the Shanghai 
Courts, it does not excuse the same phenomenon.  That lack of application constitutes a real 
tragedy for Chinese corporate governance reform, as it was the dire state of corporate 
governance at public companies in China which occasioned the 2006 Company Law 
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amendments and the statute’s new “justiciability” outlined here,332 and it has long been 
recognized that there is no more efficient or effective way to implement corporate governance in 
China.  Since companies limited by shares or publicly-listed companies and their shareholders 
are simply not present in the Shanghai Courts, the following claims go unimplemented in the 
Shanghai judiciary:  promoters’ agreements, either among promoters,333 or against promoters;334 
shareholders’ meeting resolutions offered by shareholders (3% shareholding);335 rights and 
privileges of different share “classes”;336 convening of board meetings by shareholders (10%), 
directors other than the board Chairman (one third), or the supervisory board;337 prohibition on 
company loans to directors, supervisory board members or senior managers;338 shareholders’ 
approval of proposed transfer of “major” (zhongda) assets;339 supermajority approval by 
shareholders (two thirds) of sale of “major” (zhongda) assets or guarantee of value exceeding 
30% of corporate assets;340 recusal by conflicted directors on board resolutions considering 
related party transactions;341 shareholders’ power to convene a shareholders’ meeting (10% 
shareholder);342 promoters’ and directors, officers and supervisory board members’ one year 
transfer restrictions; 343 merger-objecting shareholders’ appraisal rights;344 listed company 
mandatory disclosure obligations (another badly-drafted incursion of the Company Law into the 
province of PRC securities regulation);345 or shareholder (10%) petitions for company 
                                                 
332 See CHINA CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REPORT, supra note 18, at 135. 
333 See 2006 Company Law, supra note 5, arts. 80, 84 & 94. 
334 Id. at art. 95. 
335 Id. at art. 103. 
336 Id. at art. 132. 
337 Id. at art. 111. 
338 Id. at art. 116. 
339 Id. at art. 105. 
340 Id. at art. 122. 
341 Id. at art.125. 
342 Id. at art. 101(3). 
343 Id. at art. 142. 
344 Id. at art. 143(4). 
345 Id. at art. 146. 
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dissolution.346  In only one rare case in the 1992-2008 sample do the Shanghai People’s Courts 
intrude into the explicit province of the CSRC.347  This however is a criminal case, where the 
Courts act at the direction of the People’s Procurate and as an adjunct to the CSRC in its central 
regulatory mission, and the judgment is firmly based in a Company Law provision which over-
broadly addresses securities trading (a provision which should be covered exclusively by the 
PRC Securities Law).348 
 From an institutional standpoint, a central question for the future of the Chinese judiciary 
is the sustainability of this defensive posture against mass plaintiff cases of all kinds, not just of 
public company cases in the Company Law sphere.  Aside from urgings of reformist intellectuals 
and lawyers, and despite older studies (2001 and 2002) which show some litigation-adversity 
among China’s urban and rural citizens,349 individuals and groups continue to push into the 
courts en masse.  In late 2008, the Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court announced that it 
alone had seen skyrocketing numbers of “group” (qunti) lawsuits accepted in the past few years:  
                                                 
346 Id. at art. 183. 
347 The case relates to securities, and the trading of securities outside of a CSRC-approved Exchange and 
implementation of 2006 Company Law Article 139.  See PRC v. Fang Kun, 2007 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI 
JINGXUAN (Shanghai Pudong New Dist. People’s Ct., 2006), (ruling that trading in unlisted securities, including 
acting as agent-underwriter in public offerings, without CSRC approval and registration to engage in the securities 
business, constitutes the crime of “illegal business operations”), aff’d, Shanghai No. 1 Interm. People’s Ct. (2007). 
348 For both companies limited by shares (listed or not) and limited liability companies (even the close 
corporation/corporate partnership form prevalent in China), a wide range of the tools offered in the 2006 Company 
Law are not used by the People’s Courts either.  These tools include:  shareholders’ civil suits against other 
shareholders for oppression; claims against control or “actual control” parties for harm to the company; specifically-
pleaded (arts. 148 and 149) breaches of “duty of care” or “duty of loyalty” (including funds misappropriation, illegal 
lending or guarantees, self-dealing, corporate opportunity, corporate secrets confidentiality); specifically-pleaded 
claims against directors, officers or supervisory board members for compensation arising from law-breaching 
behavior; specifically-pleaded derivative actions under art. 152; adjudication of “actual control person” status; 
failure to make financial reports to shareholders; company dividend distributions; or breach of duties for a People’s 
Court-confirmed liquidation group.  Even in the apparently more accessible context of limited liability companies, 
there are few lawsuits involving new or previously existing claims permitted under the 2006 Company Law, such as 
contract claims by shareholders against other shareholders for failure to pay in subscribed-for capital, preemptive 
rights on new issuance of capital, or mandatory buy-back/appraisal rights.  As demonstrated in this article, limited 
liability companies do see claims related to a narrow band of new rights offered in the new Company Law or pre-
existing rights, including shareholders’ information rights; 50% shareholder consent, and right of first refusal, on 
equity transfers; and shareholder (10%) petitions for company dissolution.  See 2006 Company Law, supra note 5, 
arts. 20, 21, 28, 34, 35, 72, 75(3), 150, 166, 167, 172, 183, 190, and 217(3). 
349 See Measuring Harmony, supra note 49, at D24. 
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from 27 group cases suing on the same cause of action and 1047 claimants in 2006, to 50 cases 
(1671 claimants) in 2007, and 62 cases (1449 claimants) to October 1, 2008.350  That is a 
doubling in case acceptances over 24 months, and the referenced report does not indicate how 
many of such cases were refused.  The majority of these cases pertain to labor disputes, 
residential housing management, administrative condemnation of land and buildings, and rural 
contracting disputes;351 other data indicate that continued assays directed at the People’s Courts 
nationally come in respect of labor rights,352 environmental torts, official misfeasance,353 food 
contamination,354 securities lawsuits, and so on.  One Intermediate People’s Court in the 
Shanghai system, recognizing the unstoppable force of such group actions, has issued special 
procedures to handle such cases, procedures which may act to provide early warning to the entire 
Court system of the approach of such lawsuits.355  Of course, the more direct way of handling the 
phenomenon is simple refusal to accept cases potentially giving rise to large—and angry—
plaintiff groups.  That is apparently the response of the Shanghai judiciary (and by extension the 
                                                 
350 Pan Gaofeng, Shanghaiahi Diyi Zhongyuan Tansuo Shenpan Xin Juecuo [Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate 
People’s Court Explores New Adjudication Measures], XINMIN WANBAO [NEW PEOPLE’S EVENING NEWS], Nov. 5, 
2008, at A3 [hereinafter New Shanghai Adjudication Measures]. 
351 Id. 
352 One public report in late 2008 shows how overburdened a very local level court in the Dongguan area of 
Guangdong Province is.  Until November 15, 2008, a Basic level People’s Court serving a sub-district of Dongguan 
with only 13 judges had to process 7,540 cases (mostly labor contract cases and disputes regarding the handling of 
laid off workers), corresponding to roughly 580 cases per judge—as against a national average of 42 cases per 
judge; this case acceptance and adjudication rate was already a 100% increase over cases in the same district for the 
entirety of 2007.  See China’s Busiest Court, supra note 57, at A7. 
353 See, e.g., Edward Wong, Parents of Schoolchildren Killed in China Quake Confirm Lawsuit, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 23, 2008, at A10 (reporting on a group of parents who filed a lawsuit against government officials for 
the collapse of elementary school buildings during the Sichuan earthquake in May 2008). 
354 See, e.g., Andrew Jacobs, Chinese Parents Reject Milk Settlement, Seeking Care for Victims, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2009, at A7 (reporting that Chinese parents of children poisoned by tainted domestic dairy products 
were collecting signatures for a petition demanding remedies and preparing to refuse a government-sanctioned 
compensation package as part of their demand for long-term health care and preventive research); Edward Wong, 
Milk Scandal in China Yields Cash for Parents, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2009, at A6 (reporting that parents of one child 
poisoned by the tainted milk products had already accepted a compensation package from the dairy manufacturer, 
but mentioning that other parents were persisting with their petitions for relief). 
355 See New Shanghai Adjudication Measures, supra note 351, at A3 (discussing the effectiveness of the 
new coordinating mechanism between the District and Intermediate People’s Courts for qunti—or group—lawsuits). 
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national People’s Courts) in respect of companies limited by shares that have listed shares in the 
hands of hundreds or thousands of Chinese citizen shareholders.356 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 In this study I have shown two aspects of company law adjudication in the Shanghai 
People’s Courts between 1992 and 2008:  bold autonomy,357 and continuing constraints on that 
autonomy.  Two aspects of the constraints identified are worrying.  First is the perverse 
authorization-constraint dynamic seen in the increasingly conservative application or non-
application of corporate law doctrines like veil piercing, the derivative lawsuit or corporate 
fiduciary duties after the basis for those doctrines has at last been provided by statutory law.  
Second, and perhaps of greater concern, is the evident “red line” drawn around companies 
limited by shares (with many shareholders) and in particular companies limited by shares with 
public listings (even more shareholders), where the Shanghai People’s Courts simply do not 
accept or adjudicate cases involving corporations with a large number of shareholders.  As noted 
in the body of this article, this is exemplified by the Courts’ rejection of shareholders’ suits 
generally, and shareholders’ claims to overturn board or shareholders’ resolutions, force 
dividend distributions, cause judicially-mandated sale of equity, or spur dissolution, in each case 
specifically at companies limited by shares or such companies with listings.  Recall how the No. 
2 Civil Division of the Shanghai Higher People’s Court explicitly addressed the situation in its 
                                                 
356 Most Chinese analysts understand that a rejectionist response is not sustainable in the long term, even if 
that refusal is animated by the sheer inability to process the huge number of cases flooding into the courts.  See 
Assuaging Popular Anger, supra note 11, at E31 (suggesting that the Chinese government use the judicial systems 
as a “buffer” to abate acute political and social issues); Mass Compensation, supra note 52, at 152 (reasoning that 
for major claims involving mass compensation, the People’s Courts should be the first institution providing 
remedies for injured parties, rather than administrative action).  
357 As noted supra note 88 increased autonomy may not be an undiluted “good” as it may permit judicial 
institutions to act autonomously but illegally or corruptly. 
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grudging reversal of the pre-2006 policy ordering rejection of public company shareholders’ 
petitions for invalidation of corporate resolutions:  
In view of the fact that these kinds of cases may give rise to issues related to mass 
litigation (quntixing susong) and volatility in the securities markets, [the Shanghai 
People’s Courts] have taken an especially cautious attitude towards accepting 
these cases; ...358 
 
The same concern can also be perceived, albeit more subtly, in the Shanghai judicial system’s 
unremitting bias in favor of “stability” (including business entity preservation at all costs) over 
other corporate law values such as transactional efficiency, adaptability and the easy 
redeployment of capital, or the rights explicitly granted in statute to firm participants.  The 
evidence presented above shows that the shyness about accepting claims associated with multiple 
shareholders was largely ordered inside the Court bureaucracy.  Under the 1994 Company Law, 
the Supreme People’s Court, the Shanghai People’s Courts and other People’s Courts systems 
assuredly issued “Opinions” and “Notices” explicitly forbidding the acceptance and adjudication 
of public company cases and directing those cases to the CSRC.  In the post-2006 scenario, many 
of those explicit prohibitions have been removed359 or made moot by clear authorizing 
provisions in the 2006 Company Law, and yet the evidence presented here indicates that cases 
concerning such corporate entities and their many shareholders are not making it into the 
People’s Courts.  The problem then is the very strong concern in the People’s Courts for political 
or social order even in the mundane world of corporate law adjudication, in which Law, 
regulation, coherence, and “fairness” (often invoked by the Shanghai People’s Courts in 
corporate law cases) should be dispositive, and outside of the more sensitive social control 
context.  This concern causes the judiciary to disregard the power it is clearly authorized to wield 
                                                 
358 Shanghai Higher People’s Court No. 2 Civil Division 2007, supra note 8, at 44. 
359 Although, as noted supra, at least one senior Shanghai People’s Court system judge alluded to some 
kind of broad non-public direction from the Supreme People’s Court asking the lower level courts not to take public 
company cases.  See supra note 322 and accompanying text. 
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under the 2006 Company Law, or causes the political and administrative masters of the Court 
system to limit jurisdiction in bald contradiction with the scope of their power now outlined in 
statute. 
 With respect to the authorization-constraint dynamic, the development path presented 
here may appear counter-intuitive.  It seems rare indeed to witness a state or governmental organ 
acting with less autonomy upon the grant of more power.  As with the rejection of public 
company cases, the Courts’ refusal to hear cases they are now authorized doctrinally to 
adjudicate is the result of both specific instructions inside the bureaucracy and voluntary 
deference by the People’s Courts.  These refusals are both political and bureaucratic in origin.  
Doubtless, because of the keen political sensitivities sometimes in play, superior departments of 
the state or Party warn the Courts off certain kinds of cases.  There is also ample evidence that 
the People’s Courts voluntarily reject cases when they perceive a political problem.  The latter 
phenomenon is exemplified by the People’s Courts’ nationwide refusal starting in 2005 to 
adjudicate creditor claims on non-performing loans transferred to China’s asset management 
companies and then resold to third party purchasers.  This coordinated refusal was sourced in 
lower-level Court fears that such cases might implicate one of transitional China’s hot-button 
issues:  the theft of state assets.360  Most importantly, this national refusal came bottom-up, and 
has persisted even in the face of repeated public urgings from numerous central government 
authorities to re-start case acceptance and adjudication.  The bureaucratically-based refusals are 
by and large voluntary and not ordered by superior departments.  Revived voluntary constraints 
on autonomy—now in the more complex and less apparently political areas of fiduciary duties, 
veil-piercing, and firm dissolution—exemplify the underlying bureaucratic nature and status of 
                                                 
360 This worry was first articulated in a report issued in late 2004 by the Hebei Provincial Higher People’s 
Court President Liu Ruichuan.  See Two Regulation Difficulties, supra note 102, at 60 (describing President Liu’s 
report) and Unfreezing Litigation, supra note 104 (the same). 
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the People’s Courts in China.  Without any mention of certain doctrines in statute before 2006, 
the People’s Courts apparently felt free to range about and implement common sense or 
“justice”/”fairness”-oriented solutions, such as invocation of corporate fiduciary duties against 
obviously opportunistic or inattentive directors, or ad hoc derivative lawsuits, even if not 
pleaded.361  However, with some of these doctrines now included in formal “Law”, even if very 
much in principle, the People’s Courts as embedded bureaucratic actors subject to Party direction 
now wait to see how the apex of their bureaucracy—the Supreme People’s Court in Beijing—
will instruct implementation of these newly-authorized doctrines.  This view, however, cannot be 
wholly explanatory as even the Shanghai People’s Courts did continue to act freely in some 
specific areas after January 1, 2006 without Supreme People’s Court Regulations or any kind of 
superior direction. 
 The effects of the autonomy dialectic revealed here may be profoundly injurious for the 
Chinese legal reform project.  As noted above, two of the functions asserted for judicial 
institutions in non-democratic, non-rule of law, states like the PRC are to bolster a regime’s 
claim to “legality” and to facilitate investment, and then growth.362  With respect to legality and 
legitimacy, in the counter-intuitive developments identified in this article we may be seeing 
unfortunate effects akin to what Xu Xiaoqun, historian of an earlier period of Chinese judicial 
reform, has called the “paradox of [judicial] modernity.”363  Professor Xu describes the efforts 
toward judicial reform in China’s late Qing and Republican eras (1900-37), and the relatively 
consistent motivations and goals of the central state/Party in promoting that reform.  He 
                                                 
361 This incidentally is exactly the opposite of what might be expected from bureaucratic judges working 
under a quota system, or subject to punishment for “incorrectly-decided” cases.  See Judicial Responsibility Systems, 
supra note 26. 
362 AUTHORITARIAN RULE OF LAW, supra note 21, at 4. 
363 XU XIAOQUN, TRAIL OF MODERNITY: JUDICIAL REFORM IN EARLY TWENTIETH-CENTURY CHINA, 1901-
1937 (2008) [hereinafter 20TH CENTURY JUDICIAL REFORM]. 
2010] CORPORATE LAW IN THE SHANGHAI PEOPLE’S COURTS  417 
 
 
questions whether expansion of the formal state and judicial system resulted in real 
“development,” by which he means the increased effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy of 
those same state institutions (including the courts).  Xu focuses on the defeated expectations of 
the consumers/subjects of the judicial power, who were made abundant promises by the 
“modernizing” state, but upon which the judiciary cannot deliver, thereby injuring the efficacy 
and legitimacy of the judiciary itself.364 
 Xu’s insights about early 20th century China shed important light on the expansions of, 
and constraints on, judicial autonomy described in this article.  Likewise, the expansion of and 
constraints on judicial autonomy in the years 1992-2008 with respect to corporate law 
adjudication exemplify not only the failure to deliver resolution, justice and some kind of 
predictability, but also serve to diminish the legitimacy of the “state” and its institutions, the 
People’s Courts in particular.  Contemporary China is witnessing the same paradox in the 
hesitancy of the Shanghai People’s Courts—and by implication the national People’s Courts—to 
hear cases which they used to accept and adjudicate without any legal basis in statute, and after a 
firm legal basis has been provided in the Company Law and the Law has—nominally—increased 
its “justiciability.”  The same phenomenon can be perceived in the Courts’ rejection of mass 
plaintiff, public company, cases.  Of course, this paradox is most searing, disheartening, and de-
legitimizing—and most readily noted by PRC and foreign legal analysts—in other areas of PRC 
judicial activity such as the application of criminal law or in the more direct social/political 
control context.365  Yet this negative phenomenon is equally important in the corporate and 
                                                 
364 Id. at 20-22. 
365 The hardy appetite for rights protection and recourse to law in the Company Law sphere is echoed in all 
other sectors of Chinese civil society. Among others, they include peasants living under the fist of oppressive, 
corrupt and ill-educated local tyrants, laid off workers in Northeast China, and sweatshop workers in Southern 
China.  See CHEN GUIDI & WU CHUNTAO, ZHONGGUO NONGMIN DIAOCHA BAOGAO, (2004) (detailing constant 
reference to local judicial institutions in the face cadre oppression).  See also AGAINST THE LAW, supra note 23 
(demands on and sustained access to the People’s Courts regarding labor disputes, particularly in the “Sunbelt” 
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commercial sphere.  It is important not just because of the harmful effects visited on economic 
development in an increasingly marketized and corporatized China.  Its significance arises from 
the fact that formal institutional development and increased notional access to the People’s 
Courts in the Company Law sphere, specifically, have spurred societal demand for competent 
institutions able to apply the Company Law fairly—which in turn only doubles the 
disappointment upon subsequent institutional failure or rejection of claims. 
 There is no question that China’s 1994 Company Law and its 2006 re-formulation, and 
the existence of corporate business organization in Reform-era China, have changed the nature of 
law and legal institutions in China, the expectations of the consumer/subjects of the law in 
China, the idea of “rights” (including property rights but also brushing up against civil and 
political rights), and the relationship between the state (and Party) and the governed as mediated 
through the legal and political system.  In Weberian-North terms366 China is still very far from 
the complete rule of law state with seamless protection of property rights and property 
expectations.  Notwithstanding, my analysis of corporate law cases and opinions shows that the 
corporatization/partial privatization program and the implementation of a justiciable corporate 
law calling for ex post application of judicial standards by a stand-alone judiciary have spurred 
the nation’s formal legal institutions to develop competence, autonomy and the beginnings of 
                                                                                                                                                             
region of the PRC); China’s Busiest Court, supra note 57, at A7 (noting the huge volume of cases directed towards a 
Basic level People’s Court in Guangdong Province, the majority of such actions concerning labor disputes).  This 
article does not focus on the “demand” side of corporate and commercial litigation, but the expertise and autonomy 
of China’s judicial institutions when they are confronted with corporate law cases.  There continues to be a very 
healthy debate on just how litigation-adverse modern PRC urban and rural citizens are.  See Measuring Harmony, 
supra note 49, at D24 (citing a 2001 urban study performed by Ethan Michelson with support from the Ford 
Foundation on behalf of the Beijing Municipality and seven Beijing Districts, and a February 2002 study by the 
Sociology Department of Renmin University in six rural Counties and 30 Villages). 
366 See generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990); MAX WEBER, Self-government, Law and Capitalism, in THE 
RELIGION OF CHINA: CONFUCIANISM AND TAOISM 84-104 (Hans H. Gerth trans., 1964) (1922); Donald C. Clarke, 
Economic Development and the Rights Hypothesis: The China Problem, 14 AM. J. COMP. L. 459, 494 (2003) 
(addressing the PRC’s remarkable record of economic growth notwithstanding the absence of rule of law and clear 
and predictably-enforceable property and contract rights). 
2010] CORPORATE LAW IN THE SHANGHAI PEOPLE’S COURTS  419 
 
 
political independence in the application of one kind of law—all factors very important for 
economic growth.  Those developments, and expectation of future developments on the same 
trajectory, have provided some of the assurances necessary for growth-enhancing economic 
bargains and investment, including the establishment of China’s public equity capital markets.  
The critical question for China going forward is how long obvious non-application of law or 
failures to exercise judicial autonomy can continue before the purported market environment and 
investor expectations are so poisoned as to negatively affect growth and the efficient allocation 
of capital to its most productive uses, or cause generalized collapse. 
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CASE REPORTS APPENDIX 
 
1994 Company Law – Corporate Establishment Construed as a General Partnership by the 
People’s Courts 
 
Zhang Qingzhao v. Zhang Wenhu, 55:1 Renmin Fayuan Anli Xuan 234-41 (Shanghai Baoshan 
Dist. People’s Ct., 2002), (Shanghai No. 2 Interm. People’s Ct., 2004). 
 
Precis Summary of Case and Judgment: The legal facts of a formal corporate establishment and 
its funding are to be disregarded, and investors participating in the business association are to be 
seen as general partners, with distribution of return on investment, of investment, and post-
liquidation rights determined accordingly. 
 
Parties/Defined Terms:  Shanghai Hufeng Steel Structuring Company (“Hufeng Entity”), 
transformed into, and renamed as, Shanghai Baoxing Machinery Maintenance and 
Manufacturing Company (“Baoxing Company” or “Company”); Wang Zhaoming (“Plaintiff 
Wang”); Zhao Qingzhao (“Plaintiff Zhang”); Zhang Wenhu (“Defendant Zhang”); and Zhang 
Wenyao (“Defendant’s Brother”). 
 
Facts:  Baoxing Company was formed out of the Hufeng Entity.  The Hufeng Entity was 
approved and registered at the relevant Bureau of the State Administration of Industry and 
Commerce (“AIC”) on October 27, 1998, with its registered address at the Shanghai 
Municipality Baoshan District North Wenchuan Road Economic Development Zone.  It was 
registered as a “domestic equity joint venture limited liability company” (guonei hezi youxian 
zeren gongsi), with the two shareholders—Defendant Zhang and Defendant’s Brother—and a 
registered capital of RMB 500,000 yuan.  Defendant Zhang was to contribute RMB 300,000 
yuan, and Defendant’s Brother RMB 200,000 yuan, all in cash.  On March 25, 1999, the Hufeng 
Entity changed its named to “Shanghai Baoxing Machinery Maintenance and Manufacturing 
Company Limited.”  On April 29, 1999, Defendant Zhang entered into a “Shareholders’ 
Agreement” (gudong xieyi shu) with the two Plaintiffs, pursuant to which:  Defendant Zhang and 
the two Plaintiffs would promote the establishment of the Baoxing Company with investment of 
RMB 1,821,693 yuan; the three parties would “have the same equity, share profits and losses 
equally, and have equal management rights”; policy issues to be decided by a vote, with at least 
the vote of two of the three parties required for effectiveness.  This “Shareholders’ Agreement” 
was fixed with the seal of the Baoxing Company.  At the request of the two Plaintiffs, on 
September 28, 2003, the Shanghai Baoshan District People’s Court retained an accounting firm 
to audit the sources and actual capitalization of Baoxing Company, its operating condition to 
August 2002, expenditures, use of funds, revenues and profits, etc.  That accounting firm 
reported the following:  (i) the Baoxing Company accounts showed May 30, 1999 “other 
revenues” of RMB 100,000 yuan, “fixed assets” of RMB 400,000 yuan, and a notation 
describing “received capital” of RMB 500,000 yuan, but the firm could find no actual receipts or 
documentation showing the receipt or payment of this cash or value, and thus had no way to 
confirm the purported contributions by Defendant Zhang or Defendant’s Brother of cash or fixed 
assets into Baoxing Company; (ii) in May, 1999, Plaintiff Zhang contributed RMB 128,500 yuan 
to Baoxing Company for 24.83% of Baoxing Company’s received capital; Plaintiff Wang 
contributed RMB 200,000 yuan (made up, in part, by conversion of RMB 44,024 of receivables 
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due from Baoxing Company) for  47.15% of Baoxing Company’s received capital; and 
Defendant Zhang  contributed RMB 145,020 yuan for 28.02% of Baoxing Company’s received 
capital.  In the period to August 2002, Plaintiff Zhang had received from Baoxing Company 
RMB 66,410 yuan, Plaintiff Wang had received from Baoxing Company RMB 190,000 yuan and 
an additional RMB 30,000 yuan in employee compensation, and Defendant Zhang had taken out 
of Baoxing Company RMB 335,000 yuan; (iii) to August 2002, Baoxing Company’s cash on 
hand and undistributed profits amounted to RMB 706,728 yuan, which, with the deduction of 
depreciation and rent payables, left undistributed cash of RMB 643,248 yuan—it being noted by 
the accounting firm that prior to the submission of capital by the Plaintiffs, the Baoxing 
Company had shown no records of profit or loss; and (iv) no evidence that vehicles or any 
materials used by Defendant Zhang had ever been included on the Baoxing Company accounts 
as company assets.  The firm concluded its report by giving the accounts a fairly clean opinion, 
unable to identify any great variance or failure to record assets and liabilities.  Finally, as the 
court proceedings started, Defendant’s Brother asserted that he was merely a low-level person at 
Baoxing Company without any management involvement whatsoever, and in fact only knew 
about the “Shareholders’ Agreement” between his brother Defendant Zhang and the two 
Plaintiffs once the litigation was filed.  
 
Plaintiffs’ Allegations at Time of Suit:  The two Plaintiffs argue that when they signed the 
“Shareholders’ Agreement” with Defendant Zhang in April of 1999 it was an agreement to 
jointly capitalize and establish the Baoxing Company.  Under the Agreement, the three 
signatories were to have equal shares, and share the risk of profits and liabilities equally.  After 
the Agreement took effect, the three parties invested RMB 519,059.41, comprising Plaintiff 
Zhang’s RMB 130,000 yuan, Plaintiff Wang’s RMB 244,024 yuan, and Defendant Zhang’s 
RMB 145,034 yuan.  Baoxing Company was established on March 25, 1999.  Through the 
efforts of the three parties they exceeded initial expectations and did rather well, accumulating 
profits of RMB 706,728 yuan by August of 2002.  In addition, in the period between March 2000 
and the end of August 2002, Baoxing Company returned (fanhuan)367 RMB 665,000 yuan to the 
investors, with RMB 130,000 to Plaintiff Zhang, RMB 190,000 to Plaintiff Wang, and RMB 
335,000 to Defendant Zhang.  At the present time, the three parties have encountered 
disagreements about management of the Baoxing Company and Defendant Zhang has frozen the 
two Plaintiffs out of any management role in the company.  In light of this, the two Plaintiffs ask 
the People’s Court to issue an order confirming their rights as shareholders of Baoxing Company 
between April 1999 and August 2002; Plaintiff Wang sues for an order by the Court causing 
Defendant Zhang and Baoxing Company to return RMB 54,024.94 yuan of his investment; the 
two Plaintiffs ask for an order causing Defendant Zhang and Baoxing Company to distribute 
undistributed profits of RMB 471,152 yuan, and a separate order causing Defendant Zhang to 
return to Baoxing Company the RMB 335,000 yuan he improperly looted from the Company. 
 
Defendants’ Allegations at Time of Suit:  Defendant Zhang and the Baoxing Company assert that 
the three-party “Shareholders’ Agreement” never took effect and was never implemented.  The 
two Plaintiffs never contributed capital, and never participated in management of the company, 
and thus cannot be considered “shareholders” of Baoxing Company or be seen to have any right 
to the company’s profits or request dividend distributions.  Because the two Plaintiffs were never 
                                                 
367 The use of this term in Chinese shows the Plaintiffs think this is a “return of capital”, not a distribution 
of profits, or salary and wages, etc.  Obviously, this characterization needs to be settled by the People’s Courts. 
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shareholders of Baoxing Company, there is no issue of share transfer.  The relationship between 
the two Plaintiffs and Defendant Zhang is one of creditor-debtor, and Defendant Zhang has 
already returned to the two Plaintiffs all amounts borrowed from them.  Defendant’s Brother’s 
pleading is similar:  because Plaintiffs are not shareholders of Baoxing Company, there can be no 
talk of “dividends” or “stock redemption”.   
 
Shanghai District Court’s Judgment:  The No. 2 Civil Division of the Shanghai Baoshan District 
People’s Court ruled as follows on May 15, 2004:  The true nature of the “Shareholders’ 
Agreement” signed between the two Plaintiffs and Defendant Zhang was that of a contractual 
agreement allowing the parties to “borrow” the existing name of the Baoxing Company to 
undertake business activities.  Judging from the AIC’s records, and the results of the audit 
requested by the Plaintiffs and ordered by the People’s Court, the Baoxing Company was 
actually established before April 29, 1999 (in October 1998).  Thus, the three parties could not 
have had an intention to “establish” the Baoxing Company or become the “new” company’s 
shareholders.  Formally, Baoxing Company only had two shareholders, Defendant Zhang and 
Defendant’s Brother, neither of whom actually capitalized the Company.  This corporate form 
was managed and operated by Defendant Zhang, and only used the name of Defendant’s Brother 
who did not contribute capital or participate in Company management.  In fact, from the formal 
establishment of the Company to the date of signature of the “Shareholders’ Agreement”, or 
April 29, 1999, Baoxing Company had no real operations.  Defendant Zhang, as one of the 
promoters—and publicly-identified (registered) shareholders—of Baoxing Company, signed the 
“Shareholders’ Agreement” with the two Plaintiffs, which Agreement clearly stipulated that the 
three parties would jointly employ RMB 1,800,000 yuan to establish Baoxing Company, and that 
the enterprise would be managed by all three of the parties to the Agreement.  However, even 
with the agreement of each of the parties to make their respective capital contributions and 
jointly run the enterprise, no change of the registered capital (RMB 500,000 yuan) or the list of 
shareholders was made at the relevant AIC and thereby not notified to the public at large.  
Therefore, and in accordance with the principle of public notice (gongshi yuanze) the Company 
itself enjoyed a reduced limitation on its liability (as against the world) of only RMB 500,000 
yuan (i.e., as against the RMB 1.8 million yuan of initial capitalization called for under the post-
establishment “Shareholders’ Agreement”).  Thus, the Court pronounces, the April 29, 1999 
“Shareholders’ Agreement” in fact constitutes the borrowing of the name of the already-
established Baoxing Company to undertake a “partnership” (hehuo jingying)-form business 
enterprise.368  Thus, the two Plaintiffs may not simply by virtue of partial capitalization of and 
management rights over the business be deemed shareholders of the Company.  By the same 
token, Defendant’s Zhang’s claim that the relationship between the two Plaintiffs and Defendant 
Zhang is that of creditor-debtor cannot be sustained.  That is because the “Shareholders’ 
Agreement” clearly stipulates that the three parties are cooperating partners, and the reality is 
that all three signatories participated in active management and operation of the business.  With 
respect to Plaintiff Wang’s claim against Defendant Zhang and Baoxing Company for return of 
RMB 54,024 yuan of his investment, the Court states as fact that Plaintiff Wang has already been 
given RMB 30,000 yuan as employment compensation, but that Plaintiff Wang has offered no 
evidence to prove that this was Defendants’ obligation to provide.  Thus, the Court only supports 
a reasonable amount of “investment return” to Plaintiff Wang (after deduction for what he has 
                                                 
368  This idiom, hehuo is not used casually, and is the Chinese character set used for what we may think of 
as general partnerships and registered as such under the PRC Partnership Enterprise Law. 
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already received from the business).  With respect to the division and distribution of the profits 
earned by the Baoxing Company enterprise during the three-party cooperation period, when the 
partners can no longer work together then the commonly-derived profits should be subject to an 
accounting and distributed.  Here, even though the “Shareholders’ Agreement” calls for total 
investment in the business of RMB 1,821,693 yuan with each party contributing the same share, 
in fact not all of this investment was made, and not by each party equally.  Because the parties 
did not contract to share profits and losses in accordance with their capital investment, and 
because it is difficult to sort out the real joint contributions to the business during the cooperation 
period, the Court rules that notwithstanding the actual proportions of capital contributions made 
by the three parties, profits and losses should be shared by the parties pursuant to the principle 
stipulated in the Agreement that “the three parties will together share the risk and the profits”.  
Therefore, with confirmed retained profits of RMB 643,248 yuan, each is due a share of RMB 
214,416 yuan.  With respect to the obligor of these distributions, because the common 
investment was situated at Baoxing Company, then Baoxing Company has the obligation to 
make these distributions.  Defendant Zhang has a double obligation here, as both a “partner” 
(hehuoren) and the Legal Representative of Baoxing Company—he has a duty to keep custody 
over and manage the “partnership’s profits” (hehuo lirun) prior to their distribution to the 
investors.  Therefore, if there is any shortfall in the distributions of profit made to the two 
Plaintiffs in accordance with the foregoing, Defendant Zhang has a duty to make up any 
shortfall.  Finally, with respect to the Plaintiffs’ claim that Defendant Zhang has illegally taken 
out RMB 335,000 yuan of cash from the enterprise, that claim is rejected.  Defendant Zhang 
must be seen as one of the common operators (gongtong jingying ren zhi yi)369 of the enterprise 
who has a right to share in the profits thrown off by the business.  Thus, the amount taken out of 
the business by Defendant Zhang, although larger than his investment (and thus in excess of his 
return of investment) can also be seen to include his return on investment.  Accordingly, the 
Court dismisses the Plaintiffs’ claim that he has illegally looted the enterprise.   
 
Shanghai Intermediate People’s Court’s Judgment:  Neither Defendant Zhang nor Baoxing 
Company accepted the first judgment, and appealed.  In the appeal, the parties made additional 
or amended pleadings as follows.  Baoxing Company:  (i) the District People’s Court made 
procedural mistakes in accepting the audit report asked for by the Plaintiffs in establishing 
evidence in the case, and the accounts have been completely under the control of Plaintiffs since 
the start of the litigation, and manipulated by them; (ii) the District People’s Court’s judgment to 
the effect that the tripartite agreement constitutes a “partnership” is wrong—Baoxing Company 
was established before signature of the “Shareholders’ Agreement” and the Agreement was not 
actually implemented because the parties did not make their required capital contributions; 
therefore, from a funds flow and accounting payables point of view, the money actually 
contributed by the two Plaintiffs and Defendant Zhang is clearly part of a private lending 
arrangement between the cash providers and the Baoxing Company.  In the alternative, even if 
the tripartite Agreement does create a partnership in law, the partnership has been dissolved in 
law by virtue of the parties’ receipt of return of investment; the District People’s Court ignored 
the fact that the parties have effected a return of capital, and incorrectly confers on the Plaintiffs 
a right to share in the partnership’s post-dissolution residual profits.  Defendant Zhang:  Repeats 
the pleadings of Baoxing Company, and in addition asserts that he and the Company are 
                                                 
369 Note how the opinion, having the opportunity, does not now identify the individual as a “partner” 
(hehuoren) as previously. 
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independent civil legal subjects, and that as the Legal Representative of Baoxing Company he 
has no responsibility for the corporate liabilities of the company he acts as Legal Representative 
for (Baoxing Company).  Plaintiffs:  They assert that they have not manipulated the Company 
accounts offered as evidence, and that Defendant Zhang was allowed to review them prior to 
submission into evidence; in addition, the first Court’s view that the arrangement written up as 
equity investment in a limited liability company was actually an enforceable partnership 
arrangement is correct—the Agreement was only not implemented in part, not completely 
unimplemented; finally, because the Baoxing Company has been absolutely controlled by 
Defendant Zhang since inception, he should have personal responsibility to make up any 
shortfall in the Court-ordered distributions. 
 
In its judgment of September 24, 2004, the Second Civil Division of the Shanghai No. 2 
Intermediate People’s Court ruled as follows:  First, it dismissed the procedural attack on the 
District Court’s use of the audit firm’s review of the Baoxing Company accounts.  Second, it 
“praises and approves” the lower Court’s judgment that the three parties were in a “partnership 
relationship” (hehuo guanxi).  Even though the Agreement itself talks about “establishing 
Baoxing Company”, the Company was already established, and thus there was no possibility of 
the parties actually doing what the Agreement called for.  With their further investment 
associated with the existing legal person entity, it is clear that the three parties were only using 
Baoxing as a “framework” of reference, but were actually engaged in a partnership, and certainly 
not a creditor-debtor relationship.  With respect to the return of investment argument of Baoxing 
Company, the Intermediate People’s Court understands that partnership property can only be 
distributed upon the unanimous agreement of all partners, and the claim that after distribution of 
profits initial investment cannot be recovered if the partnership is dissolved by partner 
disagreement is unsustainable.  In sum, the partners continue to have equal rights to the 
distribution of all residual amounts “in” the partnership.  Third, the Baoxing Company is the 
entity which holds the residual assets of the partnership arrangement determined to have existed 
in law.  Even though the Baoxing Company and Defendant Zhang are indeed separate subjects of 
the civil law, he still has responsibility for seeing to the distribution of Plaintiff’s return or profits 
from Baoxing (i) as the actual controlling person of Baoxing (and the Legal Representative of 
the corporate legal person who could frustrate such action), and (ii) as a partner with a duty to his 
other “partners” (the Plaintiffs).  Thus, the Court rules, there is nothing untoward in making 
Defendant Zhang responsible for any shortfall in partnership distributions due to the Plaintiffs 
which have to be effected via the agency of the Baoxing Company.  Costs are to be split by 
Defendant Zhang and the Baoxing Company.  
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2006 Company Law, Article 22 – Shareholder’s Suit to Invalidate Board and Shareholders’ 
Resolutions 
 
Shanghai Yingdafang Service Company v. Shanghai Yingdafang Zhangjiang Service Company, 
2007 Nian Shanghai Fayuan Anli Jingxuan 190-95 (Shanghai Pudong New Dist. People’s Ct.), 
appeal filed Shanghai No.1 Interm. People’s Ct. (2007). 
 
Précis Summary of Case and Judgment:  Plaintiff legal person shareholder seeks to annul board 
and shareholders’ resolution of investee company under the control of two other shareholders 
who have apparently breached pre-company formation agreement to direct all business to 
investee company, and established a competing company (without participation of Plaintiff 
shareholder) to which all corporate opportunities due to investee company will be directed.  Both 
the Pudong District People’s Court and, on appeal, the Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate People’s 
Court agree that such resolutions should not be annulled because they are not contrary to law, 
and because they do not infringe upon the rights of the investee company or the Plaintiff 
shareholder.  Both People’s Courts also strive not to rule on the apparent shareholder’s – not 
directors’ or officers’ – breach of the duty of loyalty or the prohibitions against competition or 
taking a corporate opportunity.  
 
Parties/Defined Terms:  Shanghai Yingdafang Service Company (“Plaintiff”); Shanghai 
Zhangjiang (Group) Company (“Defendant Company A”); Shanghai Zhangjiang High 
Technology Park Development Co., Ltd. (“Defendant Company B”); Shanghai Yingdafang 
Zhangjiang Service Company (“Investee Company”); Shanghai Zhangjiang Investment 
Operations Company (“Defendant Companies’ Holding Company”); and Shanghai Zhangjiang 
Service and Facilities Management Company (“Competing Company Establishment”). 
 
Facts:  Plaintiff, Defendant Company A and Defendant Company B executed an agreement 
looking to the establishment of Investee Company, and in the agreement promised “in principle” 
that each of the investors would direct any business related to management or facilities work in 
Shanghai’s Zhangjiang High Technology Park to the Investee Company.  Thereafter, Investee 
Company was formally established, with each of Plaintiff, Defendant Company A and Defendant 
Company B as the shareholders.  (The opinion does not recite the respective equity ownership 
percentages of the three parties in the Investee Company, but as described below, Defendant 
Company A and Defendant Company B must hold 50% or more of the voting share interest.  
Similarly, the case report does not describe the size of the board of directors, but it is later made 
clear that Defendant Company A and Defendant Company B are able to direct the votes of at 
least three of the elected directors.)  However, after the establishment of Investee Company, 
Defendant Company A and Defendant Company B established Defendant Companies’ Holding 
Company, which then with Defendant Company B and a number of other outside investors 
established Competing Company Establishment.  On September 9, 2005, Investee Company 
issued a board resolution which, among other things, stated that all work in the Zhangjiang High 
Technology Park entrusted to Investee Company by Defendant Company A would be 
discontinued.  On the same day, Investee Company passed a shareholders’ resolution, supporting 
and confirming the board resolution.  At the time of these resolutions, the work entrusted to the 
Investee Company by Defendant Company A and Defendant Company B made up 75% of 
Investee Company’s business.  In accordance with the above-described board and shareholders’ 
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resolutions, when Defendant Company B’s then current contractual arrangements with Investee 
Company came to term, Defendant Company B took the entirety of such work and assigned it to 
Competing Company Establishment. 
 
Plaintiff’s Allegations at Time of Suit:  Plaintiff alleges that, without the participation of Plaintiff 
(as a shareholder in Investee Company) the resolutions procured as a result of the convening of a 
board meeting and a special shareholders’ meeting by Defendant Company A and Defendant 
Company B were (i) in contravention of Investee Company’s Articles of Association, and (ii) 
harmed the interests of both Investee Company and the Plaintiff.  The Plaintiff accordingly prays 
for the following relief:  (a) a judgment declaring that the subject board and shareholders’ 
resolutions are null and void; (b) an order commanding that Defendant Company A and 
Defendant Company B desist in their rights-infringing behavior, and a declaration that the 
transfer of business by Defendant Company A and Defendant Company B to Competing 
Company Establishment be without effect; and (c) court costs to be borne by the Defendant 
Companies. 
 
Investee Company (as Named Defendant) Allegations at Time of Suit:  The Investee Company, 
named as a defendant in the case, asserts (i) that the two resolutions were fully in compliance 
with the Company Law of the PRC and the Investee Company’s Articles of Association, and 
should be confirmed to have full force and effect; and (ii) the second request by the Plaintiff 
(item (b) immediately above) has nothing to do with Defendant Company. 
 
Defendant Company A and Defendant Company B’s Allegations at Time of Suit:  Defendant 
Company A and Defendant Company B assert (i) that they are both shareholders of Investee 
Company and thus have nothing to do with the Plaintiff’s first pleading (item (a) immediately 
above) and should not be named as defendants; and (ii) there has been no harm to the interests of 
any party.  
 
Shanghai Pudong District People’s Court Judgment:  The first court which considered the case 
understood two basic items in dispute:  (i) whether or not the two named resolutions are valid, 
and (ii) whether or not Defendant Companies A and B have infringed upon the rights of Plaintiff.  
On the first question, whether or not the resolutions are valid, the 2006 Company Law clearly 
provides a provision whereby shareholders can sue to have shareholders’ or board resolutions 
invalidated and declared without effect when either (a) the resolutions contravene law, regulation 
or the company’s Articles of Association, or (b) the calling of, or voting procedures at, a 
shareholders’ or board meeting is in violation of law, regulation, or the company’s Articles of 
Association.  On the first sub-inquiry, item (a) immediately above, the Pudong People’s Court 
expands its inquiry beyond that directed by the Company Law, seeking to rule on whether the 
substance of either resolution “contravenes Law, administrative regulation, or any agreement 
between the parties” (the last prong being something more than the agreement between the 
parties as reduced to the company Articles of Association).  As the Pudong District Court 
understands the situation, the three eventual shareholders of the Investee Company had executed 
an agreement which promised to direct all business “in principle” to the Investee Company.  
However, the People’s Court then asserts that, with the establishment of the Investee Company, 
that new legal person’s Articles of Association supersede and replace the terms of the apparently 
lesser pre-formation “agreement” between the shareholders, even though that agreement speaks 
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to the business that will be done by the future company.  Accordingly, in the Court’s view, there 
is no legal or factual basis for the Plaintiff’s assertion of a continuing duty of Defendant 
Companies A and B to direct business to the newly-established company.  The Court then strays 
farther from reasonable doctrinal application and analysis by invoking Article 21 of the 2006 
Company Law (prohibition against use of related party transactions to injure the interests of the 
company):  admitting that Defendant Companies A and B have engaged in such a related party 
transaction in establishing the Defendant Companies’ Holding Company and then using it to 
create the Competing Company Establishment, the Court then lets Defendant Companies A and 
B completely off the hook by saying they are “operators” (presumably as well as shareholders) 
and the pre-Investee Company establishment had already expired, or “in the project preparation 
stage and before project commencement, electing to use another project services provider, … 
does not constitute using related party transactions to harm the interest of the Investee 
Company.”370  On the second sub-inquiry, item (b) above, the alleged defects in the calling of, or 
voting at, the board or shareholders’ meeting, the court reviews the specific provisions of the 
Investee Company’s Articles of Association (including convening and chairmanship authority, 
required notice period, form of notice, addressees of notice, etc.) and rules that all such 
provisions were complied with in the calling of the two meetings.  The court further says that the 
Plaintiff’s failure to participate in the meetings, directly as a shareholder and via its 
representative on the board in the board meeting, constitutes a “waiver of its rights”.  On voting 
procedures, the Court again examines the Investee Company’s Articles of Association, and 
recites the fact that certain major decisions require the approval of all of the shareholders, with 
other matters requiring the approval only of shareholders holding more than 50% of the shares of 
the company.  Likewise, all board decisions require the support of three or more directors to 
pass.  The court rules that the subject of the shareholders resolution does not pertain to the 
“major matters” requiring unanimous shareholder approval.  As the shareholders’ meeting was 
attended by shareholders able to vote more than 50% of the shares, and as the directors’ 
resolution gained the approval of three directors, both resolutions are produced in compliance 
with the Investee Company’s Articles of Association and are not in contravention of law and 
thus should not be invalidated.371  Finally, on the second prong of the Plaintiff’s attack, whether 
or not Defendant Companies A and B have “infringed upon the rights” of Plaintiff, the Pudong 
District People’s Court piggybacks on its strangled view of the Defendant Companies A and B 
duties above, all in the context of board and shareholder resolutions which are procedurally and 
facially without defect, to rule that the redirection of business away from the Investee Company 
to another provider which does not include the Plaintiff as a shareholder is not an infringement of 
the Plaintiff’s rights.  Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s claims are rejected, and the burden of costs 
assigned to the Plaintiff. 
                                                 
370  2007 NIAN SHANGHAI FAYUAN ANLI JINGXUAN 192.   
371 Note that the Pudong District People’s Court does not seem to understand a separate quorum 
requirement, i.e., the requirement that either meeting be attended by shareholders voting a minimum number of 
shares or a minimum number of directors, as the case may be, before the meeting is established in law.  It is not 
clear from the opinions (i) what kind of company the Investee Company is (limited liability company or company 
limited by shares), and (ii) whether (a) the Articles of Association in this case had quorum requirements for the 
respective meetings and the meetings were established, or (b) the Articles of Association had no quorum 
requirements.  It should be noted here that the 2006 Company Law—consistent with its proclaimed “private 
ordering” emphasis—commands no quorum for limited liability company board or shareholder meetings, and no 
quorum for companies limited by shares shareholders’ meetings, but a quorum for companies limited by shares’ 
board meetings (“more than half of the directors”) (see 2006 Company Law, arts. 37-51, 99-108, 112 ). 
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Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court’s Judgment, on Appeal:  On appeal from the 
Plaintiff, the Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court takes the following view:  First, it 
agrees with the lower Court that the redirection of business away from the Investee Company to 
the Competing Company Establishment is important, but not one of the “major” matters 
requiring unanimous shareholder approval by all of the shareholders of the Investee Company, 
and not a matter that can be read into the language “and other matters” in the relevant article of 
the Articles of Association.  The higher Court also affirms the legality of one specific aspect of 
the board resolution not addressed in the lower Court’s opinion, that part of the directors’ 
resolution which fires the President of the Investee Company (no doubt, an officer nominated by 
the Plaintiff).  Stating that the board is responsible to the shareholders’ meeting, and that both the 
1994 Company Law and the Investee Company’s Articles of Association authorize the board of 
directors to hire and fire senior officers, the Intermediate People’s Court sees the board 
resolution which implements that power as perfectly legal.  Third, the higher Court affirms the 
lower Court’s view that the meeting convening and voting procedures are all in accordance with 
the PRC Company Law and the Articles of Association, and thus the resulting resolutions are not 
subject to attack.  Finally, the Intermediate People’s Court addresses the most provocative 
question decided on the Plaintiff’s pleadings—the extent to which the Defendant Companies A 
and B have “infringed upon the rights” of any other party.  And here, just as with the lower 
Court’s opinion, there is an extraordinary emphasis on the almost exclusive power of the 
Investee Company’s Articles of Association, as a summary of the rights and duties of the 
participants in the Investee Company.  Saying that the pre-formation agreement is expired by 
virtue of the subsequent Investee Company establishment and agreement of the Articles of 
Association, and that the new all-governing Articles of Association contain no provisions either 
affirmatively directing business to the Investee Company or restricting shareholders or their 
agents from independently pursuing opportunities within the Investee Company’s expectation, 
the Court dismisses the Plaintiff’s broadest pleading.  The Intermediate People’s Court, in a 
parting shot, does at last invoke the pre-2006 Company Law (which it should be remembered did 
not have a statement of broad fiduciary duties for directors, officers or controlling shareholders) 
and its prohibition against directors and senior officers of a company engaging in competing 
business, but only to subject that clause to the strictest reading possible and happily pronounce 
that it is binding on “directors and officers” only, not shareholders like Defendant Companies A 
and B. 
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2006 Company Law, Article 183 – Shareholders’ Suit for Dissolution 
 
Tang Chunxiao v. Zhou Huizhong, 2007 Nian Shanghai Fayuan Anli Jingxuan 138-44 (Shanghai 
No.1 Interm. People’s Ct., 2006). 
 
Précis Summary of Case and Judgment:  Plaintiff shareholder seeks judicial dissolution of a 
company (formed before 2006) under Article 183 of the 2006 Company Law, while defendant 
shareholder (and subject company) resists and alleges suit for dissolution is with malevolent 
intent and in addition that the difficulties at the subject company do not conform to the high legal 
standard for judicial dissolution.  The Shanghai Intermediate People’s Court dismisses the suit, 
with costs to Plaintiff, because Plaintiff has failed to offer sufficient evidence supporting his 
claim for relief under Article 183, i.e., he has failed to prove that the only remedy for the parties 
is court-ordered dissolution.  The Court does not respond to or rule upon any of the clear 
breaches of fiduciary duties by the Plaintiff, even though the Defendant responsively pleads 
multiple violations of the duty of loyalty by the Plaintiff. 
 
Parties/Defined Terms:  Tang Chunxiao (“Plaintiff”); Zhou Huizhong (“Defendant”); Fukang 
Century Real Estate Development Co. Ltd. (“Project Company”); Dongxing Real Estate 
Development Co. Ltd.  (“Partner Company”); proposed Shanghai corporate buyer of Project 
Company (“Strategic Investor”). 
 
Plaintiff’s Allegations at The Time of Suit:  The Project Company was established on February 
18, 2004 with a declared registered capital of RMB 10 million yuan, and 60% of the equity held 
by the Defendant and 40% by the Plaintiff.  The Project Company was originally promoted to 
undertake a real estate development project in Zhejiang Province.  By April of 2004, the Project 
Company had entered into an agreement with the Partner Company to develop a commercial 
residential housing project in Zhejiang Province, whereby the Partner Company would contribute 
the land use rights for the land to be developed, and the Project Company would contribute all 
funds needed for construction.  However, because the Project Company was not able to 
contribute the full amount of the construction funds, the actual construction was stopped; the 
construction contractor sued the Partner Company for the unpaid construction cost in a Zhejiang 
Province People’s Court proceeding and won, with the Zhejiang Province Court ordering the 
Partner Company to pay the unpaid amounts to the construction contractor.  The Partner 
Company then brought a second suit in the Zhejiang Huzhou Municipal Intermediate People’s 
Court asking for the termination of its arrangement with the Project Company, which suit is still 
sub judice at the time of the present Project Company dissolution case.  Because the Plaintiff is 
at the same time a shareholder and a Supervisory Board member of the Project Company, and a 
shareholder and the Legal Representative of the Partner Company, the dispute between the 
Project Company and the Partner Company has only intensified the bad blood between the 
Plaintiff and the Defendant.  At the time of the Plaintiff’s suit for dissolution, the Project 
Company is experiencing the following difficulties:  (i) the Project Company is not yet fully 
capitalized, because—in breach of the Project Company’s Articles of Association requiring a 
capital contribution by the Defendant of RMB 6 million yuan—Defendant has contributed just 
RMB 3.34 million yuan; (ii) Defendant has engaged in the following “rights infringing” 
behavior:  (a) in February of 2005, the Defendant forged the Plaintiff’s signature to create a false 
shareholders’ resolution and amendment to the Project Company Articles of Association 
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extending the Project Company’s term of operation to 2015, and in June of 2005 used the same 
procedure to sell a 51% equity interest in the Project Company to a third party, Shanghai-based 
Strategic Investor; (b) on May 15, 2005, without calling a Project Company shareholders’ 
meeting, the Defendant had himself appointed both a director and President of the Project 
Company; (iii) the Project Company has not been able to call a shareholders’ meeting, even 
though the Plaintiff has on several occasions asked in writing that the shareholders’ meeting be 
convened; and (iv) relations between the parties have worsened, because of the project 
development related litigation in Zhejiang Province related above.  Accordingly, the Plaintiff 
brings the present action in the Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court seeking dissolution 
of the Project Company under Article 183 of the 2006 Company Law, with court costs to the 
Defendant. 
   
Defendant’s Allegations at The Time of Suit (Joined by the Project Company):  (i) The suit by 
the Plaintiff to dissolve the Project Company is brought with malevolent intent.  The Plaintiff, as 
both a director and Vice-President of the Project Company, and with full power to represent the 
Project Company in its dealings with the Partner Company in regards of the real estate 
development in Zhejiang Province, has used his position to, after the Project Company has 
already agreed to acquire the Partner Company, and without the Project Company shareholders’ 
approval, personally acquire control of the Partner Company and thereby illegally taken a 
corporate opportunity that belongs to the Project Company and therefore seriously violated his 
duties of loyalty and prohibition against competition.  At the same time, the Project Company 
has its own autonomous development rights and profit expectations arising from the 
development agreement with the Partner Company.  Thus, the Plaintiff’s suit to dissolve the 
Project Company is motivated by his desire to squeeze the Project Company out of the real estate 
development project, and have the Partner Company—which Plaintiff now controls—take all 
profits arising from the real estate project as it is further developed on the base established by the 
Project Company.  (ii) The Plaintiff has primary responsibility for the difficulties now existing at 
the Project Company.  The Project Company’s major difficulties are a result of its lack of funds.  
There are many ways to solve this problem, and yet the Plaintiff, to further its squeeze-out 
scheme detailed above, has continually blocked the Project Company and the Defendant in their 
efforts, including:  (a) frustrated the refund by the Huzhou People’s Government of a part of the 
land use rights grant fee (RMB 1.1 million yuan) which has aggravated the shortage of funds; (b) 
blocked the effort to get a strategic investor—in June of 2005 the Defendant arranged a share 
transfer agreement with the Strategic Investor for a registered capital investment in the Project 
Company of RMB 5.1 million yuan, however the Plaintiff blocked the deal causing it to collapse.  
(iii) The operational situation at the Project Company has not reached the standard required 
under the 2006 Company Law for dissolution:  (a) the main difficulties experienced at the 
Project Company and leading to a work shut-down are liquidity problems which occur at any 
enterprise and are solved in various ways; (b) the shareholders have no basic disagreement over 
the operations of the Project Company and are both willing to pursue the real estate development 
activity under the above-mentioned agreement (when the shareholders convened a meeting under 
the auspices of the development site’s village head, they agreed to continue the development in 
accordance with the original agreement); and on April 26, 2006, when the Partner Company 
brought suit against the Project Company, with the Plaintiff serving as Legal Representative of 
the Partner Company, the latter again made clear that it wanted to continue to abide by and 
perform the development agreement; (c) there are many other ways to solve the operational 
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difficulties encountered by the Project Company, which at the very least include:  first, the 
shareholders can invest additional capital in the Project Company (the registered capital of the 
Project Company is RMB 100 million yuan, with RMB 74,151,180 yuan already contributed, so 
the shareholders can contribute additional capital to the Project Company in accordance with the 
Company’s Articles of Association); second, the Project Company can introduce a strategic 
investor; third, the Project Company can in accordance with the law seek to enforce its creditor’s 
rights (at the present time, the Project Company is a creditor to the development site People’s 
Government in the amount of RMB 1.1 million yuan (the refund of the land use rights grant fee) 
and creditor to another Shanghai company unrelated to the lawsuit(s) in the amount of RMB 
119,165 yuan—if the Project Company could collect on those outstanding balances it might go 
some way to solving its liquidity difficulties); fourth, the Plaintiff can sell his equity in the 
Project Company, and exit from a difficult situation, replacing himself with another shareholder 
who is interested in pursuing the development; (d) the dissolution of the Project Company would 
harm the legal rights of both the Project Company and its shareholders, as follows:  to November 
21, 2005, the Project Company has already invested RMB 7.29 million yuan in the development 
project, and owns the exclusive development rights to the property; according to the financial 
projections for the project, it will produce a return (profit) to the Project Company of RMB 5.71 
million yuan; if the Project Company is dissolved, then the exclusive development rights and the 
projected returns on the project will go only to the Partner Company, which the Plaintiff controls 
as its Legal Representative, with no return at all for the Project Company.  Because the 
Plaintiff’s suit is brought with malevolent intent, and because the difficulties experienced at the 
Project Company do not rise to the legal standard for judicial dissolution of the Project 
Company, the Defendant asks that the Plaintiff’s suit be dismissed. 
 
Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court Findings of Fact:  The Court finds that much of the 
factual pleadings are accurate, with the following additional details or confirmations:  On April 
18, 2004, the Project Company and the Partner Company executed a “Joint Project Development 
Agreement” pursuant to which the Partner Company would contribute land use rights with a 
value of RMB 2.92 million yuan into the real estate development, and the Project Company 
would bear all other costs for the same project.  On April 19, 2004, the two Companies executed 
a “Supplemental Agreement” giving full control over the project to the Project Company, but 
guaranteeing the return to the Partner Company of the invested value of the land use rights 
contribution (RMB 2.92 million yuan), and further agreeing that after the return of the capital 
contribution (represented by the land use rights) to the Partner Company, the Project Company 
would have the sole and exclusive right to operate the real estate project and receive all revenues 
thrown off by it (and would be responsible for all further costs and liabilities in connection with 
the project and its operation).  On October 31 of the same year, the Project Company entered into 
a “Land and Corporation Transfer Agreement” with the Partner Company, pursuant to which the 
Project Company was to acquire the Partner Company.  However, a month later, on November 
26 , 2004, the Plaintiff (still a shareholder and supervisory board member of the Project 
Company) and Zhao Guogang entered into an agreement with the shareholders of the Project 
Company, pursuant to which, for an aggregate purchase price of RMB 10 million yuan, the 
Plaintiff would gain a 52% interest in the Partner Company, and Mr. Zhao Guogang the 
remaining 48%.  This latter transaction was completed, whereby the Plaintiff became the 
controlling shareholder and Legal Representative of the Partner Company.  After January 17, 
2005, the Project Company attempted to convene shareholders’ meetings numerous times, but on 
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each occasion was unable to produce shareholders’ resolutions.  To April 20, 2005, the real 
estate project has been stopped and is sealed, yet foundation construction and first floor 
construction have been completed, with only partial completion of the exterior areas of the 
second floor.  As agreed by the contesting parties, the Project Company has already invested 
approximately RMB 3 million yuan in the real estate construction.  Finally, the Shanghai 
People’s Court confirms that on April 26, 2006, the Partner Company sued the Project Company 
in the Zhejiang Province Huzhou Intermediate People’s Court asking that the Project Company 
pay outstanding construction fees and stoppage penalties in the amount of RMB 6.4 million 
yuan, and that the Project Company continue to perform the two development agreements. 
 
Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court’s Judgment:  In its judgment the Court understands 
the case to be limited to the question of whether or not the application for judicial dissolution 
meets the standards for the same under the Company Law.  While acknowledging that the 
Plaintiff has the requisite 10% minimum equity interest to plead dissolution, and that the Project 
Company has not been able to function (or produce a shareholders’ resolution) for more than a 
year, the Court rules that—at the time of suit—the evidence offered by the Plaintiff (who the 
Court says has the burden of proof) is not sufficient to prove that if the Project Company 
continues it will result in significant injury to the shareholders, or that the difficulties 
experienced at the Company have reached such a point that only dissolution will solve the 
problem (hinting strongly that the parties should be able to negotiate a buy-out to bring about the 
exit of one of the two contesting shareholders).  Accordingly, the case is dismissed, with costs 
(of RMB 60,010 yuan) to be borne by the Plaintiff.372   
                                                 
372 Interesting are the Court’s rationales supporting its dismissal of the case, offered as a kind of dicta.  
First, the Court is loathe to order the dissolution of a corporate legal person because it would “necessarily impact in 
different degrees market order and stability.”  This legal policy aim may be contrasted with what might be termed an 
economist’s focus on the situation, or the encouragement of re-deployment of capital when shareholder relations 
become so difficult as to stop a project before completion and revenue earning.  Second, the Court understands that 
any dissolution uses up judicial resources (tantamount to a bankruptcy), and negatively impacts both shareholders 
and third parties (including creditors).  Third, and as a kind of window into an equity approach to the problem, the 
Court says it must consider the “appropriateness” (zhengdangxing) and “rationality” (helixing) of such a significant 
step as judicial dissolution.  This orientation allows the court to take judicial notice in effect of the Plaintiff’s rather 
“unclean hands”, and thus support its technical dismissal of the case based on the failure to meet the statutory 
standard. 
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2006 Company Law – Shareholders’ Lawsuit to Invalidate Shareholders’ Resolution (Election of 
Director) for Failure to Disclose or Incomplete Disclosure 
 
Lu Jianming v. Shanghai Light Industry Machinery Co., Ltd., Zhongguo Zuijin Xin Gongsifa—
Dianxing Anli Pingxi 189-94 (Shanghai Jingan Dist. People’s Ct.), (Shanghai No. 2 Interm. 
People’s Ct., 2006). 
 
Précis Summary of Case and Judgment:  Plaintiff’s suit for invalidation of a resolution electing 
directors is dismissed because the defect in the subject resolution was not one provided for in the 
Company Law provision as the basis for invalidation of board and shareholders’ resolutions. 
 
Parties/Defined Terms:  Lu Jianming (“Plaintiff”); Shanghai Light Industry Machinery 
Company, Limited (“Defendant Company”); and Shanghai Hong Chang Shen Group Company 
(“Controlling Shareholder”). 
 
Plaintiff’s Allegations at Time of Suit:  In the Defendant Company’s 2003 annual report, it was 
disclosed that Defendant Company’s board candidate Ms. Shi was employed at the Controlling 
Shareholder (under a prior name, “Shanghai Erdi Group Company Limited”).  On August 2, 
2008, the Controlling Shareholder changed its registered name to its present name.  [In the 
materials distributed concerning the election of directors, the] Defendant Company did not 
disclose that Ms. Shi had worked at the Controlling Shareholder, the purpose being to hide the 
fact that it controls the Defendant Company via personnel appointments.   
 
Defendant Company’s Allegations at Time of Suit:  The complete disclosure of the background 
and employment history of board nominees in materials distributed is not required by any of the 
procedures relevant for the convening of board meetings, voting, or by corporate law.  Moreover, 
the Defendant Company’s Articles of Association do not require the disclosure of whether or not 
there is any relationship between any board nominee and any actual control persons.  Even if the 
Defendant Company did not fully disclose materials on the board nominee, that is not reason for 
the resulting board resolutions to be invalidated.  There are at present no stipulations in law or 
administrative regulation concerning informational disclosure on board nominees, and thus there 
is no basis to the Plaintiff’s claim that the Defendant Company’s failure to make disclosure on a 
board nominee’s background is illegal or contrary to regulation.   
 
Facts Determined by The Court of First Instance:  The Shanghai Jingan District People’s Court 
determined the following:  From February 16, 2005 to the time of suit in 2006, the Plaintiff 
owned 100 shares of the Defendant Company.  On March 19, 2004, the Shanghai Securities 
Daily carried the Defendant Company’s 2003 Annual Report summary.  Under the heading 
“Changes in Shareholdings of Directors, Supervisory Board Members and Senior Management”, 
it stated “Ms. Shi is a director of the [Defendant] Company from April 29, 2003 to April 28, 
2006”; in a separate column describing the employment of board and supervisory board 
members, it stated “From October 2001 to the present, Ms. Shi has been employed at Shanghai 
Erdi Group Limited.”  On March 25, 2006, the Shanghai Securities Daily carried the Defendant 
Company’s 2005 Annual Report summary, and board resolutions passed by the 13th meeting of 
the Defendant Company’s 4th Board, and announcement for convening of the 15th General 
Shareholders’ Meeting.  Resolution No. 9 contained in that announcement stated simply that Ms. 
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Shi be nominated as a director for the Defendant Company’s 5th Board.  The same announcement 
contained background information on the board nominees, and in the materials on Ms. Shi her 
employment at Shanghai Erdi Group Limited was not raised.  Finally, in the Defendant 
Company’s 2005 Annual Report publicly posted on the Shanghai Stock Exchange website in 
March 2006, it stated that between April 2003 and March 2004 Ms. Shi worked at Shanghai Erdi 
Group Limited and that from April 2004 to that date Ms. Shi had been the Defendant Company’s 
Deputy General Manager (Vice President) and a board director.  
 
Judgment of the Shanghai Jingan District People’s Court:  First, the Court holds that under the 
2006 Company Law shareholders may bring an action in the People’s Courts for invalidation of 
board resolutions in cases where a board meeting has been improperly convened, the method of 
voting violates law, administrative regulation or the company’s Articles of Association, or the 
content of the challenged resolution violates the company’s Articles.  Thus, in trying to 
determine whether or not a board resolution is to be invalidated, the only standard that will be 
applied is whether or not the resolution violates law or administrative regulation.  “The Guiding 
Articles of Association for Listed Companies”373 promulgated by the CSRC are departmental 
regulation (bumen guizhang) [i.e., forms or regulations issued by Ministry-level state 
administrative organs] and thus do not come within the scope of “law” or “administrative 
regulation”.  Second, the Defendant Company’s Articles of Association stipulate only that the 
board of directors should send information on a board nominee’s career and basic situation to 
shareholders, with no clear stipulation requiring information on any relationship between an 
actual control party and the board nominee.  Accordingly, the claim that, even though the 
Defendant Company made public notification of Ms. Shi’s career history, because it did not 
allude to her service at the Controlling Shareholder the resolution passed by the 13th Meeting of 
the 4th Board of Directors is “in violation of the Articles of Association” goes too far.  Third, 
listed companies are not limited to newspapers in making information disclosure.  In “today’s 
information society”, shareholders can also go online to research information on a listed 
company.  Even though the Defendant Company did not make complete disclosure of Ms. Shi’s 
career background in its Annual Report carried in “Shanghai Securities Daily”, and left out 
mention of her past service at the Controlling Shareholder, the same (full) Annual Report with 
complete disclosure about Ms. Shi’s past was already filed with the Shanghai Stock Exchange, 
and could be easily accessed by any member of the public via the Internet.  Finally, the claim by 
the Plaintiff that the Defendant Company purposefully and with bad intent concealed Ms. Shi’s 
past service with the Controlling Shareholder is not supported by the facts and will not be 
entertained.  Thus, the March 2006 board meeting was convened in accordance with valid 
procedure, the voting was in conformity with law and regulation, and the content of the 
resolutions did not conflict with the company’s Articles of Association—and thus the claims of 
the Plaintiff cannot be supported.  
  
The Plaintiff did not accept the judgment of the District People’s Court, and appeals: 
                                                 
373 Note:  this is the form of “mandatory” Articles of Association required of all domestically-listing 
companies domiciled in China (there are separate Mandatory Articles of Association for Overseas-Listing Issuers).  
The Court’s point here is that—as a form—the stipulations in these Articles are not themselves law or regulation, 
they are merely a template of provisions which should be adopted by listing companies, which the CSRC enforces 
by forbidding listings if a company undertaking an IPO does not have conforming Articles.  It would seem in this 
case that, at the time of the challenged board resolution, the Articles of Association had not been changed to 
conform with the updated (post-2006 Company Law) version of such Guiding Articles of Association.  
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Plaintiff’s Claims on Appeal:  The District People’s Court was wrong to look to the Internet for 
evidence in the case, and use evidence so procured as dispositive, and this was a violation of 
China’s civil procedure law.  The “Guiding Articles of Association” are administrative 
regulations (xingzheng fagui) and should be employed in the case.  The Articles of Association 
put into evidence by the Defendant Company were the Company’s 2004 version; in accordance 
with a Notice accompanying the amended form of Guiding Articles of Association promulgated 
by the CSRC in 2006 to conform with the new 2006 Company Law, all listed companies were 
obligated to amend their Articles of Association at the next shareholders’ general meeting to 
bring them into line with new Guiding Articles of Association; therefore, the Articles of 
Association offered up by the Defendant Company were invalid and without effect.  Finally, the 
original judgment neglected to discover that Ms. Shi and the Legal Representative of the 
Defendant Company are husband and wife, which is important because any resolution 
nominating her for the board might impact upon the Legal Representative’s personal interest.   
 
Defendant Company’s Response on Appeal:  The Articles of Association offered into evidence 
were the 2005 version, with “2004” written on them by mistake.  The CSRC Notice referred to 
by the Plaintiff was promulgated on March 16, 2006, and so when the Defendant Company 
sought to convene the 13th Session of the 4th Board only a week later, it had not had time to 
revise the Articles of Association in accordance with the new CSRC template.  Accordingly, that 
board meeting used the 2005 version Articles of Association.  The Defendant Company’s [2005 
version] Articles of Association and its 2006 Annual Report were all filed for the record [and 
posted] on the Shanghai Exchange’s “official” (guanfang) website.  They are in conformity with 
law, and in full force and effect.  With respect to Ms. Shi’s former service at the Controlling 
Shareholder, this was already disclosed in the Defendant Company’s 2003 and 2005 public 
Annual Reports.  Thus, there has been no purposeful concealment of information.  The personal 
relationship between Ms. Shi and the Legal Representative of the Defendant Company is not 
something that is subject to mandatory disclosure, nor is it a fact which has any impact on Ms. 
Shi becoming a board nominee.  Therefore, the subject board resolution is in conformity with the 
law, and effective. 
 
Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court Judgment:  In accordance with China’s laws and 
regulations, the decision on whether or not a company’s board resolution may be invalidated 
turns on law, administrative regulation and the Articles of Association.  The Guiding Articles of 
Association do not come within the scope of law or administrative regulation.  The failure to 
disclose Ms. Shi’s past work history with the Controlling Shareholder or her relationship with 
the Defendant Company’s Legal Representative at the 13th Session of the 4th Board in the 
proposed resolution is not a violation of law, administrative regulation, or the Defendant 
Company’s Articles of Association, and the resolution is therefore effective as passed.  Nor was 
there any purposeful concealment of Ms. Shi’s history because it was fully disclosed in the 2003 
and 2005 Annual Reports filed with the Shanghai Exchange and published in the “Shanghai 
Securities Daily” and on the Exchange website.  The invocation of evidence sourced from the 
Internet, after confirmation from the Exchange, is appropriate and not contrary to law.  The 
Plaintiff’s invocation of the CSRC Notice calling for the amendment of the Defendant 
Company’s Articles of Association to conform with the new Guiding Articles of Association is 
irrelevant, because the subject board meeting was held before the next succeeding shareholders’ 
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general meeting, and thus a board resolution based on the 2005 Articles of Association is correct 
and legal.  The relationship between Ms. Shi and the Defendant Company is of no relevance to 
the case, and the failure of the District People’s Court to discover it and confirm it does not 
constitute a defect in the case (or justify overturning the lower Court’s judgment). 
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